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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines Native-newcomer relations during the “integrationist” era in 
Canadian Indian affairs: the two and a half decades after World War Two during which 
the federal government introduced policies designed to integrate Indians into mainstream 
Canadian social, political, economic, and administrative life.  Particular focus is given to 
developments in British Columbia, where some of the most concerted steps towards 
integration took place.  Growing public and political demands for institutional 
desegregation and the granting of rights of citizenry to Aboriginal people recast Indian 
affairs into a matter of unprecedented intergovernmental importance. 
 Shifting between micro- and macro-historical perspectives, the following chapters 
consist of a series of comparative policy case studies.  Individually, they examine the 
development, implementation, and effects of the four main areas of federal Indian 
integrationist planning after WWII: health, education, economic development, and 
welfare.  Collectively, chapters demonstrate how integration was a mission essentially 
administrative in orientation: every policy undertaken in this period, whether directly or 
indirectly, sought to implicate the province and other federal line departments in Indian 
affairs.  Not all attempts at “administrative integration,” however, were successful.  
While BC and the federal government reached joint agreements in the fields of education 
and health, other areas such as Indian economic development and welfare proved to be a 
source of significant intergovernmental conflict and impasse. 
 
ii 
Aboriginal people were important participants when it came to integrated health, 
education, and social welfare.  Incorporating ethnohistorical insights and Aboriginal 
perspectives throughout, this dissertation documents how Aboriginal agency in this 
period—expressed in a range of innovative actions and words—included important 
combinatory aspects of compliance, resistance, and accommodation.  Many individuals, 
for instance, demanded access to provincial services as within their rights as Aboriginal 
people and provincial voting and taxpaying citizens.  While post-war integrationist 
policies varied widely in terms of their local perception and impact, Indian assimilation 
remained an elusive goal throughout this period.  Advances in provincial devolution of 
Indian administration rarely resulted in the type of social and economic integration 
envisioned by federal officials. 
This study looks beyond unitary conceptions of “the state” towards questions of 
power and local agency.   It engages Foucauldian and Weberian theories to show how a 
combination of intergovernmental politics, intrastate variables, and Aboriginal agency 
refashioned Native-newcomer relations in this period.  Post-WWII administrative 
contexts served as theatres for the contestation of old, and formulation of new, power 
relationships.  Developments in this era were to have a significant influence on Native-
newcomer relations moving into the modern era. 
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 Statement on Nomenclature 
 
Several terms are used in this study to describe the original and descended inhabitants of 
the area known as North America.  The term “Indian” is used throughout this dissertation 
in specific reference to those people historically defined as such under the Indian Act.  
Since “Indians” are subject to historically-changing notions of eligibility, “Aboriginal,” 
“Native,” and “First Nation” are used in more general reference to those with indigenous 
ancestry or identity.  This includes people having lost Indian status via Indian Act 
enfranchisement provisions as well as those living off-reserve no longer eligible for 
federal administrative services.  This dissertation attempts to use specific tribal or 
linguistic designations such as Haida or Kwakwaka’wakw whenever such information is 
known.  The terms “non-Aboriginal,” “non-Native,” and “Canadian” are used 
interchangeably to describe the descendants of those who began settling in North 
America following the sixteenth century. 
vi 
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 Chapter 1 
 
“Introduction: Integration and Indian Affairs after 1945.” 
 
 
“I think it will be a clash between the political will and the administrative won’t.” 
—Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, Yes Minister.1 
 
 
Just months before the release of the now infamous 1969 federal Liberals’ White Paper 
policy statement on Indian affairs, British Columbia Premier W.A.C. Bennett made 
newspaper headlines when he pledged a “Take over of Indian Affairs.”  Bennett vowed to 
create a provincial Indian affairs department, reportedly stating that, “if Ottawa will 
agree, we will set up a provincial department of Indian affairs and all services available to 
our native Indians, plus special benefits which must go to our native people forever 
because this was their land.”  Also promising to investigate allegations of government 
discrimination against Indians in the province, Bennett explained: 
If the Indian citizens of our province ask for it and are willing to keep their 
lands in perpetuity so that no person can take them away, and will set up 
municipal governments in these areas which they will own forever—and 
they must own them forever—then this government is willing to take over 
all matters relating to Indians in the province.2 
 
The pledge stood in stark contrast to BC’s century-long prior position of denying the 
existence of aboriginal rights and title in BC.  Here was the province agreeing in principle 
to special Aboriginal rights and provincial oversight of Indian affairs! 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, Yes Minister, Vol. 2. In Elizabeth Knowles, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 480. 
 
2 Vancouver Sun, 12 March 1969, “Takeover of Indian Care Pledged by Bennett,” 18; Victoria Daily 
Times, 12 March 1969, “Bennett Wants Indian Affairs,” 14; Vancouver Sun, 24 March 1969, “BC Indian 
Affairs Branch Pledged by Bennett Denied,” 31. 
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 The story gained a quick and loud reaction in Victoria’s political circles.  
Opposition New Democratic Party leader Robert Strachan condemned the promise as an 
empty Social Credit platitude and blasted Bennett for “playing cheap politics with the 
native Indians of this province.”3  Vancouver Sun reporters quoted Indian spokesmen as 
thinking no better of Bennett’s plan.  Philip Paul, president of BC’s Southern Vancouver 
Island Tribal Federation, derided Bennett’s pledge as “an empty gesture,” adding that 
“We’ve had no indication in the past that the provincial government is ready to accept us. 
… They don’t ask our opinion and they treat us like children.”4  Forest Walkem of the 
Cook’s Ferry band further added that “It was wrong of Premier Bennett to say he was 
going to set up an Indian branch without consulting us about it.”5 Within weeks, the 
government reversed its stance and backed off the promise, even denying its utterance.  
BC’s Minister of Municipal Affairs and Social Welfare, Dan Campbell, explained before 
a convention of the North American Indian Brotherhood: “The premier has no intention 
of establishing an Indian branch in BC.  What he said was, ‘I don’t personally believe in 
the existence of the Indian affairs department but there is a place for (Indian) advisory 
apparatus attached to the department of municipal affairs.’”6  Soon, the pledge was 
recognized as another of Bennett’s radical impromptu policy announcements, something 
                                                 
3 Ibid.  Ironically, one-year earlier Strachan urged Bennett to lobby the federal government for 
constitutional change allowing BC to take over Indian affairs.  See Vancouver Sun, 6 December 1968, 
“NDP Urges BC Bid to Change Laws,” 22. 
 
4 Vancouver Sun, 12 March 1969, “Indian Head Raps Bennett's Offer,” 2. 
 
5 Vancouver Sun, 24 March 1969, “BC Indian Affairs Branch Pledged by Bennett Denied,” 31. 
 
6 Ibid. 
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 for which he was renowned.7  Subsequent events in the summer of 1969, notably the 
release of the White Paper, soon overshadowed the memory of Bennett’s vow to wrest 
administrative control of Indians from the federal government.  The creation of a 
provincial office dedicated solely to Aboriginal matters would wait another nineteen 
years.8 
Although long-forgotten, Bennett’s pledge was not an anomalous utterance.  
Called many things, devolutionary attempts to “phase,” or “integrate” Indians into 
provincial services had been taking place for years in areas such as health and education, 
and with considerable success.  Some provinces, particularly BC and Ontario, appeared 
willing to accept Indians into public institutions on similar terms as non-Indians.  With 
Indians entering provincial schools and hospitals in record numbers, BC deserved to be 
called the nation’s leader in desegregation and provincial devolution in the decades after 
WWII.9  Not all prior efforts to offload responsibility for Indian administration, however, 
were successful, and, in many regards, Bennett’s pledge was the latest installment in a 
series of intergovernmental debates two decades in development.  Indeed, as the pledge 
and its subsequent withdrawal suggest, the province in 1969 remained ambiguous as to 
                                                 
7 One year later, Bennett suggested to a federal-provincial audience that Canada’s provinces be redrawn 
into five regions.  David J. Mitchell, W.A.C. Bennett and the Rise of British Columbia (Vancouver: Douglas 
& McIntyre, 1983), 393-94. 
 
8 The Ministry of Native Affairs was established in 1988 by the Bill Vander Zalm Social Credit 
government. 
 
9 See Victoria Daily Colonist, 25 January 1953, “B.C. Called Leader in Indian Progress,” 11; Victoria Daily 
Colonist, 23 March 1950, “BC Moves Forward in Indian Affairs,” 3; Victoria Daily Colonist, 4 April 1954, 
“BC Sets Pattern for Indians,” 25.  In 1953, T.R. Kelly applauded granting of the franchise, steps towards 
educational integration, and creation of the Indian Advisory Act, calling BC, “one of the most progressive 
provinces in Canada in Indian affairs.” Vancouver Sun, 26 January 1953, “Legislation for Indians Wins 
Praise,” 32. 
10 
 whether it should assume complete control when it came to Indians, provided the federal 
government be willing to relinquish it.   
Focusing on themes of administration, bureaucracy, and intergovernmental 
relations, this dissertation examines Indian affairs during what is known as the 
integrationist era in Native-Newcomer relations: the two and a half decades after WWII 
during which the federal government introduced a series of policies designed to integrate 
Indians into mainstream Canadian social, political, economic, and administrative life.  
Particular attention is given to developments in the Pacific province, where some of the 
most concerted steps towards integration took place.  Shifting between micro- and macro-
historical perspectives, the following chapters consist of a series of comparative policy 
case studies.  Individually, they encapsulate the four main policy areas of federal Indian 
integrationist planning after WWII: health, education, welfare, and economic 
development.  Collectively, they trace the micro-workings of colonial-bureaucratic 
relations and demonstrate how integration was a mission essentially administrative in 
orientation; every policy undertaken in this period, whether directly or indirectly, sought 
to implicate provincial and other federal line departments in the administration of Indian 
affairs.  While the earliest architects of assimilation policy saw the transformation of 
Indians into provincial citizens as a historical eventuality, post-war policies were unique 
in that they marked a complete reversal of how this was to take place.  After WWII, the 
integration of Indians into provincial institutions came to be seen as a new structural 
means for assimilation itself. 
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 Interest in Indian integration was the product of a convergence of several 
developments unique to the post-war years.  Heightened realization and criticism of 
previous policy failures, combined with a growing public discourse aimed at the 
promotion of Indian citizenry and democratic rights, catalyzed a gradual shift in the 
outlook, mandate, and tactics of Indian affairs officials.  Although Indians were rarely 
invited to join the conversation, consensus was growing among social advocacy groups, 
social scientists, and the Canadian public that prior protectionist policies were failing the 
interests of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people alike.  Differences in opinion 
undoubtedly existed throughout this history as to what “integration” meant as well as 
what constituted the most desirable future for Aboriginal people.  The failure of federal 
wardship policies to produce mass Indian assimilation, however, was irrefutable.  
Enfranchisement, the main legal mechanism through which Indians were to abandon their 
legal and cultural identity, was proceeding at a snail’s pace.  Massive post-war 
Aboriginal population growth, largely the result of improvements in Aboriginal health 
and infant mortality rates meant that “Indians” were not only not vanishing, they were 
actually increasing in number.  Between 1939 and 1959, Canada’s Indian population 
grew by more than fifty percent.10  The added administrative expenses associated with 
post-WWII population growth provided rationale for Indian affairs officials to pursue 
integrationist policies designed to offload costs onto other provincial and federal line 
agencies. 
                                                 
10 See Appendix A. 
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 Amid the fervour of WWII, Indians began to take on new public and political 
importance.  As they had during the Great War and earlier conflict of 1812, Aboriginal 
people contributed to the Canadian military effort, with both their resources and lives.  
The continued denial of basic citizenry rights to Indians and Indian veterans after 1945 
came to be seen as a perversion of the very ideals the Allied effort was meant to 
protect.11  That Indian matters were discussed in 1944 in both BC’s legislature as well as 
before the federal House Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishment was, as 
historian Scott Sheffield suggests, “indicative of both the connection between the ‘Indian
and the war and the increasing salience of the Indian problem in the minds of 
Canadians.”
’ 
ports 
es 
                                                
12  This salience only increased throughout post-war years.  Indians routinely 
attracted newspaper headlines, editorials, letters to the editor, and special series re
detailing their struggles into the 1950s and 60s.13  In his survey of Indian welfare polici
in Canada, Hugh Shewell notes how the race-based Indian problem met modern liberal 
democracy after WWII; a qualitative shift took place in which Indians went from being 
 
11 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000), 324. 
 
12 Scott Sheffield, The Red Man's on the Warpath: The Image of the "Indian" and the Second World War 
 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 92; Victoria Daily Colonist, 11 March 1944, “Legislature Debates at 
Length on Health and Education of Indians,” 2. 
 
13 See Vancouver Sun, 10 September 1949, “Injustice in the King's Name,” 4; Vancouver Sun Magazine, 4 
September 1954, “New Era for Our Indians,” 4; Victoria Daily Colonist, November 24, 1955, “Not Even 
Second Class,” 4; Victoria Daily Colonist, 15 March, 1957, “Clothes, Food Pouring in for Indians,” 6; 
Victoria Daily Colonist,  “BC Indians Destitute,” 14; Victoria Daily Colonist, 5 April 1962, “‘Stricken’ 
Band called Pretty Healthy Bunch,”; Victoria Daily Colonist, 6 November, 1965, “Winter Hardship Dogs 
Indians,” 12; Victoria Daily Colonist, 26 April 1967, “BC Indians Lay Claim to all Land in Province,” 17; 
Vancouver Sun, 8 March 1968, “Better Deal Urged for BC Indians” 13.  Victoria Daily Colonist, 2 
February 1969, “They Look Life in the Eye but it’s Hard,” 21. 
   
13 
 seen as the problem to people with problems.14  If the so-called “Indian problem” was 
changing, so too were the remedies deemed necessary for its solution.  Indians 
increasingly came to be seen as Canadian citizens deserving equitable treatment by 
government.  In BC, the granting of the franchise to Indians in 1949 only increased 
pressures and demands that Indians be also granted the same administrative rights as 
provincial non-Indians.  Post-war years thus bore witness to a search for a new Indian 
policy to achieve these ends and to solve what was fast becoming seen as Canada’s 
“Indian
t in 
e 
                                                
 administration problem.”15   
For the federal government, this search for a new Indian policy took early 
political expression immediately after WWII.  In 1946-48 a Special Joint committee 
(SJC) of Parliament met to examine the Indian Act and its administration, and offer 
policy reform recommendations.  Although few committee recommendations were 
implemented in subsequent bureaucratic restructuring and revisions to the Indian Ac
1951 and 1952, the SJC raised new public and political awareness and affirmed the 
policy principle of provincial administration.16  The 1950 transfer of the IAB from the 
Department of Mines and Resources to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration 
further affirmed the federal government’s interest in Indians as Canadian citizens rather 
than federal wards.  Speaking before an Indian Eskimo Association of Canada conferenc
 
14 Hugh Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2004), 22-3.  
 
15 Byron King Plant, “‘The Indian Administration Problem’: Aboriginal Urbanization and Federal-
Provincial Relations, 1945-69,” (Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical 
Association, Toronto, ON, May 2006). 
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 audience in Vancouver several years later, Kwakwaka’wakw Alfred Scow noted of the
transfer: “We have seen progress in that now w
 
e are recognized by the government as 
people,
th 
 
S 
 
                                                                                                                                              
 instead of minerals and resources.”17   
The search for a post-war policy continued into the latter half of the twentie
century when a second joint committee convened to revisit Indian administration.  
Released in 1961, the final report of the Joint Committee (JC) further advocated that 
federal-provincial discussions on Indian affairs take place “in order that such matters may 
be transferred to provincial jurisdiction as may be acceptable to Indian people, provincial
and federal authorities.”18  Canadian plans to include Indians in its own rendition of U
“Great Society” emerged after Lester B. Pearson’s Liberals took power in 1963. The 
Indian Affairs Branch (IAB) began an intensive review of its existing programs and 
explored new guidelines for the extension of provincial services to Indians that year.19  
Notably, Indian affairs were discussed for the first time at a federal-provincial conference
that autumn, soon followed by another meeting in October 1964 solely dedicated to this 
   
l report] (22 June 1948). 
 
 
mons, 8 July 1961, 617. 
 
16 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and 
Consider the Indian Act, Fourth Report [fina
 
17 Indian Eskimo Association of Canada, “[Report of Proceedings] Conference on Concerns of Indians in 
British Columbia, 2-4 December 1966,” 14.
 
18 Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Report to the Senate
and House of Com
 
19 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 2, “R.F. Battle to C.M. Isbister, 26
February 1964.” 
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 purpose al 
 this 
al 
 
eed, 
t 
lopments.21  By 1969, BC, long deemed a historical bystander in 
regards r 
ed 
                                                
.  Shortly after, the IAB began consulting with Indians via the creation of region
and national advisory committees composed of Indian representation.20 
Throughout the policy discussions of the 1950s and 60s, unfettered integration 
came to be seen as the solution to Canada’s “Indian administration problem.”  From
broader perspective, 1969 capped off an era of federal policies and intergovernment
discussions aligned toward the integration of Indians into provincial administrative 
structures.  The White Paper undeniably marked a blatant attempt at termination, a 
perversion of the Indian consultation process, and a turning point in Native-newcomer 
relations moving into the modern era; however, like Bennett’s pledge, it too was rooted in
a history of failed policies and intergovernmental negotiations regarding Indians.  Ind
as Sally M. Weaver suggests, the White Paper was less innovative when seen in the ligh
of prior policy deve
 to Indians, had been directly implicated in Indian policy and administration fo
over two decades. 
The notion that Indians would one day fall under provincial auspices was, of 
course, implicit in the earliest assimilationist designs in Canada.  Introducing a revamp
Indian Act in 1887, Sir John A. Macdonald stated, “The great aim of our legislation has 
been to do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects 
 
y of British Columbia Press, 1995), 142-143. 
f 
20 Paul Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-
1989 (Vancouver: Universit
 
21 Sally M. Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-70 (Toronto: University o
Toronto Press, 1981), 196. 
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 with the inhabitants of the Dominion, as speedily as they are fit for the change.”22  T
early architects of assimilationist policy, however, could only speculate just
he 
 how speedily 
this cha f their 
n 1864, 
 
 
nge might occur.  What was agreed at the time was that Indians, as part o
development into full citizens, needed to be isolated on reserves and protected from 
provincial governments who could not be trusted to treat Indians justly.23   
Historically, BC’s interest in Indians largely related to the acquisition of 
Aboriginal lands and resources.  When colonial Governor James Douglas retired i
his “system” of treaty-making, land reform, and missionization gave way to more 
repressive policies under colonial officials like Joseph Trutch.  The irony of the 1871 
terms of BC’s entry to Confederation, which transferred control of Indians to the 
Dominion on the condition that the federal government adhere to policies “as liberal as
that hitherto pursued by the British Columbia Government,” was that prior policy had 
been anything but liberal.24  As Brian Titley demonstrates in the context of BC reserve 
land conflicts in the early twentieth century, variant federal and provincial interests in 
Indians after Confederation proved a ripe source for intergovernmental conflict.25  After 
WWII, branch officials remained wary of historical antecedents and the province’s lack
                                                 
22 Return to an Order of the House of Commons, dated 2 May 1887, Canada Sessional Papers (No. 20b), 
1887, 37 in Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 254. 
 
23 J. Anthony Long and Menno Boldt, eds. Governments in Conflict?: Provinces and Indian Nations in 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 3. 
 
24 British Columbia, Sessional Papers, 1871, 12 in Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics, 43-44 f.n.16. 
 
25 E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in 
Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986), 161.  For a comparative study involving Treaty Three and the 
Ontario-Manitoba boundary dispute of 1870-1889 see Barry Cottam, “Federal-Provincial Disputes, Natural 
Resources, and the Treaty #3 Ojibwa, 1867-1924 (PhD Dissertation, University of Ottawa, 1994). 
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 of interest in Indian protectionism and the assimilationist mission.  Speaking before the
SJC in 1946
 
, the Indian Commissioner for BC, D.M. McKay, noted of provincial 
govern
st 
hed 
s 
d 
 
he 
1910s when the federal government began compensating the provinces for treatment of 
ments: “[They] have washed their hands of the Indians pretty well. They do not 
consider that they have any responsibility whatever with respect to them.  They simply 
say [‘]they are wards of the Crown, the dominion, and it is their responsibility and not 
ours.[’]”26 
Scholars since the late 1980s in turn have taken evidence of provincial disintere
in Indians to its logical limit and contended that lower governments have always “was
their hands” when it comes to Indian policy and administration.  Indeed, the systemic 
provisions of section 91 (24) of the 1867 British North America Act, which stipulated 
federal jurisdiction over “Indians and lands reserved for the Indians,” have exerted a
much influence on the writing of Aboriginal history as they have on the evolution of 
Indian-state relations.  In their edited work, Governments in Conflict?: Provinces an
Indian Nations in Canada, Anthony J. Long and Menno Boldt note: “The provinces have
steadfastly resisted accepting greater responsibility for Indian residents within their 
boundaries.”27  This characterization has some early and modern historical applicability 
but it flies in the face of evidence to the contrary throughout much of the twentieth 
century.  In BC, official integration with provincial health services began as early as t
                                                 
26 Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 4 (11 June 1946). 
 
27 Long and Boldt, eds. Governments in Conflict, 5. 
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 Indian patients in provincial hospitals.28  A distinct pattern emerged in post-war
when dozens of formal and informal federal-provincial agreements were struck in ar
of health, education, welfare, and community development devolving administrative 
responsibility for Indians onto lower government.  While the goal of complete 
institutional assimilation was never realized to its fullest extent, no steadfast polic
 decades 
eas 
y 
existed C or in 
r 
 
to prote on 
into Ca John 
A. Emm ime:  
tegration programs are not too effective when there are so many areas of 
administration.  All separate or different programs for Indians tend to keep 
Canadian society they must have access to the same social programs and 
 
 when it came to federal devolution of Indian administration.  Whether in B
Saskatchewan, as historian Laurie Barron’s study of Indian and Métis CCF policies unde
Tommy Douglas shows, no static or singular “provincial” perspective existed.29  
Throughout the post-war years, federal officials came to see the systemic 
administrative relationship between Indians and the federal government less as a means
ct and civilize Indians, and more as a barrier to their successful transformati
nadian citizens.  In a 1963 letter to the Minister, Indian Affairs field official 
s epitomized the prevalent sentiment within bureaucratic circles by that t
In
activity where Indians are under a separate, or different, form of 
the Indian separate and different.  If Indians are to become part of 
responsibilities as the non-Indians.30 
                                                 
28 The first integrated hospital existed in BC as early as 1859.  The Royal Victoria Hosptial opened that 
year on the Songhees reserve in Victoria, on the condition that it serve both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
patients.  Grant Keddie, Songhees Pictorial: A History of the Songhees People as Seen by Outsiders, 1790-
1912 (Victoria: Royal British Columbia Museum, 2003), 64.  
 
29 Laurie Barron, Walking in Indian Moccasins: The Native Policies of Tommy Douglas (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1997). 
 
30 LAC RG10 Vol. 13866 File 1/42-1 Pt. 1.1, “John A. Emms to the Minister, 13 May 1963.” 
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 Post-w  
citizens enth century.  
They specifically sought to devolve Indian affairs onto lower government.  Boldt and 
Long describe attempts to shift responsibility for Indians onto the provinces as 
“institutional assimilation,” or the:  
phasing out of administrative, political, legal, and economic boundaries 
individually and collectively, under general federal and provincial 
 
en 
Indians
ments 
s 
ars 
 in 
BC were exceptional in their own right.  Under the post-war Coalition government of 
ar integration policies represented more than a response to calls for Indian
hip or a novel moniker for assimilationist designs born in the ninete
between Indians and other Canadians, and incorporating Indians, both 
policies, programs, and line departments.31 
Integration, in short, was a mission administrative in both design and function.  It 
represented a tangible way to dissolve the systemic relationship established betwe
 and the federal government by transferring administrative responsibility for 
Indians from the federal government to the provinces, compelling increased provincial 
fiscal responsibility for on-reserve Indians, and promoting municipal-style govern
on reserve to replace band structures.  The federal government came to see all of these 
goals as possible within the existing parameters of constitutional and treaty law. 
The history of federal-provincial relations and Indian affairs after WWII remain
largely unwritten, and perhaps for good reason; the task of condensing twenty-five ye
of policy events, political changes, bureaucratic restructuring, intergovernmental 
negotiations, and Aboriginal roles therein is a formidable one.  For scholars interested in 
the undertaking, this history can be told multiple ways.  As provincial history, events
                                                 
31 Long and Boldt, “Federal Indian Policy and the Provinces,” in Governments in Conflict, 22. 
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 Byron Johnson, BC was among the earliest provinces to grant Indians the provincial 
franchise and the first to elect an Aboriginal MLA in 1949 to the “roaring approval” of 
the legislature.32  Within a year, the province further recognized Aboriginal people’s ne
political status—and significant voting power—when the BC legislature passed the 
Indian Inquiry Act, creating the first provincial advisory body dedicated to considerat
of Indian ma
w 
ion 
tters.33  BC Aboriginal people in this time began assuming and exercising 
new pa
he 
 
 
in 
s did 
nister, and chair of Treasury Board, 
                                                
rticipatory roles in BC politics.  As leader of the Native Brotherhood of British 
Columbia (NBBC) in 1954, Haida Rev. Peter Kelly estimated that the BC Indian held t
balance of power in at least seven MLA constituencies, “And don’t think he doesn’t 
know it.”34 
BC also pioneered many administrative firsts with regard to Indians.  While it was
granting the franchise, the province began accepting Indians into its new public health 
insurance plan.  Joint federal-provincial agreements soon followed opening provincial 
public schools to Indians.  After taking power in 1952, Bennett’s Social Credit carried on
integrationist policies but implemented few new ones, excepting sporadic agreements 
health, provincial child welfare and off-reserve Indian welfare provisions.  Commonly 
credited for building BC’s social welfare state in the 1950s and 60s, Bennett’s plan
not always include Indians.  As Premier, Finance Mi
 
32 Victoria Daily Colonist, 24 February 1950, “Legislative Members Roar Approval as Indian MLA Makes 
rst Speech,” 11.  See Victoria Daily Colonist, 10 March 1950, “Coalition Praised for Taking Indians from 
 n Inquiry into the Status and Rights of Indians in the Province, Statutes of British 
Fi
Welfare State to be Citizens,” 27. 
 
33 An Act Authorizing a
Columbia [or SBC] 1950, c. 32.   
 
34 Victoria Daily Times, 21 May 1954, “Indian Voter Holds Power in Seven BC Constituencies,” 10.  
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 the pre .  
 
eral 
 
etitive 
n, 
 
des.  
mier held tight control over both political and executive arms of government
Bennett, despite any pledge to the contrary, increasingly came to see Indians as a material 
liability and, like his colonial and early provincial predecessors, treated Indians as
secondary to larger provincial economic interests.35 
From another perspective, the historical development of BC-federal Indian 
relations can be told from within a broader federalist narrative.  Most successes in fed
devolution took place during a period scholars have termed the administrative or 
cooperative era in Canadian federalism: the period from WWII to the mid-1960s in which 
intergovernmental relations became more regular and formalized in response to policy
needs and the growing capacities of government.  Cooperative relations deteriorated 
around the mid-1960s giving way to executive federalism.  Amidst this more comp
and conflictual era under the governments of John Diefenbaker and Lester B. Pearso
devolutionary trends declined once the provinces began exerting greater autonomy in
financial matters and jurisdiction.36  BC was notorious for its tumultuous relationship 
with the federal government, especially under the two-decade long premiership of 
Bennett.  Indians, along with tax rentals or equalization payments, were sources of 
intergovernmental conflict and political maneuvering throughout post-war deca
                                                                                                                                                 
 
35 Normal J. Ruff notes how BC’s relationships with Ottawa have always been somewhat enigmatic; BC 
premiers in general have “been promoters of a distinctive B.C. brand of ‘province building.’” Norman J. 
Ruff, “British Columbia and Canadian Federalism,” in The Reins of Power: Governing British Columbia 
(Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1983), 272. 
 
36 Kathy Brock, “Executive Federalism: Beggar Thy Neighbour?” in New Trends in Canadian Federalism, 
Francois Rocher and Miriam Smith, eds. (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003), 71-72; Garth Stevenson, 
Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2004), 85. 
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 Indians’ unique constitutional status and the statutory provisions of the federal Indian Act
provided convenient means for the province to criticize the federal government for 
“Hitler-like tactics” but then also to decline any devolution offer it so chose.  Provincial 
officials invoked constitutional and statutory law in areas o
 
f health, economic 
develop
l 
ted 
y 
ower of 
the “government generation” and evolution of the modern Canadian state.40  In Canada 
ment, and welfare in the 1960s whenever it suited broader political and economic 
interests.37  BC’s approach to Indian administration typifies in microcosm what politica
scientists Norman J. Ruff and Philip Resnick describe as the province’s self-interes
regional distinctiveness.38  “Always,” as BC journalist Bruce Hutchinson succinctly 
noted in 1948, “British Columbia thinks of British Columbia.”39 
Institutional frameworks provide yet another lens to assess mid-twentieth centur
Indian affairs in Canada.  An important product of post-war national economic growth 
was the emergence of “big government.”  Growing bureaucratic interest in Indian 
integration was a consequence of what historian Doug Owram terms the rise to p
since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism, Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and 
                                                 
37 See Victoria Daily Colonist, 31 October 1954 “Bennett Hits Laing for ‘Hitler-Like’ Tactics,” 3; Victoria
Daily Colonist, 6 June 1968, “Goblet to the 
 
Drained,” 27.  Indians also were a source for intra-provincial 
arty politicking.  For example, in 1969, Tom Berger, leader of the NDP, claimed that “A socialist 
5 
, “Let BC Handle Indians,” 6. 
t: 
bia Regionalism and Canadian Unity (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
000), 20. 
untry: Canada and Her People (Longmans, Green and Company, 
948), 275. 
tual and the State, 1900-1945 (Toronto: 
niversity of Toronto Press, 1986), x. 
p
government in B.C. would wrest the initiative from Ottawa in lifting native Indians out of poverty.”  
Vancouver Sun, 1 May 1969, “BC Seen Taking Lead on Indians,” 9.  See also Victoria Daily Colonist, 1
March 1957
 
38 Ruff, “British Columbia and Canadian Federalism,” 272-273; Philip Resnick, The Politics of Resentmen
British Colum
2
 
39 Bruce Hutchinson, The Unknown Co
1
 
40 Doug Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellec
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 John English similarly describe how “The real Canadian ‘growth industry’ was ‘public 
administration plus defence plus service activities.’”41  If the dire extremes of the 
Depression and WWII had the effect of compelling new forms of governmental 
intervention in Canadian life, post-war economic prosperity, demographic growth, and 
bureauc  not 
ent of 
mained 
t immune 
characteristics of modern bureaucracies identified by sociologist Max Weber: 
fficialdom, continuity, impersonality, and expertise, all in the larger 
   
ratic modernization enabled this intervention to occur.  Surely, the IAB was
isolated from national trends.  From 1940 to 1959, its budget grew from six million to 
over thirty-six million dollars and its staff doubled in number.42 
After 1945, the IAB began to undergo a gradual but steady transformation, 
developing from what Weaver identified as an irrelevant branch within the Departm
Mines and Resources, into a large and professional civil service.  J.L. Granatstein notes 
how Canada’s civil service underwent a modernization after WWII.  A new class of 
young, well-educated, and progressively-minded bureaucratic “mandarins” began 
steering federal civil service departments after WWII.43  While the IAB largely re
a “lost battalion” repository for ex-military types well into the 1960s, it was no
from broader bureaucratic changes then taking place.  The IAB became responsible for a 
ballooning budget and clientele population, enveloping many of the “ideal-type” 
hierarchization, o
                                                                                                                                              
 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power Politics, and 
 
41
Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 23. 
 
42 See Appendix B. 
 
43 Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy, 46-47; J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service 
Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). 
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 name of administrative efficiency.44  Bureaucratic proliferation had a qualitative impa
on state policies.  After 1945 the so-called “Indian problem” became more and more 
rationalized and legitimated in administrative terms.  Increasingly professional,
and liberalist, bureaucratic action—what John Leslie refers to as new forms of 
“administrative activism”—lay at the heart of post-war Indian policies.
ct 
 secular, 
 
ectives 
ver ceased to exert their 
ubiquit
 
er 
 
45  It was the work
of bureaucrats, administrators, and social scientists that recast post-war policy obj
although, as this dissertation shows, political interests ne
ous influence on executive Indian programming. 
While political, federalist, and institutional analyses provide important contexts to 
situate mid-twentieth century policies, none provides a complete framework, particularly 
when probing questions of power.  As sociologists and scholars of public administration
have long noted, bureaucracies may appear to but do not always operate in the mann
Weber described.  Many of those organizations exhibiting “ideal-type” structuralist 
characteristics are capable of inefficiency, if not outright dysfunction.46  Domination, in
short, is not an implicit consequence of the ontology of government; state institutions, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
d 
d on laws 
etypical 
expression of legal-rational domination; legal-rational domination is based on the existence of laws and 
regulations enacted and the authority of a structural administration of politically-appointed officials. Max 
ociology, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. 
olicy, 1943-1963” (PhD Dissertation, Carlton University, 1999), 244. 
ublic Administration: An Introduction to Theory and 
44 Weber referred to the historical evolution of different forms of power as “basic legitimations of 
domination,” which he ordered these into three chronological classifications: traditional (domination base
on custom), charismatic (domination based on leadership), and legal-rational (domination base
and organizational power).  The modern bureaucracy, according to Weber, represented the arch
Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” (Lecture delivered at Munich University, October 1919), 78. See also Max 
Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive S
erkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 956-58. (B
 
45 John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?: The Development of Canadian Indian 
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46 Gregory J. Inwood, Understanding Canadian P
Practice (Scarborough: Prentice Hall, 1999), 35. 
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 while crucial to the formulation of power relationships, are not potent determinants in 
themselves.  French theorist Michel Foucault, of course, has done more than anyone el
to attract attention to this fact, particularly in his later career works and interviews.  As
Foucauldian scholars John Caputo and Mark Yount observe, Foucault situated 
institutions within the thin but all-entangling web of power relations, approaching th
as “readily definable macro-objects, grosser instruments for the finer, more elemental
workings of po
se 
 
em 
 
wer.”47  Foucault put it simply as a matter of methodology: “one must 
analyze ”48  His 
 
f 
er 
 and 
homogenized conceptualizations of “the state,” recent and not-so-recent works 
 institutions from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa.
array of theoretical concepts—such as governmentality, biopolitics, and analytic of
power—all probed questions about the relational patterning and dynamism of power 
relationships. 
Scholars in the Canadian field have been slow to apply this basic tenet o
Foucault’s work.  Particularly evident in works published since the early 1990s, a 
normative paradigm stressing the colonialist and hegemonic implications of state pow
has dominated the Canadian historiography.  Straying little from structuralist insights
diametrically juxtapose colonizer with colonized, and gloss over the complex means by 
                                                                                                                                                 
tics 
 
47 John Caputo and Mark Yount, “Introduction,” in Foucault and the Critique of Institutions, John Caputo 
and Mark Yount, eds. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 4. 
 
48 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneu
by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 222. 
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 which state power takes form and expression.49  This study moves beyond static and 
unitary conceptions of the state to illustrate how intrastate spaces act as sites for the 
interplay of both colonial-bureaucratic power and Aboriginal agency.  As anthropologi
Diane Nelson notes in her study of Guatemalan national development, the state acts 
“both a site of demand and the stake of the struggle.”
st 
as 
ons in Canada.  As such, it 
probes 
d, 
use 
50  Accordingly, this dissertation 
challenges some of the orthodoxy that has emerged in the past twenty five years of 
deductive theoretical approaches to Native-newcomer relati
the inner dynamics and micro-workings of administrative relations and draws 
conclusions that might be best conceived of as revisionist. 
While the interplay of power can produce systematic relations of rulers and rule
state policies, by their mere existence, discursive expressions, or bureau-structural 
origins, have not always involved the unilateral extension of state power.  As Foucault 
suggests, “[O]ne should not assume a massive and primal condition of domination, a 
binary structure with ‘dominators’ on one side and ‘dominated’ on the other.”  Rather, 
power relations “serve” because they are capable of being used in strategies and beca
                                                 
49  Some examples include J.L. Tobias, “Protection, Assimilation, Civilization: An Outline of Canada's 
Indian Policy," Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology Vol. 6 No. 2 (1976), 39-55; Mary-Ellen Kelm, 
olonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-1950 (Vancouver: UBC 
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ills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2003); Noel Dyck, What is the 
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 they provide the very means for resistance.51  This study contends that a comprehensi
understanding of policy can only be addressed through critical considerations of the 
entire range of processual implications of “government.”  In doing so, this disse
takes up J.R. Miller’s empiricist challenge to question the efficacy of governmental 
policies and to, “adjust … the generally accepted view of the whole array of policies 
aimed at political control and cultural assimilation.”
ve 
rtation 
 
le 
mer history, such forces varied widely in 
terms o
results 
 
52  The following chapters forward
evidence that shows, through different policies and periods, how state-directed 
integrationist measures rarely produced the results envisioned by their architects.  Whi
some themes—assimilationist designs, financial first principles, Aboriginal exclusion 
from the decision-making process, and racist ideas about the inferiority of “Indians”—
resonate throughout the breadth of Native-newco
f their importance, influence, and result.  In many ways the contradictions and 
discrepancies that existed between integrationist policy intentions, operations, and 
echoed the theme of the British television comedy Yes Prime Minister: “a clash between
the political will and the administrative won’t.” 
                                                 
51 Michel Foucault, “Power and Strategies,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 142.  Foucault also describes how 
power always involves and engenders resistance: “[T]here are no relations of power without resistances; 
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xercised.” Ibid.  See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: 
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dian-White Relations in Canada, ed. by J.R. Miller (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 340.  
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 As John Lutz demonstrates in his recent study of inter-ethnic exchange in B
tories require new ways of talking about the past.
C, 
new his
adopting national or provincial frameworks of reference, this study utilizes the concept 
ield 
 whether individuals or groups, exist and 
subsist in and through difference; that is, they occupy relative positions in 
empirically, is the most real entity and the real principle of the behaviour 
 
r 
specific
53  Instead of exclusively 
intrastate throughout in reference to what French theorist Pierre Bourdieu calls “the f
of power,” or “the space of the relations of force.”  For Bourdieu, any notion of space 
carries with it relational understandings of the social world: 
Apparent, directly visible beings,
a space of relations which, although invisible and always difficult to show 
of individuals and groups.54 
Gesturing towards a combination of theoretical approaches, this study contends that 
administrative spaces have served as important spaces for the reproduction of old, and 
interplay of new, power relationships.  The impacts and legacy of post-WWII 
developments continue to unfold today. 
In terms of format and method, the overall approach is comparative.  Fou
 policy episodes are compared and contrasted to show how integrationist policies 
embodied combinations of both new and old variables.  In addition to providing glimpses 
into the gamut of federal integrationist policies, a comparative approach facilitates both 
macro- and micro-historical insights and reduces the possibility for analytical myopia 
                                                 
53 John Sutton Lutz, Makúk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 
21, 277. 
 
54 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
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 prone to studies of singular policy fields.  No two policy areas were identical in term
historical evolution, popular perception, intention, implementation, and impact. 
Integrationist measures in Indian health provide one such example.  Chap
traces the early development of integrated health and shows how the Indian health system
underwent a massive reorganization after 1945 following the transfer of responsibility fo
Indian health from the IAB to the Department of National Health and Welfare (DNHW). 
Subject to a federal-provincial cost-sharing framework, Indians began accessing non-
Indian hospitals in increasing numbers after WWII.  Most scholars to date have 
characterized the advent of Western medicine as a colonizing process, one in which 
Aboriginal people were subjected to foreign colonial notions of clinical and bodily 
health.
s of 
ter Two 
 
r 
 
m 
, growing Aboriginal use of western health care in 
the twe
ell into 
o 
                                                
55  While the advent of integrated health services undoubtedly entailed a 
“governmentalization” of Indian health and the imposition of what Foucault might ter
new biopolitical56 regulatory controls
ntieth century was not a simple correlative of colonial power.  The integration of 
Indian health was a process fraught with inter- and intragovernmental conflict w
the 1960s.  Moreover, Aboriginal people identified, utilized, and demanded new 
opportunities for improved health care before, during, and after WWII.  As such, health 
care, like so many other government programs and initiatives, was something that cut tw
ways.  It was assimilationist, an expression of federal authority (and funding) in a 
 
55 See Kelm, Colonizing Bodies; Maureen K. Lux, Medicine That Walks: Disease, Medicine, and Canadian 
Plains Native People, 1880-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
 
56 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume One: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 
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 provincial sphere of constitutional power, but it also was something most Aborig
people actively sought out and used. 
Chapter Two offers alternative perspectives on the meaning and implications of 
increasing Aboriginal involvement with western health care.  It shows how the 
integration of Indian health with federal line and provincial departments had an arra
impacts, one of which was the facilitation of improvements in Aboriginal health.  By and
large, significant Aboriginal in
inal 
y of 
 
terest in Canadian medical services by the mid-twentieth 
was no
 
  
 the administration of Indian education began shifting from 
federal
                                                
t an ironic reversal of assimilationist tactics on the part of Aboriginal people, but 
rather paralleled what other scholars have suggested in the context of syncretic 
Aboriginal spiritual re-orientation: the emergence of entirely new and innovative forms 
of Aboriginal bodily health that were neither essentially traditional nor non-traditional in 
character.57  Aboriginal people were central players in this process, identifying, seeking 
out, and demanding improved and free forms of state Indian health care, from both 
federal and provincial authorities, as part of their perceived rights as Aboriginal people
and Canadian citizens.   
As in health, Indian education was an area of substantial devolutionary “success.”
Chapter Three discusses how
- and church-run schools to integrated public schooling in the two decades after 
WWII.  Some of the earliest and most significant steps to desegregate schools took place 
in BC.  In 1949, both levels of government agreed to a per-capita funding arrangement; 
 
57 H.G. Barnett, Indian Shakers: A Messianic Cult of the Pacific Northwest (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1957); Susan Neylan, The Heavens are Changing: Nineteenth-Century Protestant 
Missions and Tsimshian Christianity (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003). 
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 shortly after, a series of joint agreements were struck between the federal government an
BC school boards facilitating the entry of Indians into public educational institutions.  
After mid-century, the province joined the Indian policy development community and 
began administering—later even partially funding—Indian education services und
terms of joint agreements.   
The history of integrated education provides another example of how policies are
capable of producing a multiplicity of results.  Despite the creation of new administrative 
arrangements facilitating the inclusion of Indians in provincial ins
d 
er the 
 
titutions, the results of 
integra ic 
hey also 
o 
n 
 different and often conflictual, converged in the early 1950s when it came to 
Indian 
 and 
ted schooling rarely delivered on the overtures of Indian affairs officials.  Publ
schools offered some improvements over the federal Indian school system but t
exposed and exacerbated many of the problems of the residential and day institutions.  
Indian children most often remained segregated in provincial schools in terms of 
educational achievement, instruction practices, and their treatment at the hands of non-
Indian students and school personnel.  In the early goings, integrated schooling was n
panacea for desegregationist ends nor that of assimilationist state designs.  Integration, i
short, never occurred beyond a macro-institutional perspective.   
Why was integrated schooling in BC an area of such spectacular success and 
failure?  Chapter Three documents how federal and provincial interests, while 
qualitatively
education.  Integrated education might have offered a means for the province to 
desegregate its schools, a way for the federal government to share its costs for Indian 
education.  The immediate effect of integrated schools, however, was not social
32 
 cultural Indian integration.  Aboriginal people, marginalized from the decision-ma
process throughout the integration process, were relegated to marginal positions of 
power.  The inability of integrated public schooling to effect assimilation was apparent
the 1960s and 1970s when Aboriginal people began demanding greater self-control of 
education.  
In addition to tracing the full implications of different policies, a major purpose of
this work is to deconstruct “the state” and to critically examine policies through
sociologist J. Rick Ponting and political scientist Roger Gibbins refer to as the 
multifaceted “six dimensional political spaces” in which Indian administration is 
negotiated: party politics, Indian government politics, federal-provincial politics, Indi
Indian politics, bureaupolitik, and inter-departmental politics.
king 
 by 
 
 what 
an-
tion to 
nt” 
an 
heterogeneous, in expression.59  Another recent work, Hugh Shewell’s study of post-
                                              
58  Nearly three decades 
have passed since the publication of Out of Irrelevance: A Socio-Political Introduc
Indian Affairs in Canada, yet the number of Canadian works that move beyond state-
centered approaches to recognize the various constituent parts invoked by “governme
are few.  While recent studies, such as those by historian Robin Brownlie and 
anthropologist Toby Morantz shift focus away from federal contexts to examine local 
colonial relations, historians continue to stress state policies as monomorphic, rather th
   
 
 Carstens, The Queen's People: A 
tudy of Hegemony, Coercion, and Accommodation among the Okanagan of Canada (Toronto: University 
58 See J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance: A Socio-Political Introduction to Indian 
Affairs in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 315. 
 
59 Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye; Toby Morantz, The White Man’s Gonna Getcha: The Colonial Challenge to
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 WWII Indian welfare policies, similarly fails to move beyond a structuralist paradigm.  
While more cognizant of the various constituent parts of government, Shewell too 
privileges an organic view of state action as inescapably colonial in design, constituent 
part, an ch 
s 
dian scholarship focusing on 
similar  century 
Aborig er-
                      
d effect.  Historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer describes how such an approa
employs techniques of emplotment, akin to what Hayden White terms the narrative 
tropism of tragedy.  “Mechanistic and reductionist,” Lackenbauer writes, the Canadian 
facsimile of this mode of historical emplotment “denies complexity and marginalizes 
aspects of negotiation, compromise, and accommodation.”  As he recently demonstrates 
in the context of Aboriginal-military land conflicts, the Indian affairs bureaucracy 
operated neither as a monolith nor did it always get its way.60 
This dissertation too discards the notion that singular agents, interests, or 
expressions constitute the sole driving force behind government policies and explore
more theoretical and historically-specific treatments of power.  In this regard, this study 
contributes to a small but growing body of compelling Cana
 questions of power, agency, and social action in the context of twentieth
inal/non-Aboriginal relations.61  As Paul Nadasdy notes in his study of int
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60 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “The Irony and the Tragedy of Negotiated Space: A Case Study on Narrative 
Form and Aboriginal-Government Relations during the Second World War,” 
H
Military and Aboriginal Lands (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 38, 254-255. 
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 ethnic r
relation n the 
part of ‘the state’ is to oversimplify what is in fact a much more complex situation.”62  
what I call society’s multiple arenas of domination and opposition.  
interacting—at times conflicting—with an entire constellation of social 
Any individual part of the state may respond as 
much (or more) to the distinctive pressures it faces in particular arenas as 
within the state mean that we cannot simply assume that as a whole it acts 
interests.  
Frameworks which probe the inner dynamics of intrastate relations prove useful for any 
study of Canadian Indian administration, perhaps no more than during the post-WWII 
era.  Indian administration took on entirely new forms and expressions, especially once 
the provinces and other federal line departments emerged alongside the IAB as primary 
agents of Indian service delivery. 
In addition to building on existing scholarship, this dissertation draws on 
interdisciplinary analyses and comparative international literature similarly recognizing 
elations in the southern Yukon, “it is clear that to portray Aboriginal-state 
s as the result of colonialist and/or neo-colonialist policies of exploitation o
Moving towards this end, this dissertation attempts what Joel S. Migdal terms in 
reference to third world contexts, a “disaggregation of the state.”  He writes: 
patterns of domination are determined by key struggles spread through 
Officials at different levels of the state are key figures in these struggles, 
forces in disparate arenas.  
it does to the rest of the state organization.  Different responses from 
in a rational and coherent fashion, or strategically follows a defined set of 
63
 
government as an ensemble of apparatuses, forces, and interests, akin to what Nelson 
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 refers to as “territorialized interstitial places.”64  It is from this perspective that this study
offers a new analytical perspective to assess how Native space has been structured, 
defined, and negotiated over space and time: that of
 
 administration.  Though perhaps less 
sensatio ers 
ded 
act zones— 
ve 
y, 
nal than topics such as land conflicts and rights litigation, administrative matt
profoundly have shaped, and continue to shape, Native-newcomer relations.  As historian 
Palmer Patterson notes, the power of Indian administration supplanted that of the 
missionary following “the decline of the theocratic era in Indian history.”65  Particularly 
after WWII, Aboriginal people found themselves and the spaces in which they resi
increasingly defined in new administrative terms.   
No less than those more familiar analytical “spaces” employed by scholars—
discourse, cultures, reserve geographies, workplaces, city landscapes, or cont
colonial or post-colonial relations have taken form and expression within administrati
contexts.  However, by focusing excessively on questions of politics, law, and geograph
scholars such as political scientist Paul Tennant and geographer Cole Harris have 
overdrawn the conclusion that in BC, “the land question has always been at the top of the 
                                                 
64 Nelson, A Finger in the Wound, 40; Martha Kaplan, Neither Cargo nor Cult: Ritual Politics and the 
Colonial Imagination in Fiji (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).  See also Marcia Stephenson, Gender 
and Modernity in Andean Bolivia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999); Sally Engle-Merry, Colonizing
Hawaiii: The Cultural Power of Law (Princeton, N.J., 2000); Suzana Sawyer, Crude Chronicles: 
digenous
 
 Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in Ecuador (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
ater: Western Canadian Reserve Indians Since Treaty 7 eds. Ian A.L. Getty and Donald B. 
Indian 
In
Press, 2004). 
 
65 Palmer Patterson, “Andrew Paull and the early History of British Columbia Indian Organizations,” in 
ne Century LO
Smith (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978), 47, 53.  See also Wilson Duff, The 
History of British Columbia: The Impact of the White Man (Victoria: Royal British Columbia Museum, 
1997), 73. 
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 agendas of Aboriginal people.”66  While questions of land, resources, and rights remaine
important to Aboriginal people before, during, and after post-war decades,
d 
 
 
social 
p with the 
ers, 
d about getting proper 
program
67 
administrative matters dominated the activities of federal, provincial, and Aboriginal 
leaders during the integrationist era.  H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw, and S.M Jamieson
affirmed this in a mid-1950s social science survey of BC Indian conditions undertaken
for the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.  Their 1955 report states: “The 
and economic welfare of the Indian people is … intimately linked bound u
policies of the [Indian Affairs] Branch.”68  Furthermore, as Sto:lo Ed Kelly rememb
“In those days  [the 1960s and 70s] we were more concerne
s and help for our band members, for the various bands in general, and not so 
much concerned with treaties and so on.”69  For most Aboriginal people in BC at mid-
century, the acquisition of adequate health, welfare, and education were, quite often, 
immediate matters of basic survival and quality of life.  As a result, administrative 
spaces—that ensemble of apparatuses, forces, and interests negotiated in 
multidimensional processes—served as political theatres for the interplay of power 
relationships during the two and a half decades after 1945. 
                                                 
66
Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002),
xxv, xxviii,  
 
67 See Victoria Daily Colonist, 7 September 1958, “‘Equal Rights’ Fight Talk,” 1-2; Victoria Daily 
 Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics, xii; Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, 
 
Colonist, 10 March 1961, “Indians Cite Charter,” 5; Vancouver Sun, 25 March 1969, “BC Indian Land 
Question Put Ahead of Municipality,” 16. 
 
68 H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw, and S.M. Jamieson, “The Indians of British Columbia: A Survey of Social 
and Economic Conditions: A Report to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,” (Vancouver: The 
University of British Columbia, 1955), 980. 
 
69 UVA, Interview with Ed Kelly, Sardis, B.C., 5 June 2002, Interviewed by Byron Plant. 
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 Chapter Four examines the advent of IAB economic development programm
through this lens.  Beginning in the late-1950s, the IAB implemented a range of policies
aimed at integrating Indians into mainstream Canadian life, society, and economy.  Th
initiatives, which fell under the general heading “economic development,” reflected 
growing awareness of Indian underdevelopmen
ing 
 
ese 
t on reserves, the influence of social 
science
it 
 
d it like a 
 
r 
 
tiatives 
                                                                                                                                                
 research on policy decisions, and the need for more appropriate government-
sponsored vocational and employment training.  Economic development schemes also 
provided ways for the IAB to stay public criticisms, reduce welfare costs, and solic
provincial interest in welfare devolution.  It is for these reasons that branch interest in
economic development exploded into the early 1960s; federal officials embrace
tonic; new employment creation and relocation initiatives were described as “work
magic” and capable of resolving at last the so-called “Indian problem.”70  Chapter Fou
consists of micro-case studies tracing the policy cycles of three federal programs: the 
Employment Placement Program (EPP), Community Employment Program (CEP), and 
Community Development Program (CDP).     
As noted, not all policies by their mere existence or bureaucratic-structural origins
had significant impact.  Unlike prior chapters, which show how various policy ini
had a range of effects, Chapter Four contends that federal economic development 
programs had, at best, minor and ephemeral implications.  Despite adopting a novel 
lexicon and appropriating social science discourses about reserves as spaces of 
 
 
70 “Education and Training Work Magic for Young People Coming to City,” The Indian News, July 1965. 
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 “underdevelopment,” the EPP, CDP and CEP were poorly-designed, small-scale, 
piecemeal, and short-lived initiatives that failed to affect more than a small portion of 
Aboriginal people.  The province was willing to assume functions and allocate funds fo
the purposes of integrating schools and hospitals.  BC, however, almost always treated 
Indian economic development on reserves as exclusive federal domain. 
Even within the federal realm, interest in Indian economic development schemes 
was always 
r 
subordinate to broader political interests and agendas.  Chapter Four 
docume  branch 
federal-provincial conference on Indian affairs, the first ever meeting of both levels of 
                                                
nts how parsimonious funding allocations by Cabinet acutely hindered
attempts to implement Indian economic development programming.  In the end, the 
IAB’s experimentation with economic development programming accomplished little.  
Having never gained the support within governments, or the Aboriginal consent and 
participation needed to effect actual change, federal attempts at economic assimilation 
delivered neither integration nor did it lead to subsequent welfare agreements with the 
province.  The history of failed branch economic development programming shows how 
state directives aimed at economically assimilating Indians in Canada paralleled what 
scholars describe in other global settings as colonial policies of “apathetic and ambivalent 
neglect.”71 
Chapter Five begins where Chapter Four ends by examining post-war 
intergovernmental relations regarding Indian welfare, and the proceedings of the 1964 
 
71 See Keith Thor Carlson, The Twisted Road to Freedom: America’s Granting of Independence to the 
Philippines (Diliman, Quezon City: University of Philippines Press, 1995), 3 f.n. 3. 
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 government to specifically discuss Indians administration.  Archival and government 
records are examined in detail to show how, of all Indian policy areas, intergovernmental 
agreem
on 
es how 
t 
 
 welfare 
er 
hallenges Hugh Shewell’s characterization 
of mid-1960s welfare reforms as a step towards the termination of Indians and, more 
general
tate” 
t or as 
                                                
ent over Indian welfare proved the most difficult to achieve.  How and why did 
the province accept some responsibilities for social welfare programs but resist all federal 
offers to share cost or assume responsibility for on-reserve Indian welfare?  Focusing 
the changing character of 1960s intergovernmental relations, Chapter Five discuss
BC came to view Indian welfare as a growing financial burden; federal encouragements 
to devolve Indian welfare in this period did little to dissipate provincial suspicions tha
officials in Ottawa merely sought to offload its own cost obligations onto the provinces. 
In the end, the conflicting interests of both levels of government regarding Indian
acutely hindered the trajectory and parameters of intrastate power.   
Aboriginal people were among those calling most loudly for a provincial takeov
of Indian welfare.  Accordingly, this chapter c
ly, as indicative of the hegemony of the Canadian liberal state and market 
society.72  Evidence suggests that many BC Aboriginal people sought the improved 
benefits from a provincial takeover of Indian welfare and, failing that, found ways to 
manipulate both federal and provincial systems to meet their own interests.  If a “s
policy prevailed or succeeded, it again was of ambivalent neglect.  Indian social 
assistance was never primarily conceived of as a means for economic developmen
 
 
72 Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’, 331. 
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 an effective way to integrate Indians; both federal and provincial officials consistently 
viewed it as a racially-loaded fiscal liability. 
 
The archival record for post-WWII decades provides a rich source for new 
information on policy details, governmental attitudes, and intergovernmental worki
The following analyses are largely founded on a combination of federal Record Group 
and provincial Government Records archival series, departmental annual reports, 
Hansard transcripts, social science publications, and period newspapers.  Some source
gaps admittedly exist.  For instance, prior to the advent of compulsory provincial 
document disposal legislation in 1960 and official Hansard record-keeping in 1972, man
governmental documents were either never created or never saved for posterity.  While 
part of this was symptomatic of the
ngs.  
 
y 
 province’s then preference for small government and 
high m
political memoirs.  Interviews with surviving period officials have been attempted 
herever possible or drawn from other secondary works.  Since most historiographical 
inisterial executive power, it also reflects the fact that BC lacked a department 
solely dedicated to Indian affairs at this time.  Intergovernmental liaisons regarding 
Indians were a complicated parley split along multiple provincial departments and 
personnel.  Provincial perspectives, however, can and have been gleaned from existing 
provincial records as well as a range of supplementary materials including federal 
correspondence, commission reports, provincial dailies, social science literature, and 
w
sources on integrationist policies to date are episodic and policy-specific, such literature 
is engaged in respective chapters. 
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 Any study purporting qualitative assessments about the efficacy of state po
necessarily entails appraisals about the ability of Aboriginal people to adopt, resist, 
ignore, adapt to, or benefi
wer 
t from governmental policies and practices.73  One common 
thread r usion 
of Abo or 
instance, notes how Aboriginal people largely remained peripheral to the integration 
policy development community during the two decades after WWII.   In a study 
authored for the 1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, Douglas 
Brown similarly writes:  
From the Aboriginal perspective, nowhere has their lack of representation 
practically evident as in the institutions of intergovernmental relations.  
 
ately for scholars interested in the ethnohistory of post-war periods, 
many A inalization.  
adily found 
ts, 
re, 
unning through almost all post-war integrationist policies is the virtual excl
riginal people from the executive and decision-making process.  Leslie, f
74
and participation in Canadian government been as symbolically and 
Executive federalism is an exclusive club.75 
The most obvious source for Aboriginal perspectives, of course, are Aboriginal people 
themselves.  Fortun
boriginal people were not passive, complicit, or silent about their marg
Period Aboriginal perspectives, both individual and organizational, can be re
in government records, contemporary and archived oral interviews, social science repor
newspaper accounts, non-governmental organization publications, works of literatu
                                                 
73 The same can be said in vice versa for contemporary studies undertaking cultural and discourse analyses 
at the expense of considerations of policy.  Coll Thrush’s insightful study of inter-ethnic urban relations in 
Seattle, for example, scarcely mentions the role of US termination and relocation policies in motivating US 
Indian urbanization after WWII.  See Coll Thrush, Native Seattle: Histories from the Crossing-Over Place 
iversity of Washington Press, 2007). 
 Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 405-406. 
(Seattle: Un
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 and field historiography.  It is from such sources that Aboriginal perspectives within
study are gleaned. 
Scholarly writings since the mid-1990s on the meaning and impact of 
governmental policies directed towards Aboriginal people have informed a 
historiographical debate concerning colonial power versus Aboriginal agency.  Within 
this debate, some scholars have been charged with writing works that mythologize 
Aboriginal agency and promote a “colonialist alibi,” while others have been accused of 
writing partisan works out of a sense o
 this 
f moral contrition for historical injustices.76  
Others 
c 
 
ltiple 
                                                                                                                                                
have gone as far as to blame scholars sympathetic to Aboriginal causes for 
promoting an “Aboriginal orthodoxy” which sacrifices scholarly integrity for sympatheti
and politically-motivated historical revisionism.77  This dissertation seeks to move the
debate beyond this polarization.  Just as early expressions of colonialism took on mu
forms in BC, ranging from what John Lutz describes as peaceful subordination to outright 
violence of conquest,78 Aboriginal agency too was expressed in myriad, complex ways 
that changed through space and time. 
 
bin Brownlie, “Desperately Seeking Absolution: Native Agency as Colonialist 
libi?” Canadian Historical Review Vol. 74 No. 4 (1994), 543-565; Douglas Cole, J.R. Miller, and Mary-
ity 
original Industry: The 
eception behind Indigenous Cultural Preservation (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
example, see James A. Clifton, The Invented Indian: Cultural Fictions and 
overnment Policies (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1990), 19. 
akúk, 8, 24-25. 
75 Douglas M. Brown, “Aboriginal Peoples and Canadian Federalism,” (Research report undertaken for the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996) [html version], n.p. 
 
76 Mary-Ellen Kelm and Ro
A
Ellen Kelm, "Desperately Seeking Absolution: Responses and a Reply," Canadian Historical Review Vol. 
76 No. 4 (1995), 628-643. 
 
77 Thomas Flanagan, First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Univers
Press, 2000), 4.  See also Frances Widdowson and Albert Howard, Disrobing the Ab
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Press, 2008), 9.  For a US 
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 Complicating the ethnohistorian’s task of ascribing meaning to Aboriginal action 
are ubiquitous deficiencies in language and lexicon.  Even our basic concept of agency, 
as Pierre Bourdieu notes, is problematic since it tends to frame agents as, “eminently 
active and acting, to simple epiphenomena of structure.”  “To endeavor to think th
state,” he explains, “is to take the risk of taking over (or being taken over by) a thought of 
the state, that is, of applying to the state categories of thought produced by the state and 
hence to misrecognize its most profound truth.”
e 
e 
 
o have resembled what James C. Scott terms everyday forms of resistance 
by dise
s 
 also 
n, as 
s of 
                                                
79  Aboriginal people can be said to hav
navigated colonialism with varying levels of “success,” contingent on what terminology 
and evaluative variables one chooses to base such assumptions.  Some Aboriginal agency
could be said t
mpowered social groups; other forms of Aboriginal action might be better 
interpreted as pragmatic strategic and tactical acts, akin to what Michel De Certeau term
the modality of action.80  In addition to actions of resistance, Aboriginal agency can
be said to have included elements of accommodation, cooperation, and cooptatio
shown in the work of Peter Carstens and Taiaiakie Alfred.81  Lastly, some expression
agency might be best seen as owing little to no relation to state forces or “epiphenomena 
of structure.” 
 
79 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
viii, 35. 
 
80 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), xvi; Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 29-30. 
 
81 See Carstens, The Queen's People, 273.  Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous 
Manifesto (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999), 70-80. 
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 In addition to tracing the policy cycles of several administrative areas, this
dissertation is interested in documenting how Aboriginal people plotted course through 
changing post-WWII administrative landscapes.  Whether in the context of health, 
education, or welfare, historians have depicted Aboriginal people as steadfastly 
upholding the systemic provisions of the constitutional relationship with the federal 
government established in 1867.  Long and Boldt, for example, write that “Indians have 
resisted any moves by the federal government to transfer its historical obligations to the
provinces.”
 
 
 
of 
g 
; 
ublic—appear to have vacillated somewhere between these two poles.  
Native organizations, leaders, and individuals adopted fluid strategies when navigating 
82  This study advances new evidence that Aboriginal perspectives on 
administrative integration have never been so static or singular.  In different periods and
policy areas, Aboriginal people both condemned and propounded provincial takeover 
aspects of Indian administration.  Some, such as Andy Paull, focused on resolving the 
land question with Crown authorities in his various political capacities.  Others, includin
Canada’s first ever federally- and provincially-elected Indians, adopted a different tack
MP Len Marchand of the Okanagan Indian Band and Nisga’a MLA Frank Calder both 
publicly demanded that BC assume administrative responsibility for its taxpaying and 
voting Indian populace.83  The most common Aboriginal perspectives, however—both 
political and p
                                                 
82 Long and Boldt, Governments in Conflict? 5.  See also Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 116; Shewell, ‘Enough 
to Keep Them Alive’, 320.  See also John Bird, Lorraine Land and Murray Macadam, eds. Nation to 
ation: Aboriginal Sovereignty and the Future of Canada (Vancouver: Irwin Publishing, 2002). N
 
83 See Victoria Daily Colonist, 15 March 1957, “Let BC Handle Indians,” 6; Vancouver Sun, 4 February 
1966, “MLA Suggests Indian Takeover,” 13.  Calder was reported in 1967 as stating that a BC takeover 
was “what I’ve been fighting for since 1945.” Vancouver Sun, 3 August 1967, “BC Indian Control Bold 
tep, Says Calder,” 3; Province, 24 February 1969, “Provinces Shirk Duty, Declares Indian MP,” 11. S
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 multipl
even 
 
 
ial 
ols 
at 
r, just as governmental policies 
develop e 
 
 
health, education, and welfare for better services.   
e orders of government.  Such behaviour, articulated in both words and actions, 
included combinatory elements of resistance, accommodation, cooperation, and 
abstention.  Highlighting the range of period Aboriginal perspectives that existed, this 
study challenges the prevailing scholarly assumption that Aboriginal people, along with
the provinces, have long- and unitarily-rejected the principle of administration by lower
government. 
The existence of significant period evidence of Aboriginal interest in provinc
administration presents a quandary for historians vis-à-vis the predominance of 
contemporary scholarship and political discourse emphasizing nation-to-nation protoc
and the superlativeness of indigenous-Crown relations.84  At first glance, one might be 
tempted to suggest, as Alan Cairns and Thomas Flanagan have in varying degrees, th
modern expressions of pan-Indian nationalism and political advocacy stand in odd 
contrast to earlier historical antecedents.85  Howeve
ed over time, so too have Aboriginal responses.  That federal policies wer
inadequate might have been novel to non-Indians after WWII; it certainly was not to
those people subjected to them for decades.  Federal Indian policies have always had a 
lackluster track record of success and for this reason alone many Aboriginal people 
turned to those provincial authorities constitutionally responsible and expert in areas of
                                                                                                                                                 
 
nd the Canadian State (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 
, 70-77. 
 
84 See Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1996). 
 
85 Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal People a
65-70; Flanagan First Nations? Second Thoughts1
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 De Certeau terms the practice of everyday action the survivalist mode of 
operation or schemata of action involving systems of operational combination: the 
pluralism of social and individual determinants that inform “‘ways of operating’ or do
things.”
ing 
 
d 
.  No single or unitary “Indian perspective” 
exists b
ls 
y 
 
, 
 
e inter-war period.  “There began to develop in this period,” he 
notes, “  not 
s be 
     
86  It is from this conception of human action as combinatory operations of both
rational and informal logic that aspects of continuity and change, accommodation an
resistance, are highlighted in this history
ut if one did, it might be simply that for most Aboriginal people, the material 
ends—whether they be improved health, better education, or economic well-being—
determined and justified the adoption of a wide array of strategic means.  IAB officia
were not the only ones searching for new strategies to navigate shifting post-WWII 
discursive and bureaucratic landscapes. 
From this perspective, Indian interest in provincial service delivery did not merel
signify cooptation or subscription to the assimilationist and fiscal first logic underpinning 
most devolutionary initiatives.  Rather, most Native people viewed the utilization of
provincial services as fully compatible with their identity and rights, whether as Indians
First Nations, Canadians, or “citizens plus.”  According to historian John Leonard Taylor,
this shift originated in th
concepts of ‘being Indian’ that differed from mere enfranchisement and were
necessarily incompatible with full citizenship.”87  Demands that public service
                                                                                                                                            
 
86 De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xi. 
 
87 John Leonard Taylor, “Canadian Indian Policy During the Inter-War Years,” Ottawa: Research Branch, 
Indian and Northern Affairs, 1984), 7. 
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 rendered free of charge as a constitutional or “Indian” right also appear throughout
archival record, and most often irrespective of which order of government actual
to bear such expense.   
The events of the two and a half decades after WWII thus need to be seen as 
intimately connected to the post-1969 emergence of special Aboriginal rights 
movements, land claims, treaty movements, and the post-1990s surfacing of nation-to-
nation political discourse and rhetoric of indigenous nationalism.  The Aboriginal 
struggle for rights of citizenry was a fundamental, if not necessary, precursor to 
subsequent claims that Aboriginal rights extend above and beyond those of other 
Canadians.  The emergence of large politica
 the 
ly stood 
l pan-Indian organizations, constitutional and 
commo
 at 
r 
 
t policies in this 
period might have failed to deliver on their terms of reference but the implications of 
                                                
n law precedents positing the existence of Aboriginal rights, and modern land 
claims processes in the 1970s and beyond, in short, were intimately rooted in shifting 
intrastate relations in the 1950s and 1960s.  Writing in 1964, anthropologist Wilson Duff 
befittingly predicted: “The story is not over yet, but certainly for the foreseeable future
least, the Indians are not going to be assimilated, but will remain a distinct element of ou
population and our culture.”88 
The post-war era was perhaps most remarkable for the fact that Aboriginal people
began, in every respect, “to move out of the era of irrelevance in which they had been 
cast by the majority population in the nineteenth century.”89  Integrationis
 
88 Duff, The Indian History of British Columbia, 88. 
 
89 Miller, Skyscrapers, 221. 
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 49 
them were felt long after.  New Abori er relations began to take shape in 
th
an germinating effect on the emergence of modern pan-Indian political organizations.  
Nascent power relations for d into the 1970s and 80s as 
Aboriginal people began vo e.
ginal-state pow
is era and in many ways, the release of the 1969 White paper had more a cataclysmic 
th
ged in post-war decades mature
icing and exercising this newfound relevanc
 Chapter Two: 
“‘A Sort of Divided Control and Authority over the Indians’: The Integration of Indian 
Health in British Columbia” 
 
 
I will help her.  I’m not scared. 
1 
ealth 
nd 
nder 
I used to help at times of birth, yes, 
I used to help all the women around here. 
I learned it from my book, my blue doctor’s book. 
I used to read it all the time. 
 
I made up my mind that if she needs help, 
You’ve got to be awfully quick.  There’s two lives there. 
The baby and the mother. 
           —Mary Augusta Tappage (Shuswap), excerpt from “At Birth.”
 
The development of integrated Indian health in British Columbia followed a unique 
historical trajectory which predated the post-WWII era.  As early as the 1910s, 
Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) Annual Reports recorded federal subsidies for the 
purposes of Indian treatments at non-federal hospitals and clinics.2  Integrated h
policies were also unrivaled in terms of their intergovernmental and bureaucratic 
complexities.  Multiple government departments began administering Indian health 
following the 1945 transfer of the Indian Health Service (IHS) from the Indian Affairs 
Branch to the Health Branch of the recently created Department of National Health a
Welfare.  Once removed from IAB auspices, integration with provincial health care 
institutions increased rapidly.  In 1949, the BC government agreed to terms with the 
federal government allowing Indians into provincial hospitals and healthcare plans u
                                                 
1 Mary Augusta Tappage, “At Birth” in Jean E. Speare, ed. The Days of Augusta (Vancouver: Douglas & 
McIntyre, 1992), 28 lines 1-8. 
Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report for 1911-1912, Sessional Papers (27), H-59; 
 
2 See 
Department of Indian Affairs Annual Report for 1912-1913, Sessional Papers (27), H-59. 
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 similar terms as non-Indians.3  The desegregation of BC’s health institutions, along
schooling, wa
 with 
s an area of discernible achievement in “administrative integration.” 
n 
tish 
s 
.  
inal 
n health 
iscal 
st-war health plans.  In addition, a 
unique igh when 
hat 
ation of government.  
Politically, the dire realities of Indian health and welfare made for embarrassing 
Historians to date know very little about the development of provincial Indian 
health care in BC.  The only existing published monograph study of Aboriginal health i
BC is Mary Ellen-Kelm’s Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in Bri
Columbia.  Despite describing itself as a “provincial rather than a national study,” 
Colonizing Bodies pays scant attention to the specific role of lower government in thi
history.4  Similar studies of Indian health policies in other Canadian regions, such as 
those by Maureen Lux and T. Kue Young, also focus predominantly on federal contexts
While the national government played an important part in the provision of Aborig
health throughout the 1900s, provincial agencies had begun administering India
care long prior to mid-century.  Health was an area of increasing governmental 
responsibility and humanitarian interest, particularly after WWII.  Overall economic 
prosperity and rising government revenues allowed for expansion of the public health 
purse.  BC’s governments even appeared willing to accept some administrative and f
responsibility for Indian health as part of their po
combination of moral, humanitarian, and assimilationist impetuses ran h
it came to health; neither level of government wanted to be culpable for opposing w
most Canadians came to see as a basic human right and oblig
                                                 
3 BC initiated its first buy-in health care system in 1949 with the BC Hospital Insurance Plan. 
 
4 See Mary-Ellen Kelm, Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-
950 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), 176. 1
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 headlin
contagi
r smoothly or 
without considerable conflict.  Federal and provincial governments might have agreed 
about the need to desegregate BC’s hospitals and to displace indigenous medicinal 
practices with western clinical ones, but implementation was another matter.  Federal-
provincial clashes over the cost and control of Indian health erupted after WWII and 
continued well past mid-century.  Late-1960s disputes involving Prince Rupert’s Miller 
Bay Indian Hospital and the implementation of universal healthcare in BC exemplified 
both the advent of conflictual executive era federalist relations as well as familiar 
constants in the history of Indian health service delivery: unofficial policies of 
ambivalence, fiscal evasion, and benign neglect.  The convoluted and strained evolution 
of integrated Indian health in BC underscores how, as with every other integrationist 
policy area, combinations of intergovernmental politicking, jurisdictional ambiguities, 
financial first principles, and assimilative interests both facilitated and impeded the 
implementation of “administrative integration.” 
Indigenous people’s experience with Canadian health systems involved 
bureaucracies, bodies, and minds.  Describing the emergence of Western medical 
        
es and photo journalist reports, while also stoking non-Aboriginal fears of 
on.5   
Advances in the integration of Indian health, however, did not occu
discourse in the eighteenth century, Michel Foucault notes: 
                                                                                                                                         
C Indians,” 2; Province, 4 March 
948, “Four Indian Children Die in Epidemic,” 8; Victoria Daily Colonist, 18 September 1955, “Sick 
 
5 For examples see Victoria Daily Colonist, 18 March 1943, “Tuberculosis among Indians Threat to 
Others," 2; Victoria Daily Times, 24 March 1944, “Lack of Doctors Hits B
1
Indians Starving to Death in Abject Squalor in Alberta,” 13. 
 
52 
 For clinical experience to become possible as a new form of knowledge, a 
patient in society, and the establishment of a certain relationship between 
became necessary; the patient has to be enveloped in a collective, 
6
 
7
8
reorganization of the hospital field, a new definition of the status of the 
public assistance and medical experience, between help and knowledge, 
homogenous space.  
BC’s hospitals were “collective, homogenous space,” and in both discursive and physical 
senses.  Provincial institutions were individualizing, clinical, and impersonal, and, in 
many ways, alien to both traditional forms of indigenous medicine and prior forms of 
federal Indian health care.   More generally, escalating federal and provincial interest in 
Indian health around mid-century reflected what Foucault describes as the highest 
function of post-classical regimes: the administration of populations and the preservation 
of life.  Foucault termed this a biopolitics of the population, the establishment of new 
bodily interventions and regulatory controls.   This trend found expression in the 
Canadian context, particularly once general economic growth and rising government 
revenues from the late-1940s on allowed for expansion of the national health service. 
While state attempts to displace Aboriginal medicinal practices and beliefs 
undoubtedly had significant biopolitical underpinnings and assimilationist implications, 
Aboriginal people were not uninterested or uninvolved agents in this history.  Ample 
evidence indicates that Aboriginal people increasingly sought out and accessed provincial 
                                                 
rd 
E. Trafzer and Diane Weiner (New York: Altamira Press, 2001), 98-100. 
 
8 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume One: An Introduction (New York: Vintage Books, 
990), 139. 
6 Michel Foucault, Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception (London: Vintage Books, 
1975), 196. 
 
7 Treatments by nurses and traveling doctors, for example, often took place in patient homes, akin to 
treatments delivered by traditional tribal healers.  See Nancy Reifel, “American Views of Public Health 
Nursing, 1930-1950,” Medicine Ways: Disease, Health, and A Survival among Native Indians eds. Cliffo
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 and private health institutions throughout the twentieth century.  They did so irrespecti
of historical precedents or constitutional provisos regarding Indians’ relationship with the
federal government, almost always demanding, in both words and actions, that state 
health services be delivered satisfactorily and free of charg
ve 
 
e.  Aboriginal people’s 
engage s 
east 
ot, as 
l 
 
 
alth 
rovision. 
 
rs, 
nd other lay dispensers provided the earliest forms of state Indian health care.  Shortly 
                                                                            
ment, often entanglement, with western hospitals, doctors, and health officials wa
the consequence of a combination of pressures, needs, and normative forces, not the l
of which was a basic desire for improved quality of life.  Aboriginal agency was n
suggested by scholars such as Kelm, limited to simple acts of resistance or cultura
resiliency vis-à-vis a colonial incursion of western medicine.  Rather, Aboriginal people
navigated both federal and provincial health institutions by adopting innovative 
strategies, practices, and epistemologies to cope with changing pathogenic and 
biomedical landscapes.  Thus, though it has been unappreciated by historians to date, the 
remarkable rebound of Aboriginal populations that began prior to mid-century was, in no
small part, a result of Aboriginal people manipulating and taking advantage of he
service improvements afforded by integrationist measures in Indian health care p
Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal health relations in BC stretch back to the fur trade era.   
Prior to the formation of the Indian affairs department in 1880, missionaries, fur trade
a
after its creation in 1880, the Department of Indian Affairs adopted an ad hoc Indian 
health policy consisting of the delivery of basic medical services by Indian agents and 
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 churches via residential schools.9  Despite maintaining that it had no legal obligation, 
whether by statutory, treaty, or constitutional law, to provide Indians with medical 
the federal government nonetheless provided it via limited involvement and annual 
appropriations to various departments for that purpose.
care, 
ssimilationist policy design.  In this regard, early 
Aborig
bell 
dians” 
                                                
10   
Federal Indian health services in this period tended to be minimalist, born from 
cost considerations, and rooted in the fatalistic view that the Indian race was soon to 
disappear, either by natural or a
inal health care provision differed little from other executive policy areas 
administered by the DIA under officials like Deputy Superintendent Duncan Camp
Scott: underfunded, minimalist, and informed by racial theories about the inferiority of 
“Indians.”  As Lux notes in the Canadian plains context, early state health care was 
rooted in a complex interrelated set of assimilationist motivations, federal self-interests, 
public fears of contagion, and social Darwinist ideas about the incapability of “In
to resist disease.  More generally, she notes, “Successive Canadian governments 
continued to see disease as the cause, rather than the symptom, of a much larger 
 
 
able, and shaped by interdepartmental 
ersonalities.  James B. Waldram, D. Ann Herring, and T. Kue Young, Aboriginal Health in Canada: 
004), 176. 
 1876 and 1880 Acts stipulated that the Superintendent retained the power to use band funds to care 
r “sick or disabled, or aged and destitute persons.” This provision, however, appears to have only been 
67-
t of 
 
9 As James B.Waldram, D. Ann Herring, and T. Kue Young note, early state medical care provision under
the Indian Affairs Department was ad hoc, regionally-vari
p
Historical, Cultural, and Epidemiological Perspectives (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2
 
10 The
fo
used in the case of bands with available funds to pay part-time physicians.  Statutes of Canada [or SC] 
(1876), c.18, s.73; SC (1880), c.28, s. 84.  G. Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 18
1967,” Medical Services Journal of Canada Vol. 23 (February 1967), 116.  According to the Departmen
National Health and Welfare, “A health service for native Indian and Eskimo was developed as a 
voluntarily assumed moral obligation on the part of the government.”  See Canada, Department of National
Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1947-48, 40. 
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 economic and political problem.”11  Such views justified the provision of meager federal 
health policies for close to two generations.  Low budget allocations, limited staff 
capabilities, and the formidable task of administering health to a population spanning al
parts of the country m
l 
eant that early Indian health care consisted of short-term disease 
control re 
was cou  
other administrative matters.  
The inadequacy of Indian health services in the early twentieth century was the 
source of numerous inter-departmental and intergovernmental controversies.  The 
conflicts between Scott and Peter H. Bryce, the DIA’s first medical inspector appointed 
in 1904 to oversee Indian health, have been well-documented.   Along with Bryce, 
provincial officials were early critics of federal Indian health policy.  As early as 1909, 
the secretary to the BC Provincial Board of Health voiced concern over fears of 
contagion, the disgraceful to near criminal sanitation standards in the province’s Indian 
villages, and the inadequate levels of Aboriginal health maintained by the federal Indian 
                                                
 rather than longer-term preventative, acute, or palliative care.  Indian health ca
ched low in the priorities of a disorganized department preoccupied with a host of
12
13
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25. 
 See E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs 
 
ersion of 
g forced to retire in 1921.  Graham-Cumming, “Health 
f the Original Canadians, 1867-1967,” 125. 
11 Maureen K. Lux, Medicine That Walks: Disease, Medicine, and Canadian Plains Native People, 1880
1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 192. 
 
12 As C.R. Maundrell notes, “A study of the reports and correspondence impresses one with the 
disorganization of the services.”  See Graham-Cumming, “
1
 
13
in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986), 83-7; Waldram, Herring, and Young, Aboriginal Health in
Canada, 156-8.  Lux, Medicine that Walks, 196.  Bryce, an outspoken critic of the standards of medical 
care delivered by the government and churches in the residential schools, had advocated the conv
Indian schools into sanatoria.  Bryce ended up bein
o
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 department.14  As a solution, Bryce proposed the creation of a federal health departmen
under which Indian health services would be transferred.  An early bill was tabled 
proposing to do precisely this but it never passed third reading.  Prime Minister Arthur 
Meighen explained: 
I do not think … it would be practicable for [the health department] to do that 
of divided control and authority over the Indians which would produce confusion 
15
 
16
t 
work, because [it would] duplicate the organization … and there would be a sort 
and insubordination and other ill effects among the Indians themselves.  
While the transfer would not occur for another twenty-five years, interim steps to create a 
modern Indian medical health service came in 1927 when a Medical Branch was created 
in the DIA headed by a medical superintendent, Col. E.L. Stone.   Still, budgetary 
considerations exerted powerful constraint on the development of Indian health services 
in these years.  In 1930-31, the budget devoted to Indian health hit an all time high of 
$1,061,278 only to be cut during the peak years of the Depression by almost 25%.   By 
1934, two years before oversight of Indian affairs was transferred from the DIA to the 
Department of Mines and Resources, the per capita amount allocated for non-Native 
health services was over three times higher than that paid to Indians.   The DIA’s 
17
18
                                                 
14 C.J. Fagan, Secretary for the Provincial Board of Health, Provincial Board of Health report for 1909
British Columbia, Sessional Papers 1910 in Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 49, f.n. 58. 
 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 86, f.n. 10. 
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15 T. Kue Young, Health Care and Cultural Change: The Indian Experience in the Central Subarctic 
 
16 Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1947-48, 40. 
 
 By 1935-36, the budget finally reached pre-Depression current rates.  See “Indian Health Service, 
tary Vote,” in Canada, Special Joint Committee of the 
enate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of 
 Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 1867-1967,” 126. 
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Ordinary and Special Expenditure from Parliamen
S
Proceedings and Evidence, No. 3 (June 6, 1946). 
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 reluctance, or inability, to provide better Indian health services was, as one early critic 
put it, “The Story of a National Crime.”  Early state healthcare hardly resembled a potent 
and exacting colonial force, but rather typified what Young terms in his study of Indian 
health i ance 
 
 
ial 
es 
 
 
l 
services.”  The recommendation, however, was only tentative.  Since administrative 
   
n the Central Subarctic as policies of “benign neglect” in which “public assist
in the area of health and welfare in Canada was made available only to an irreducible
minimum number of ‘indigents.’”19  Since no statutory obligation existed for government
to provide health services to Indians, officials could spin any state medical assistance as 
either gracious acts of benevolence or as deliberate steps towards the goal of Indian soc
integration, whenever it suited political expediency or deflected public criticism.   
In the years immediately prior to WWII, calls for reforms in Indian health 
escalated.  In 1937, the Rowell-Sirois Commission into Dominion-provincial relations 
heard submissions urging greater provincial controls of Indian health services.  Reserv
were described as “focal points of infection for tuberculosis and other communicable 
diseases”; provinces could do little to protect themselves so long as medical services for
Indians were federally-controlled.20  The commission’s final report recommended that
integrationist steps be taken and that “The Dominion should consider carefully the 
possibility … of buying provincial services rather than establishing its own medica
integration in Indian health was not seen as significantly reducing costs or duplication 
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19 Young, Health Care and Cultural Change, 90. 
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Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book II, Recommendations, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1954), 35 f.n. 25. 
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 betwee setting 
 
k 
dicinal 
ost 
mented the 
ongoin
oth 
n levels of government, the commission speculated that “there may be off-
advantages in the present arrangement which outweigh the financial considerations.”21
 
Aboriginal people in BC, as in other regions of Canada, sought out and too
advantage of Euro-Canadian medical services throughout the post-contact period.22  
While many undoubtedly rejected Canadian medicine outright, and traditional me
practices and beliefs endured well into early twentieth century decades and beyond, m
Aboriginal people took a piecemeal and pragmatic approach to health treatments.  No 
singular “Indian” health perspective existed by the mid-twentieth century.  Rather, 
Aboriginal people innovated old and adopted new medical practices in response to 
changing pathogenic and biomedical landscapes.  The multitude of Indian attitudes and 
responses towards Canadian health services created considerable confusion for those 
officials unilaterally dismissive of the effectiveness or worth of indigenous medicinal 
practices.  For instance, at the same time the 1946 DNHW Annual Report la
g influence of “the medicine man … even where modern medical methods are 
available,” then Chief Medical Officer Moore wrote elsewhere that “on the whole b
Indians and Eskimos have come to respect and ask for ‘white man’s medicine.’”23 
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22 See Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 19
 Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Report, Book II, Recommendations, 178, f.n. 24. 
47-8, 222; 
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al People in British Columbia,” (BA 
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1774-1874 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999); Byron King Plant, “‘The M
Human Race is Subject’: The 1862-3 Smallpox Epidemic and Aborigin
Honours Thesis: The University of Victoria, 2000). 
 
23 Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1946-47, 31; P.E. Moore, “Indian
ervices,” Canadian Journal of Public Health Vol. 37 (1946), 141. 
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 For many Aboriginal people, a common response to introduced forms of 
Canadian medicine entailed what Kelm and Lux describe as “medical pluralism”: the 
incorporation of western medical knowledge into more familiar or “traditional” 
indigenous practices and epistemologies of bodily and spiritual health.  As noted, 
“White” diseases were often seen as best treated by “White” medicine, hence, as Lux 
suggests, western medical dispensaries offered “a number of novel medicines, or 
replacement medicines, and the people incorporated these into their own therapeutic 
regime.”24  As Nancy Reifel notes in a brief but insightful study of twentieth-century 
Southe
 did other 
proactive European efforts and Aboriginal interest in staying the disease.26 
A recurrent theme in extant studies of Aboriginal-Canadian health relations is the 
otion that Aboriginal people have steadfastly held the federal government solely 
  
rn Dakota Indian views of public health nursing, “The people were survivors.  
Indians treated the imposition of white medicine in much the same way as they
aspects of their interactions with white people.  They incorporated what was necessary 
for survival into their cultural practices.”25  In BC, colonist and missionary reports as 
early as 1862 cited thousands of Indians accepting inoculation as a combined result of 
n
responsible for Indian health provision.  As Kelm argues, “Throughout the bureaucratic 
expansion, the financial cutbacks, and the administrative consolidation, Aboriginal 
people maintained one perspective on Indian Health Services: that the federal 
                                                                                                                                               
Coming of the Pestilence, 185. 
 
24 Lux, Medicine that Walks, 227; Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 154, 172. 
 
25 Reifel, “American Views of Public Health Nursing,” 104-5. 
 
26 See Plant, “‘The Most Dreadful Scourge,’” 42-44; Boyd, The 
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 government was responsible for primary care in their communities.”27  Some evidence 
certainly lends credibility to this view.  Decades prior to the establishment of judicia
precedents, such as the 1984 Guerin decision’s affirmation of federal trust obligati
Indians, many viewed the Crown as having fiduciary and administrative responsibilities 
to Indians, responsibilities that included health care services. 
l 
ons to 
 
 regardless of whether 
practiti W 
ntially 
as much as 13% of the total Indian population) received treatment in 434 provincial and 
                     
28  Peart affirmed this in 
1961 before the JC when he stated, “a widespread belief which is shared by Indians and
Eskimos [is] that health services are in fact a federal responsibility and the public 
expenditures in this field lend substance to this view.”29   
Most evidence indicates that BC Aboriginal people increasingly interacted with 
Western medicine throughout the twentieth century, but
oners were of federal, provincial, or private affiliation.30  For instance, the DHN
estimated in its 1945-46 Annual Report that 16,239 Indian patients nationally (pote
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27 See Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 116.  See also Young, Health Care and Cultural Change, 92.  
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29 Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 62. 
 
30 The published memoirs of traveling doctors in the 1940s document numerous similar examples of 
Aboriginal interest in state medical services in remote regions of BC and Manitoba.  See Cameron 
Corrigan, “Medical Practice among the Bush Indians of Northern Manitoba,” in The Canadian Medical 
Association Journal Vol. 54 (1946), 334-348; 380-383; Richard G. Foulkes, “Medics in the North: A 
History of the Contributions of the Royal Canadian Air Force to the Medical Care of Civilians in the Fort 
Nelson Area, Part I,” The Medical Services Journal of Canada (July-August 1962), 523-550; R
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the Royal Canadian Air Force to the Medical Care of Civ
M ces Journal of Ca
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 locally-operated hospitals through contractual and special arrangements.31  Of BC’
Indian population of 25,515, 4,882 cases were reportedly treated in 55 non-federal 
hospitals.
s 1946 
s 
 
ing 
out, and
32  By the mid-1960s estimates of the percentage of Indians in receipt of 
treatment at provincial facilities climbed to range from 25-50%.33  Indians were known to 
independently enroll in the plans of private medical insurers; some Indian bands went a
far as to hire their own private physicians, and even when the services of a department 
doctor were available.34  Though her analysis downplays it as evidence of Aboriginal
political opportunism, class dynamics, and even cooptation, Kelm’s Colonizing Bodies 
also documents numerous instances of BC Aboriginal people voluntarily taking, seek
 demanding “White” medicine prior to 1950.35 
It is not surprising that Aboriginal people increasingly turned to state hospitals 
and medical practitioners during this period.  Prior to the 1950s, a range of deadly 
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e 
mbia, 
 of Three 
rs and Northern 
. 
2
Indian Advisory Committee reported that over 50% of the on- and off-reserve Indian population of th
province was receiving public health nursing services under provincial health agencies.  British Colu
Indian Advisory Committee, Annual Report, 1965, 14; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, 
File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Federal Provincial Conference, Appendix D, Health Services Provided to Indians by 
Provincial and Community Facilities,” 3; D.B. Fields and W.T. Stanbury, “The Economic Impact of the 
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evels of Government,” (Ottawa: A Study for the Department of Indian AffaiL
Development, 1968), 104. 
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35 See Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 38, 105, 108-9, 134, 135, 141, 150, 151, 161
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 diseases including influenza, measles, whooping cough, and scarlet fever ravaged 
Aboriginal communities.  Tuberculosis, the “captain of the hosts of death,” was a majo
contributor to high Indian mortality and morbidity rates throughout much of the first half
of the twentieth century.
r 
 
l responses 
 
ille-Calmette-Guerin vaccine, and new preventative 
measur tical 
 
 
onvention that 
tion 
                                                                                                                                                
36  As both Kelm and Lux note, however, early federa
to treat Indian TB were sluggish and minimalist.  While federal interest in TB control 
gradually increased into the 1920s—motivated by a combination of non-Native fears of
contagion, the advent of the Bac
es—it was not until the 1945 transfer that the federal government had the poli
will or financial ability to implement significant preventative and treatment steps.37 
BC Aboriginal people were not only active in their liaisons with western hospitals
and doctors; they also were among the most vocal critics of Indian health care policy,
whether under branch, DNHW, or later, provincial oversight.  For instance, Herbert 
Cook, General Secretary of the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, wrote to the 
Indian Commissioner for BC in 1944 expressing concern about off-reserve Indians 
having to pay their own hospital bills.  The NBBC resolved at its annual c
year that hospitals or nurse services be delivered in BC and that “[s]erious considera
 
61), 1012; Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 
945-46, 27; Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1947-48, 43.  Of these 990, 269 
nual Report, 1945-46, 27. 
n under the Department of 
ines and Resources, except in cases where contagion threatened non-Indian communities.  For example, 
ventative 
easures in control of TB.  Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 1867-1967,” 125.  See 
 
36 In 1946, for instance, 723 Indians in Canada perished from the disease.  P.E. Moore, “No Longer 
Captain: A History of Tuberculosis and its Control Amongst Canadian Indians,” Canadian Medical 
Association Journal Vol. 84 (19
1
were in sanatoria, 412 in Departmental hospitals, 237 in general hospitals, and 72 in preventoria.  
Department of National Health and Welfare, An
 
37 Up until that time, tuberculosis prevention and control received modest attentio
M
Bryce earlier attempted unsuccessfully to acquire a special parliamentary vote of $20,000 for pre
m
also Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 119-121; Lux, Medicine that Walks, 191-92. 
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 should be given to the need of better medical care.”38  The Quatsino Band on northern 
Vancouver Island also voiced complaint over their inability to access the local private 
hospita
the issu
n 
 service delivery than the 
Fraser 
lth 
service Nisga’a MLA for Atlin, 
 
 Victoria complained that a nurse had not set foot on the reserve for 
over a y
inal 
     
l in Port Alice, further demanding that the provincial government take action on 
e.39  Three years later, interior Indians and the North American Indian 
Brotherhood (NAIB) under Frank Assu petitioned the DNHW for the construction of a
interior Indian TB hospital, to provide more accessible health
Valley Sardis hospital.40 
Aboriginal protests over the inadequacy of and lack of access to state hea
s continued after mid-century.  In 1950, Frank Calder, the 
requested that the provincial government establish an air ambulance service for northern
BC Indians to alleviate health concerns.41  In 1954, Chief Ed Underwood of the East 
Saanich band near
ear.  Arthur Albany, Chief of the neighbouring Songhees, also noted the need for 
nurses on their reserve in a Victoria Daily Colonist report.42  For many other Aborig
groups residing in small villages spanning wide geographies, such as the 
Kwakwaka’wakw of the south central BC coast, demands for improved health care 
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40 Vancouver Sun, 24 January 1949, “Indians Ask for Interior TB Hospital,” 16. 
 
41 , 9 March 1950, “Atlin MLA Asks Gov’t for Plane Ambulance Service,” 9. 
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 services motivated physical relocations.  Jack and Dot Nolie, for example, explain 
1960s move from New Vancouver to Alert Bay in these terms: 
Jack: There was nobody there, no boat, radio phone, nothing. Our little daught
Dot: … All my kids were sick. One died. And that’s the reason why we lef
Pete Cook also notes how relocations for health purposes only became more common
once federal Indian day schools began closing in the 1960s: 
Well, I would say it’s part of the government’s fault. School, everything. 
their 
er 
got sick. In the village they got nobody to call, and she died. 
t.43 
 
 
They wouldn’t support the school there [Tourner Island]. … [T]he people 
times we had to travel, through the gale, gale force wind, just to bring 
 
 
hcare was a matter of life 
and dea and 
provinc oem in 
the ope eople 
were no  mid-
century.  Indeed, into the 1960s, Aboriginal women emerged as some of the most vocal 
                                                                                               
had to move [to Alert Bay].  And mainly for the hospital too. And other 
somebody to the hospital here, which was really tough.44 
Cook himself relocated to Victoria specifically for health reasons: “I didn’t move there 
because I wanted to. I was against it. But if I didn’t I guess I would have been gone a
long time ago.”45 
For people such as Cook and the Nolies, access to healt
th at mid-century; many embraced the services offered by both federal 
ial facilities for this simple reason.  Shuswap Mary Augusta Tappage’s p
ning epigraph to this chapter can also be read as affirming that Aboriginal p
t culturally predisposed to reject western medical knowledge long before
                                                  
lant.  
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 UVA, In ook, Alert Bay, B.C., 8 July 2003, interviewed by Byron Plant. 
 
43 UVA, Interview with Jack and Dot Nolie, Alert Bay, B.C., 21 May 2003, interviewed by Byron P
James Sewid also cites the death of his stepfather Johnny as reason for his family’s move from River’s Inle
cannery to Village Island.  James Sewid and James P. Spradley, Guests Never Leave Hungry; the 
Autobiography of James Sewid, a Kwakiutl Indian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 20-21. 
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 advoca  
Columb dian Homemakers’ Association went as far as to accuse the government of 
racial bias and neglect in the provision of Indian health services.  One representative 
noted, “I have seen people die because health services available to whites are not 
available to Indians.”   It is further shown below how Aboriginal people forwarded 
grievances and demands to both provincial and federal authorities for better health 
services after concerted steps to integrate Indian health services with BC began.  
As noted, BC officials also criticized federal Indian health policy prior to the 1945 
transfer of the Indian Health Service from the IAB to the DNHW.  Even though British 
Columbia’s per diem rate for operating Indian hospitals was the highest of all provinces, 
BC MPs voiced complaints about poor quality of federal Indian health care services 
under IAB control.  To one such critique raised during the 1944 federal estimates debate, 
the Minister of Mines and Resources, T.A. Crerar, responded: 
The committee knows as well as I do that we have been limited in the 
clearly evident that in future years the federal government whose wards 
hospital treatment than it has spent in the past.  I am bound to add that our 
experience to date indicates that we can provide that treatment just as 
erated by the department as 
     
tes for improvements in government health provision.  In 1968, the British
ia In
46
47
amount of money provided by parliament for this purpose. … It seems 
the Indians are will have to spend considerably more money for Indian 
efficiently, just as completely in hospitals op
we can in outside hospitals, and there is no question of the comparison in 
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 costs.  We operate our Indian hospitals substantially lower than what we 
48
 
49
are paying in other hospitals.  
Crerar unknowingly foreshadowed the precise reasons why the transfer would occur one 
year later: the IAB, both then and previously, had neither the financial means nor clout 
within government to expand an Indian medical service.  One year later, the disadvantage 
of having health services administered by a department principally concerned with the 
systemic assimilation of Indians and a host of other administrative matters was finally 
recognized and acted upon.   Effective November 1 1945, Indian Health Services 
became the concern of the DNHW, a newly-created department principally focused on 
improving Canadian health and welfare standards. 
Frequently mentioned in early DNHW Annual Reports, TB morbidity was of 
primary concern to the new health service.  The department immediately set about 
combating the disease, conducting surveys, improving equipment and personnel, and 
 and 
rculosis.50  Such steps 
recruiting provincial support via its Tuberculosis Prevention and Control Campaign
the Advisory Committee for the Control and Prevention of Tube
seemed to have an immediate impact.  Between 1948 and 1949, the IHS estimated that 
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49 Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1945-46, 25; Department of National Heal
and Welfare, Annual Report, 1946-47, 13; Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 1867-
967,” 127.  Responsibility for Eskimos, previously under Northwest Territories
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 administration, was 
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 this campaign, 
-ray 
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included in the transfer to the Department of National Health and Welfare. 
 
50 Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1945-46, 27; Department of National Healt
nd Welfare, Annual Report, 1947-48, 43; Moore, “No Longer Captain,” 1014.  As part ofa
annual or biennial surveys of children and staff in residential schools were attempted.  Greater use of x
and the Bacillus Calmette-Guerin vaccine, discovered to provide a degree of resistance to mycobacterium
were also adopted to combat tuberculosis beginning in earnest in 1948-49.  Department of National Health 
and Welfare, Annual Report, 1948-49, 106.  By 1963 it was estimated that half of the Indian population 
67 
 the mortality rate dropped 30% in one year alone.51  Around 1950 TB ceased to be the 
highest cause of Indian deaths; from 1951 to 1954, TB fell from being the second to t
eighth highest cause of death among Indians.
he 
 eight 
did not 
es 
 of 
began to more closely parallel those of non-Indians.55  Acute respiratory 
infectio  
52  That same year the IAB’s monthly 
newsletter, The Indian News reported that tuberculosis deaths had dropped 90% in
years.53   TB mortality rates continued to gradually drop although epidemics 
disappear after WWII.  Sporadic series of “moderate epidemics” of TB and other diseas
touched parts of Canada over the next two decades in northern Alberta, Manitoba, 
Ontario, and the Arctic.54 
While Indian mortality and morbidity rates remained far above those of non-
Indians, an identifiable shift had begun by the mid-1950s in which the main causes
Indian mortality 
ns like pneumonia remained the leading cause of Aboriginal deaths after 1950 but
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52 Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1956-57, 93.  Conflicting evidence points to 
1948-50 or 1952 as the time during which TB ceased to be the highest cause of Indian mortality.  See Ibid.; 
P.E. Moore, “Medical Care of Canada’s Indians and Eskimos,” Canadian Journal of Public Health Vol. 47 
No. 6 (June 1956), 228; Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 1867-1967,” 141. 
 
 Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1961-62, 98.  By 1961, the mortality rate 
948-
en’s Printer, 1961), 
ed in different parts of 
 WWII as a result of increased 
53
per 100,000 population had dropped from a high of 579 in 1946 to 22.2 in 1961. “Population Exceeds 
200,000 – Expanded Services Boon the Indians,” The Indian News, June 1963. 
 
54 The worst outbreak took place in 1953 when poliomyelitis struck the area west of Hudson Bay, causing 
over ninety cases and fourteen deaths.  Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1
49, 108; Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 1867-1967,” 145, 148. 
 
55 See British Columbia, Department of Health Services and Hospital Insurance, Vital Statistics of the 
Province of British Columbia, Eighty-Ninth Report for the Year 1960 (Victoria: Que
6; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1944-45, 167.  Health improvement variJ1
Canada.  Northern groups, for instance, faced higher morbidity rates during
on-Native immigration to more remote regions.  n
68 
 accident-based mortalities moved from fourth to second place.  Chronic heart disea
number one killer of non-Indians, shifted from the sixth to the third highest cause o
Indian fatality.
se, the 
f 
in Aboriginal morbidity and mortality variables after 
WWII  
Aborig
infrastructure.  Changes to Indian health administration also played an important role.  
as 
dian 
significantly improve after 1945.  Between 
1925 an  
 
56  Improvements 
were the result of a range of inter-related factors, including betterments in
inal incomes, standards of living, social welfare services, and reserve 
The new attention given to education and preventative medicine under the DNHW w
something virtually absent under the prior treatment-focused branch-run system.57  
According to BC regional health inspector William Barclay, increasing TB control 
allowed the IHS “to devote more time to fighting other diseases among the In
population.”58   
Indian infant mortality rates, what Lux describes as, “the most sensitive index of 
the health status of any people,” also began to 
d 1955, Young records that Native infant deaths per 1000 live births dropped by
roughly 300% nationally; from 1956 to 1970, the rate continued to decline by an 
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56 Vancouver Sun, 3 December 1955, “TB Among Indians now on Decline,” 52; Department of National 
ealth and Welfare, Annual Report, 1956-57, 93; Department of National Health anH
Report, 1961-62, 98.  Cancer and neoplasm, despite being a high cause of non-Native mortality, was of lo
equency among Aboriginal people.  See Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, fr
1961-62, 98; O.H. Warwick and A.J. Phillips, “Cancer among Canadian Indians,” British Journal of 
Cancer Vol. 8 (1954), 223-30. 
 
57 DNHW preventative measures included immunization for smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough, and 
typhoid.  Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1945-46, 26. 
 
58 Indian News, August 1954, “Fight against T.B. Shows Great Progress.” 
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 additional 60%, 20% more than the concurrent reduction in the non-Native rate.59  
Reflecting on this trend in 1962, George Manuel told the Kamloops Branch of the 
Registered Nurses Association: 
Ever since an enlightened government policy has provided free medical 
total population.  This is due partly to the increased birthrate, but there can 
decisive factor.
services to the Indian people, there has been an amazing increase in the 
be no doubt that the sharp decline in infant-mortality has also been a 
 
d non-Native 
gaps in  
more capable than the IAB in meeting the medical needs of a burgeoning Aboriginal 
60 
Whether or not government health policies were “enlightened” aside, what appears 
certain is that declining infant mortality rates drove a uniquely post-WWII “Aboriginal 
baby boom” that paralleled and outlasted the non-Native baby boom that subsided in the 
early 1960s.61  While both Kelm and Lux downplay the importance of early 
improvements in Aboriginal infant survival vis-à-vis continuous Native an
 child mortality rates, mid-century improvements in this area might very well be
the most important sub-story in this history.62 
With a clear mandate, larger budget, and professional staff, the DNHW proved 
population.  Shortly after the war, the department converted two decommissioned 
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h of Non-Europeans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
and Methodological Commentary,” (RCAP Research Report, University of Manitoba Winnipeg, Manitoba 
February 1994) n.p. [html version]; Young, Health Care and Cultural Change, 45. 
 
60 George Manuel, The Indian News, October 1962, “Respect the Old Ways and Accept the New Ways.” 
 
61 See Doug Owram, Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby-Boom Generation (Toronto: Univer
of Toronto Press, 1996), ix, 5. 
 
62 See Lux, Medicine That Walks, 223; Kelm, Colonizing Bodies, 5-6.  Canadian scholars have rarely linked
changes in Aboriginal mortality and morbidity rates to administrative changes, and despite growing 
comparative literature. See Stephen J. Kunitz, Disease and Social Diversity: The European Impact on the 
Healt
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 wartime hospitals into new Indian health facilities via the coordination of the Committe
on Wartime Hospitals and Hospitalization.  A former Royal Canadian Air Force facility 
near Prince Rupert became the 180-bed Miller Bay Indian Hospital; in Nanaimo, a form
Department of National Defense facility was turned into a 220-bed facility.  At the tim
of the 1945 transfer, BC’s sole Indian hospital was Sardis’s Coqualeetza hospital, 
formerly a residential school and preventorium remodeled and reopened as a 180-bed
sanatorium in 1941.
e 
er 
e 
 
rom 
sion of 
 was 
 
agency  
    
63  The number of nursing stations and dispensaries,64 an ongoing 
source of primary health care services for many Aboriginal people in BC, increased f
nine in 1946 to forty three in 1961.  Budget figures further reflect the rapid expan
the Indian health care system after WWII.  In 1946-47 the budget for Indian health
$3,853,425; by 1961-62 that figure had grown six fold to $23,790,411.65 
Even though the transfer of Indian health responsibility to another federal line
 facilitated new funding and efficiency, challenges remained for Indian health
administrators.  As in education, staff shortages were an ongoing problem.  The demand 
                                                                                                                                             
Longer Captain,” 1014; Vancouver Sun, 9 June 1945, “Indians Take over RCAF Hospital,” 2; See also 
Keith Thor Carlson, You Are Asked to Witness: The Sto:lo in Canada’s Pacific Coast History (Chilliwack, 
BC: Sto:lo Heritage Trust, 1997), 100-101. 
ive 
solated or semi-isolated regions with limited services.  In BC, a nurse station was 
cated at Port Simpson while Lillooet, New Westminster, Kitimaat, Hazelton, and Bella Coola housed 
7 in 1946 to 117 in 1961.  The number of nurses grew 
om 119 in 1946 to 696 in 1961.  Indian News, June 1963, “Population Exceeds 200,000 – Expanded 
 
63 Victoria Daily Colonist, 13 September 1940, “Indian School to Become Hospital,” 11; Moore, “No 
 
64 Nurse stations were essentially small hospitals with a few beds under the charge of nurses and support
staff, deployed in more i
lo
field nurse dispensaries.  Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1947-48, 42.  The 
utilization of nurses had been implemented first under Bryce in 1922 as an affordable means to deliver 
health care to remote and large regions. 
 
65 The number of full time officers increased from 3
fr
Services Boon the Indians.” See also Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1948-49, 
105. 
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 for qualified doctors, nurses, and hospital beds in both Indian and provincial hosp
outstripped supply in post-war decades.
itals 
d 
ally.67  
ea 
on, etc.) remained 
vested 
 
e 
66  Miller Bay, for instance, opened with a limite
capacity of 40 beds due to staff shortages; Nanaimo’s hospital also reported labour and 
equipment shortages.  Nursing stations remained chronically understaffed well after 
WWII and in 1963 it was estimated that one nurse existed per 1,000 Indians nation
Relations between the DNHW and the IAB also remained unclear after the transfer.  
While the IHS now oversaw Indian hospitals and medical care, every other policy ar
determinant of Aboriginal health (i.e. sanitation, housing, educati
with the IAB.  DNHW publications and personnel might have ostensibly 
maintained that the two departments maintained a “very close liaison” in matters 
affecting the health and welfare of Indians and Eskimos,68 but the transfer also created 
new administrative confusion and duplication as well as ongoing policy differences. 
Relations with provincial departments of health were notably better with the 
DHNW than with the IAB.  The DNHW, an agency solely responsible for health matters 
and a budget several times larger than that of the Department of Mines and Resources,
did not suffer from the same intragovernmental insignificance and poor repute as th
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of Proceedings and Evidence, No.3 (16 March 1961), 77. 
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 IAB.  The IAB’s oversight of a wide range of program areas had only served to 
complicate individual policy negotiations with the provinces.69  Moreover, the DNHW 
had a g  ever 
r 
 
nt Committee in 1946, the Minister of 
DNHW
Indian health services as advancing the larger goal of Indian social integration and 
t “increasingly large 
ed 
       
reater degree of decentralization and higher standards of supervision than had
been the case under the IAB.  BC, for example, had its own DNHW regional directo
along with three zone superintendents who oversaw health regions and hospitals, 
including medical officers, doctors, and nurses.  Overall, the DNHW was more qualified 
and capable when it came to both the provision of Indian health and the conduct of 
meaningful discussions with the provinces to devolve services.   
Immediately following the 1945 transfer, it became clear that, along with TB
control, integration with provincial institutions was high on the priority list for the 
DNHW.  During the proceedings of the Special Joi
, Brooke Claxton, stated: “It is proposed to intensify efforts to co-operate with 
provincial and other agencies working in the same field of health care with a view to the 
improvement of the service and the avoidance of needless duplication.”70  In addition to 
fostering administrative efficiency, DNHW officials pitched provincial devolution of 
citizenship.  In 1949, the DNHW’s Annual Report announced tha
sums have been appropriated for [Indian health] … in the trust that it has been dispens
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 wisely and “with the ultimate promise that it will fit the native people for what mu
eventually, an equal place in the community at large.”
st be, 
 to 
en 
nce 
are 
 
nsated 
S 
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From the outset, integrated Indian health policy was loosely modeled on the 
Rowell-Sirois recommendation: federal payment for provincial services rendered.  
Although the IHS provided some construction grants to hospitals in some regions,72 
“integrated” services tended to involve the payment of contractual subsidization rates
provincial doctors for performed medical services.  Indians living off-reserve for eighte
months or more were considered the full responsibility of municipalities in accorda
with a 1936 federal regulation.73  This time limit was eventually lowered to twelve 
months in 1963 when a federal-BC agreement was reached clarifying health and welf
jurisdictional guidelines for off-reserve Indians.74 
 Some provincial doctors were considered part time federal civil servants and paid
via annual stipend for providing services to Indians.  Other physicians were compe
for such services according to pre-approved fee schedules.  In the latter instance, the IH
controlled costs by setting monthly quotas for Indian patient treatments by stipulating th
 
71 Department of National Health and Welfare, Annual Report, 1948-49, 107. 
 
pecial Joint Committee, 
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Indians of British Columbia, 405. 
 
73 According to the regulation, “The attendance provided shall not exceed, in amount or kind or cost, that 
provided by a municipality, at public expense, for indigent members of the municipality.  BCA GR-2720 
Box 3 File 6 Pt. 2, “Copy of Regulations 
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 any clients treated outside of such arrangements were responsible for those costs 
incurred.75  IHS Director Dr. P.E. Moore justified this policy by explaining that 
otherw
 
d 
 
and drawing additional reimbursement from the government.80  Most evidence, however, 
                        
ise, “any Indian could walk into the city of Toronto, or Ottawa, go to the best 
specialists, run up any kind of bill in any hospital or receive any type of medical care, and
it would be just absolutely beyond our budgetary control.”76  The IHS managed to find 
other ways to cut costs, namely by shifting cost burdens onto local practitioners and 
hospitals.  The fee schedule rates paid to doctors was set at one-quarter less than those 
paid to non-Indians.  Apparently, physicians were expected to look upon the 25% 
difference as a tariff for indigent patients.77  Evidence presented at the 1961 proceedings 
of the Joint Committee on Indian Affairs further demonstrates how physicians were 
compensated for only a fraction of actual costs and going rates.78  The proceedings cite
one provincial doctor who incurred monthly costs of $1,500, of which only $437.50 was 
recoverable through the IHS’s BC division fee schedule.79  Accusations of billing
inequities, however, could go both ways.  Young, for instance, notes how one Ontario 
health superintendent believed that private physicians were padding health service bills 
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80
75 
 suggests that doctors bore a significant portion of the costs of treating Indian patients 
throughout the integration process.81 
The advent of public health insurance in BC provided new opportunities for 
“administrative integration” in Indian health.  In early 1949, the province and the feder
government agreed to terms allowing Indian inclusion in the British Columbia Hospital 
Insurance Service (BCHIS), with the federal government subsidizing Indian enrolment 
costs.  Treatments rendered at both provincial and federal Indian hospitals qualified
reimburseme
al 
 for 
nt from the BCHIS.  The DNHW lauded BC’s willingness to include Indians 
in its pl  and 
rtion 
ministrative 
nightm ospitals 
and fun lly 
                          
an as “one of the most outstanding advances in the history of native health,”
“a major step in the social and economic advancement of these people.”  While Indian 
coverage under the BCHIS marked a step towards integration, the DNHW’s asse
that, “[t]he Indians will, in every way, be on the same basis as all other residents,”82 was 
an overstatement.  The early years of the BCHIS proved to be an ad
are during which the federal government continued to operate its Indian h
d the bulk of cost for Indian enrolment.83  Moreover, some uncertainty initia
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Toronto Press, 1996), 198; David J. Mitchell, W.A.C. Bennett and the Rise of British Columbia 
(Vancouver: Dougla
re
systematically contributing to the costs of plan coverage on an indi
 
76 
 surrounded whether Indians would even be assured provincial coverage under the BCHIS 
plan.  During March 1954 discussions to replace BCHIS prepaid premiums with a 5
provincial sales tax, health minister Eric Martin refused to confirm whether BC or the 
federal government would guarantee Indian health coverage under the reformed plan, 
prompting Frank Calder to accuse the So
% 
cial Credit of a “dirty low-down trick.”84  
Within
ould 
 
e Parliament of 
Canada, all laws of general application from time to time in force in any 
t 
tent that 
e by 
                                                
 days, however, Martin caved to pressures and announced that Indians would not 
only be included in the plan but also that all outstanding Indian premium arrears w
be forgiven.85   
As noted, early federal legislation lacked specific references to the general 
responsibility or maintenance of Indian health.  This began to change in the 1950s, once
it became clear that administrative integration required a clarification of federal-
provincial roles.  Section 87 of the Indian Act of 1951, the long-awaited response to the 
recommendations of the 1946-48 Special Joint Committee, stated: 
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of th
province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, excep
to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this Act or any order, 
rule, regulation or by-law made thereunder, and except to the ex
such laws make provision for any matter for which provision is mad
or under this Act.86 
 
 
84 Vancouver Sun, 26 March 1954, “Indians Fear 'Dirty Deal' on BCHIS,” 19. 
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 Specifically regarding health, section 72 (1) (g) of the new act granted cabinet the r
ke regulations “to provide medical treatment and health services for I 87
ight to 
ma ndians.”   
o 
 
ed the principle that Indians were subject to all provincial laws and 
 by an 
in an Indian community, and the Indian concerned is unable to obtain 
(b) Where an Indian has established residence off the reserve in an 
the residence and responsibility clauses of the appropriate provincial 
resident and a responsibility of the municipality or province 
concerned. 
                                                
Although the act made mention of federal-provincial/municipal health agreements in the 
case of enfranchised bands,88 it stated no legal obligation of the federal government t
provide or pay for Indian medical care. 
More significant legal reforms came two years later when the federal government
passed regulations granting agency superintendents the power to compel medical 
treatment for both Indians and non-Indian residing on reserves.  Part one of the 
regulations reifi
regulations relating to health or sanitation, punishable by summary conviction of fines 
and imprisonment.  It stated that Indians “shall comply with all laws and regulations in 
force within a province relating to health and sanitation.”89  Part two, supplemented
explanatory note issued in 1954, laid out jurisdictional terms by which Indians residing 
off-reserve were entitled to receive government health service: 
(a) An Indian is eligible to receive treatment if he resides on a reserve or 
the required attention through his own or any other source. 
assessing community (municipality) in accordance with the terms of 
legislation with respect to public assistance, he must be considered a 
 
87 Ibid., c. 29, s. 72. 
 The 1951 Indian Act continued to grant the Minster, but now with band council approval, the ability to 
d or destitute Indians.”  See Ibid., c. 29, s. 66, 111. 
 
88
use band funds, “to assist sick, disable
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 (c) When an Indian returns to a reserve and it is reasonably certain that he 
his eligibility on the basis of residence is re-established…
intends to take up residence on the reserve or in an Indian community, 
 
  In 
, 
henever possible, just like 
non-Na
r 
h 
s 
2  
al 
accounts, and we practically take it as per se that the amount of money that would be 
, would not 
90 
In addition to elaborating on- and off-reserve Indian health care eligibility, the regulation 
clarified minimal requirements for federal health provision.  Indians were to receive 
federal assistance only in cases where any other agency-provided health care, such as a 
prepaid medical plan, worker’s compensation, or health insurance, were unavailable.
keeping with both early assimilationist policies and the post-war integrationist impulse
Indians were encouraged to pay for their medical expenses w
tives.91 
 The regulation might have been clear that Indians were expected to pay like othe
provincial citizens but enforcement was another matter.  Few Indians could afford healt
care premiums and it appears that the IHS rarely pursued those with medical cost
incurred.  Before the House of Commons in 1953, DNHW Minister Paul Martin stated 
that he felt the policy of having capable Indians pay for their own health care was 
“common sense” before admitting that, “[t]here are not many Indians in that category.”9
Director Moore also noted in 1961 that “[w]e have never pressed for payment of medic
collected from an Indian on a reserve, if we attempted to collect from him
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91 See Titley, ‘A Narrow Vision’, 38.  
 
92 House of Commons, Debates, 8 May 1953, 5004. 
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 justify the time and effort involved.”93  Seemingly, the IHS had no past or future plans to
collect payment from Indians even though Moore later went on to estimate th
 
at half of 
Indians medical 
premiu  of the 
imprac rnmental 
benevo e time to even determine Indian 
n-
o 
 in settled parts of Canada then had the financial means to pay their own 
ms.94  This unofficial policy of forgiving medical costs was as much a result
ticability of enforcing the regulation and collecting arrears as any gove
lence.  Moreover, no means test existed at th
fitness to pay.  Quite often, assessments of whether a patient was a Treaty or indigent 
Indian was made by the physician at the time of treatment.95 
Provincial authorities similarly appear to have prosecuted few Indians for no
payment of medical services; BC preferred to take up collection issues with the deeper-
pocketed federal government.96  Speaking before the JC in 1961, seven years after the 
regulations were enacted, Dr. Arthur F.W. Peart, deputy general secretary of the 
Canadian Medical Association (CMA) noted: “[m]unicipal authorities and other officials 
appear firm in their belief that the federal government is entirely responsible for the 
health care of Indians and responsibility is promptly transferred even in cases which do 
not meet the criteria of eligibility.”97  Ignorance of the 1953 regulation also appears t
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97 Joint Comm
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 have been a significant source of administrative confusion and non-compliance in
Canadian provinces.  Peart quoted the experiences of one doctor who stated: 
I can truthfully say that I have yet to meet an Indian who is even faintly 
revealed only to the doctor. … There is a firmly-rooted belief that a Treaty 
part to convince them otherwise is met with great indignation and ill-
officials to whom he takes his complaint.
 other 
aware of this.  It appears that this policy, as outlined in the fee schedule, is 
Indian is entitled to free hospital and medical care, and any attempt on our 
feeling, not only from the Indian but from the local I.H.S. nurses and 
 
ere 
ge you.”  He described this as “an example of a government employee 
sabotag
 
ing 
  Even 
described instances in which Indians in receipt of treatment collected reimbursement 
                                                
98 
Peart went on to cite other examples in which Indians charged for medical service w
instructed by IHS nurses to “go right back and get your money refunded as they have no 
right to char
ing the aims and polices of their own department perhaps unwittingly.”  Indians 
also appear to have shared the view that free medical care was their right.  Peart noted
how Indians questioned the honesty of physicians attempting to collect payment 
following the delivery of medical care; others went “straight to the Indian health service 
nurse, to complain.”99  Some bands refused to pay for their own medical costs know
that others were receiving premium-free medical care, thus forcing the IHS to pay.
those Indians aware of the expectation that capable members pay their own medical 
expenses, Peart noted, used “various types of arguments to get out of it.”100  Moore even 
 
ingly, Moore too appeared to have only a partial understanding of the 1953 regulations when 
e suggested before the JC that the only regulations affecting the service were in regards to compulsory 
. 3 (16 March 1961), 72, 75. 
98 Ibid.  Amaz
h
treatment of TB patients.  Ibid., 72. 
 
99 See Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No
 
100 Ibid., 77. 
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 cheques from their health insurers only to keep them and then charge the federa
government to pay the costs of the procedures.
l 
 
tment 
ns, as well as the IHS’s apparent use of “a good deal of discretion in applying its 
policy.
inhibited the formulation of a long term Indian health policy.  Hawthorn, Belshaw, and 
Jamieson’s 1955 report noted that “[s]ometimes the policies of the Indian Health Service 
101  Of course, discrepancies between 
stated and actual policy did not always work to the advantage of Aboriginal people.  In 
their federally-sponsored 1955 survey of BC Indians, “The Indians of British Columbia: 
A Survey of Social and Economic Conditions: A Report to the Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration,” H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw, and S.M. Jamieson identified trea
delays and the arbitrary handling of cases of exclusion as products of the residency 
regulatio
”102 
Despite earlier Annual Report pronouncements that the IAB and DNHW enjoyed, 
“the finest co-operation,” in relations with provincial medical departments, growing 
conflicts over cost sharing and jurisdiction incubated during this period.103   The splitting 
of Indian healthcare responsibilities between federal and provincial departments might 
have removed many of the hurdles to more effective administration and provincial 
devolution; however, it also created new conflicts and uncertainties which in turn 
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 and the Indian Affairs Branch seemed at cross purposes.”104  Briefing the Joint 
Committee in 1961, Peart also remarked that the splitting of administrative functions for
Indians between the Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and National Health 
and Welfare contributed to misunderstandings, difficulties, d
 
ifferences in philosophy, and 
a confu  
n 
mber 
60 
ry 
es 
sion of policy.105  By the 1960s, it was becoming readily apparent that “cross
purposes,” particularly in regards to cost and jurisdiction, were boiling into federal-
provincial strife.106  Events involving the Miller Bay Indian Hospital, provide one case i
point.   
Since the introduction of the BCHIS in 1949, health services rendered to Indians 
at Indian hospitals were eligible for coverage under the plan.  At Miller Bay, the nu
of cases treated at the hospital charged to the BCHIS had grown steadily throughout the 
1950s.  The provincial Department of Health Services had become so concerned by 19
with the high rates and costs of Indian hospitalization that it began enforcing a regulato
provision of the Hospital Insurance Act mandating that provincial coverage for servic
rendered at a federal hospital be provided only in the prior denial of treatment at a 
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would be accepted as IAB welfare charges yet be denied federal medical care, noting th
c
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 provincial facility.107  In other words, local Indians had to attempt to receive treatment at
the Prince Rupert public hospital and acquire proof of a refused admittance before they 
could be treated by their local Indian hospital.  Immediately, the number of cases paid o
by the BCHIS to the federal hospital plummeted. 
The issue spawned a lengthy and prickly exchange between the Eric Martin
provincial minister of Health Services and Hospital Insurance, and J. Waldo Monteith, 
Minister of the DNHW.  In a 1961 letter to Martin, Monteith noted that Indian
were being denied service at the federal Miller B
 
ut 
, 
 children 
ay facility due to the provincial 
regulat ter 
ed 
 
f 
 by 
stating that BC was merely doing as it was asked by the federal government; as with 
ion and threatened to withhold grant payments to force the issue.108  Martin la
responded by reminding Monteith that the BCHIS adopted this measure to reduce 
duplication and overlapping of services.  Indian hospitals, he noted, were “subject to the 
prior approval of the Provincial Authority in the same manner as is required for other 
hospitals.”109  BC’s deputy minister of Hospital Insurance in BC, D.M. Cox explain
earlier that year: “We have … always expected hospitals, in dealing with Indians, to
consider them only as residents of the Province and as patients requiring the services o
the hospital.”110  Provincial health officials like Martin and Cox justified their position
integrated schooling, the province was encouraged, if not legally compelled, to treat 
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108 BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 11, “J. Waldo Monteith to Eric Martin, 10 November 1961”; BCA GR-0678
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 Indians no differently than it did other provincial citizens, whether in regards to BC
eligibility or treatment.
HIS 
 to 
d 
 
the 
t 
 
icials took the 
opportu
ry 
spute.  
        
111  The inability, or unwillingness, of the federal government
provide adequate health care services on reserves, BC officials argued, unfairly shifte
service and fiduciary burden onto a province already struggling to manage high costs and
overcrowding in its public hospitals.112  Those regulatory and statutory provisions 
demanding unfettered integration just so happened to provide a convenient means for 
province to control rising costs, compel administrative efficiency, and assert 
jurisdictional supremacy in the area of health.   
The issue dragged on into the summer of 1963 when the federal governmen
began publicly discussing intent to close Miller Bay and its other Indian hospitals in 
Nanaimo and Sardis.  Declining numbers of TB cases and deteriorating facilities were the
primary reasons for the planned Miller Bay closure, although federal off
nity to explain it as resulting from “being very unfairly treated by the B.C. 
Hospital Insurance Service.”113  The province, however, never budged.  Seconda
appeals to BCHIS by Indian affairs officials failed to bring resolution to the di
Those most inconvenienced by the impasse, local Tsimshian, also appear to have had 
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111 Ironically, the province also didn’t discriminate between public and federal hospitals when it came to
 
11  To resolve the issue, Martin flippantly suggested that Indian health service work
embership on the staffs of provincial public hospitals.  BCA GR-0678 Box 16 Film
Waldo Monteith, 4 December 1961”; Mitchell, W.A.C., 357. 
 
11  House of Commons, Debates, 13 April 1964, 2086; BCA GR-0678 Box 16 File 11, “P.E. Moo
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 little influence in changing provincial attitudes.  Even BC’s own Hospital Finance 
Manager, W.J. Lyle, sympathized with the federal position, stating that “the present 
re 
public health and other services located at the reservation.”   Resolution of the dispute 
finally cam outstanding 
unpaid claims and remove the admission ticket requirement; in exchange, the federal 
government agreed to limit the total number of chargebacks to the BCHIS at Miller Bay 
to 4,400 accounts annually.  The agreement was a decided provincial victory and the 
federal government later asserted that it was “practically coerced into making this 
agreement.”   BC knew that it was a mere matter of time before the federal government 
closed its Indian hospitals such as Miller Bay anyway, which the federal government did 
in 1971 when a new provincial facility was erected in Prince Rupert.  
While the Miller Bay dispute was brewing, the integrationist cause received new 
support with the release of the report of the Royal Commission on Government 
Organization (Glassco Commission) in 1962.  The report, which assessed the 
organization and methods of federal departments and agencies, described the existence of 
federal health facilities in the provinces in servicing those “now entitled as ordinary 
                                    
approach to the Indian problem is not satisfactory.  Perhaps what is needed are mo
114
e when the province proposed that it commit to pay some of the 
115
116
citizens to facilities under provincial jurisdiction,” as “an example of duplication and 
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 waste from the national point of view.”  Regarding Indian and Eskimo health, the repor
advocated that: 
1. A positive program be developed for the more rapid transfer of Indian 
province   
practicing physicians an
t 
health care to normal community facilities in populated areas of the 
2. Where possible, medical and dental care be arranged through private 
d dentists (with the federal government 
bearing the cost of pre-paid medical plans where necessary).117 
The Glassco report essentially affirmed the established policy of the DNHW, compelled 
further consolidation of health institutions, and served to channel more Indians into more 
cost-effective provincial facilities and health plans.  The same year the Commission 
issued its report, the Indian Health Service was dissolved and responsibility for Indian 
health was merged into the Medical Services Branch (MSB).  Moreover, as early as the 
1950s the IAB had already begun a general consolidation of administrative services in 
hopes of controlling expenditure and compelling Indian urbanization.  The 1996 Report 
of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples describes how IAB administrative 
consolidations were commonplace in this period nation-wide for the purposes of 
cheapening and improving Indian administration and services such as health and 
education.   Much like those events surrounding the Miller Bay hospital, the mantra of 
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1
87 
 integra
 
als 
incial 
ver 
nd 
ials 
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f universal health care in BC 
incited another similar incident providing a second case in point.  
   
tion justified administrative consolidations and the streamlining of more costly 
components of the medical service.  Official policies aimed at devolving and 
consolidating federal health and education services with those of the province thus 
provided the federal government with coincidental and new opportunities to cut costs and
advance assimilationist agendas.   
While assimilationist agendas and federal interest in cost-saving sometimes 
complemented each other, they also often conflicted.  Federal and provincial offici
might have both supported integrated health as a way to incorporate Indians as prov
citizens,119 but the Miller Bay incident revealed that governments could disagree o
just how far “administrative integration” should be taken.  Federal administrators were 
likely surprised to learn that unfettered integration could result in both higher costs a
increased hardships for Aboriginal people.  In that instance, IAB and DNHW offic
fought to mitigate the full effects of “administrative integration” and BC’s assertion o
full domain in the realm of health.120  Indeed, neither the Glassco recommendations nor 
subsequent bureaucratic restructuring prevented intergovernmental clashes like the Miller
Bay conflict from occurring.  The mid-1960s advent o
                                                                                                                                              
lonist, 15 February 1956, “Assimilate Indians, Dr. Amyot Advises,” 2.  A few years earlier, Moore 
ated, “whatever plan is adopted in any province, we will endeavour to see the Indian brought under 
utes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 3 (16 March 1961), 68. 
 
119 Dr. G.F. Amyot, provincial Deputy Minister of Health, stated in 1956, “Indians should be encouraged to 
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Daily Co
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 In 1965, BC replaced the BCHIS with the BC Medical Plan (BCMP) and passed 
the Medical Grant Act, establishing a subsidization scheme for low income residents to 
participate in the plan.121  The province agreed to continue to accept Indian enrolment
under the BCMP but on the condition that they not apply for the subsidy, a 50% stipend
given to designated needy recipients.  Indians were already able to receive a feder
of up to 50% to cover the cost of provincial premiums for unemployed or unemployable
Indians.  Conflict erupted when the province learned that the MSB staff had been 
instructing Indians to apply for the provincial grant.  MSB officials saw the step as 
shifting costs to the province and as a way for Indians to gain coverage under the 
provincial plan, since BC medical officers discouraged bulk applications.
 
 
al grant 
 
elfare were deemed the 
respons
 
 
122  In response, 
the province began invoking a Medical Grant Act clause prohibiting the provincial 
provision of the grant for any persons whose health and w
ibility of the federal government.  BC Medical Plan executive director A.W. 
Brown informed DNHW regional director R.D. Thompson that “[we] cannot accept these
application in the form in which they have been written, as we understand these persons
are the responsibility of the Federal Government.”123 
                                                 
the federal government footed most of the bill for public health in BC.  Fields and Stanbury note that
121 Barman, The West Beyond the West, 298.  Even though the intent was to share costs on a 50-50 basis, 
 in 
1966 the provincial share was amounting to only 39% of the total operating costs for BC’s public hospitals.  
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 The matter gained higher profile when Aboriginal people began wading into the 
issue.  In July 1965 the executive of the Nishga Tribal Council forwarded a resolution to 
the IAB demanding federal coverage of the costs of BC Indians to receive provincial 
health insurance coverage.124  That December, three Squamish band members also met 
with Brown to demand Indian eligibility for the provincial medical grant.  James 
Nahanee, one delegation member, noted the inadequacy of medical attention under the 
federal
e 
.  
g that 
provisions of the Medical Grant Act.126  The meeting ended with Nahanee simply asking 
how coverage might be obtained, to which Stewart answered, “Our Government is 
                                              
 government only to be reminded by Brown that the province would not allow 
grant provision for persons “for whose health and welfare care the Government of 
Canada is responsible.”  Nahanee decried this as representing unfair treatment sinc
Indians paid provincial sales tax in support of the BCMP but did not receive due benefits
With no resolution in sight, Nahanee reportedly concluded the meeting by warnin
“the Indians would have to do something about this.”125 
The Squamish men did precisely this, taking up their claim with G.A. Stewart of 
the BC Medical Plan.  They again demanded provincial health coverage as a right in the 
absence of any statute asserting federal responsibility for Indian health.  Nahanee even 
offered band funds towards the securing of Indian enrolment to which Stewart declined 
since “that would be considered a group application,” and contravene the eligibility 
   
 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “A.W. Brown to W.D. Black, 8 December 1965.” 
wart to W.D. Black, 10 December, 1965.” 
124 Vancouver Sun, 22 July 1965, “Indians Ask Medicare Payments,” 56. 
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 interested in the Indian, and wants them treated as any other resident,” before directing 
the three men to take up their issue with provincial secretary W.D. Black.  Stewart w
later privately write to Black, warning him that that the Squamish men were attempti
“to get something for nothing.”
ould 
ng, 
ear by H.F. King, 
Medica
cried 
fficials 
129  
al 
overnment institutions.  In February 1969, Len Marchand, elected to the 
House 
127  Subsequent appeals the following y
l Superintendent of the MSB, to Black and other MLAs, similarly failed to change 
provincial minds.128 
As the Miller Bay and Medical Grant incidents indicate, Aboriginal complaints 
and intergovernmental conflicts over Indian health administration endured over two 
decades into the integration process.  Aboriginal people lobbied provincial health 
officials for fair treatment under the MSB; provincial officials, in turn, publicly de
the inadequacy of federal housing and sanitation services on reserves to enhance 
Aboriginal ill-being.  BC newspaper reports condemning the poor living and health 
standards on federal reserves provided further ammunition for provincial health o
to level blame at their as frugally-minded federal counterparts for policies of neglect.
Aboriginal people also continued to protest instances of being denied equitable medic
treatment from g
of Commons in 1968 as Canada’s first Indian MP, said it was “damn silly” that 
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 Kamloops Indians were denied access to a nearby provincial health unit.130  The gr
participation of Aboriginal people in health debates in the 1960s exemplified what 
Foucault refers to as the ability of strategies which co-ordinate relations of power to 
produce new effects and advance into hitherto unaffected domains.
owing 
 
neral 
a placing of the responsibility of providing services on the 
provincial government and on the Indian people.”  The committee noted ongoing 
jurisdic
 
f 
Just like Peart nearly a decade earlier, BC doctors cited ongoing jurisdictional 
livery standards 
o  “There is considerable confusion in the 
ds of both Indians and non-Indians with respect to the responsibility of the Federal 
131 
Vocal critics at the JC proceedings in 1961, BC’s doctors also continued to weigh
into the debate in the latter 1960s.  In 1968, the Indian Health Committee of the BC 
Medical Association (BCMA) undertook an independent investigation of Indian health 
care in BC.  The report condemned the federal government for engaging “in a ge
withdrawal of services and 
tional confusion, low Indian socio-economic standing, and inadequate sanitation 
on reserves as exacerbating poor Indian health.  It criticized the current division of 
responsibilities between the MSB, IAB, and the provincial health department as 
“irrational, inconsistent, and ineffective,” and demanded the development of a more
systematic and orderly plan to ease the changes taking place in the administration o
Indian health.   
confusion and misinformation as producing wide variances in service de
fr m region to region.  The report stated that
min
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 Government for medical services.”132  The committee also attributed much of this 
confusion to the virtual exclusion of Aboriginal people from the decision-making proces
and, more generally, the lack of a long-term health plan for Indians.
s 
ion, 
all 
e 
 
 
reaucracies as operating within official jurisdiction areas “which are generally 
ordered
          
133  The solut
according to the committee, lay in increased Indian health spending and a transfer of 
residual legislative authority in matters of Indian health and sanitation to the appropriat
federal and provincial departments of health.  The committee concluded that “It is quite 
apparent to the committee that present conditions of sanitation and general public health
on reserves are far below anything which would be acceptable to the Provincial 
Department of Health.”134 
 
In his seminal Economy and Society, Max Weber defines the first characteristic of
modern bu
 by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations.”135  Sociologists now 
acknowledge that Weber over-assumed implicit correlations between bureaucracy, 
jurisdiction areas, and resultant domination;136 a similar criticism can be leveled at 
Canadian scholars of Indian health policy.  When it came to providing Indian health 
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 services, basic questions of cost responsibility and jurisdiction were, and perhaps rem
unresolved since the nineteenth century.  The conflicts surrounding Miller Bay and the 
BC Medical Grant demonstrate how such questions endured amidst advances in 
“administrative integration.”  Government discourse and implemented policy varied 
significantly when it came to integration policies and their stated results.  The BCM
committee’s report noted one of the ironies of most integrationist policies in this period: 
despite their so-called integration in health, Indians often remained separate in terms of
ain, 
A 
 
their ad
 
s, as 
 
 
demonstrated by the Squamish delegation to Victoria, or by repeated Indian demands for 
ts, as 
ministrative treatment and health indicants.  “Integration” in BC, whether in 
health or as discussed in the context of education and integrated schooling, was never
fully implemented, let alone realized.  Post-WWII integrated Indian health wa
Meighen predicted it would be in 1920, “A sort of divided control and authority over the 
Indians.” 
Although long-standing federal involvement in Indian health shaped events and
attitudes in this period, evidence indicates that BC Indians were not of singular mind 
when it came to provincial health care.  If one “Indian” view ever existed in BC—an area
not ceded by treaties with medicine chest provisions—it did not survive long into the 
twentieth century.  BC Aboriginal people routinely demanded that medical care be 
adequate and delivered free of charge by both federal and provincial sources.  Whether 
inclusion in early provincial medical insurance schemes and the BC Medical Grant, 
Aboriginal people in BC tended to view free medical care as wholly within their righ
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 federal wards or as voting and sales-tax paying provincial citizens.  Another point to 
consider is that few Aboriginal people likely understood the jurisdictional intricacies of 
Canadian federalism or those complex funding arrangements underpinning a simple visit 
to a loc he place 
 “are 
 
 
lic 
eking out 
and acquiring medical care, and in forcing the cost issue on government.  As a result, 
osts and 
 
al hospital.  What mattered most was that health services be delivered at t
and point of need; responsibility for cost was something for federal and provincial 
officials to figure out.  “The Indians,” the Minister of the DNHW remarked in 1950,
not inclined to consider that they have any responsibility with regard to premiums.”137 
In his study of European feudal class struggles, James Scott coins the notion of 
weapons of the weak: self-interested, informal, and commonplace forms of effective 
resistance by lower class societies seeking to defend their interests from both 
conservative and progressive orders.138  Judging by most evidence—whether in the form
of doctor complaints about bearing cost for Indian treatments, statistics showing growing
Indian visitations to provincial and private hospitals, government forgiving of unpaid 
premiums, or federal-provincial squabbling over the costs of Indian enrolment in pub
health plans—Indians were somewhat successful tacticians when it came to se
both the provincial government and its doctors increasingly came to share in the c
duties of administering Indian health by mid-century.139  In a 1970 study undertaken for
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138 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985), xvi. 
 
139 Graham-Cumming noted how it was impossible to estimate the precise costs of Indian health care owi
to factors such as informal practices, blurred jurisdiction, and part
95 
 96 
the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, D.B. Fields and W.T. 
Stanbury estimated that $8.35 mi  health and hospitalization in 
1966-67, roughly half of which was paid out by the BCHIS.140   
underg f 
diseases such as diphtheria, in
contributed to the population rebound.  While significant gaps remained (and still remain) 
llion was spent on Indian
After over a century and a half of decline, Aboriginal populations began 
oing remarkable growth around WWII.  The lessening of the deadly grip o
fluenza, and tuberculosis on Aboriginal communities 
when comparing Native/non-Native health statistics, Canadian scholars have been too 
quick to dismiss or ignore the basic fact that changing health policies, integrationist 
measures, and Aboriginal agency around mid-century had a significant influence on this 
demographic resurgence.  The full impact of colonization on Aboriginal bodies was not 
played out by 1950 but rather is part of a larger continuum whose effects are still being 
felt today.141  The post-1970s growth of Aboriginal demands for self- control of health 
thus can be seen as stemming from both changes brought about by the integration of 
Indian health services as well as ongoing deficiencies within that system.142  
                                                                                                                                                 
Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians,” 128.  Existing archived provincial health records from
period are extremely piecemeal for periods prior to the late 1960s, further complicating this task. 
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Come with me to the playgrounds of an integrated high school … See how level and flat 
moved in doors. 
od 
st 
y 
, 
 
ing 
s is 
ra 
developments and growing post-WWII provincial control of Indian education, when 
and ugly the blacktop is … but look … now it is recess time … the students pour through 
the doors … soon, over here is a group of white students … and see … over there, near 
the fence … a group of native students … and look again … the black is no longer level 
… soon the bell will ring and the students will leave the play yard.  Integration has 
—Chief Dan George, “My Very Good Dear Friends,” (1969).1 
 
Scholars often discuss Indian education within the context of two distinct eras: the peri
of federal control, or residential schooling, and the post-White Paper era of growing Fir
Nations control of Indian education.  Marie Battiste, for instance, writes: “For a centur
or more, DIAND attempted to destroy the diversity of Aboriginal world views, cultures
and languages.”  Framing the 1969 White Paper as a “crucial turning point,” she adds,
“Aboriginal people began to see educators, like their missionary predecessors, as noth
more than racists, patriarchs, and oppressors who hid behind fine-sounding words or 
ideology.”2  In such works, the entire history of Canadian Indian educational policie
compressed as colonialist, hegemonic, and of exclusive federal domain.  Integrationist e
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 mentioned at all, are treated as simple extensions of prior federal policies born from th
residential era.
e 
tuation of paternalistic 
relation
d 
e Indian education system was failing to achieve its own 
            
3  
While the shift from residential schools to public schooling that took place after 
WWII involved much continuity—namely in terms of the perpe
s and the marginalization of Aboriginal people from the decision-making 
process—it also marked a significant departure from earlier policies.  The primary agents 
responsible for educating Indians shifted in this period from the churches and federal 
government to the provinces.  Long before the mass school closures of the 1970s, the 
church-run residential system ceased to serve as the primary means of educating status 
Indians.4  The change was the result of a combination of reasons.  In the aftermath of 
WWII’s exposure of the extreme capabilities of human racism, Indian schools became 
seen as symbols of racial segregation and the denial of rights of citizenry to Indians.  
Disapproving depictions of residential schools as discriminatory and akin to Unite
States segregationist policies regularly surfaced in BC newspapers in post-war years.5  In 
addition to the normative sway of sympathetic popular and political opinions, more 
practical eyes could see that th
                                     
integrationist developments in Indian education in their overview of Indian education in Canada.  See Jea
Barman, Yvonne Hébert, and Don McCaskill, “The Legacy of the Past: An Overview,” in Indian Educat
in Canada, Volume 1: The Legacy, Jean Barman, Yvonne Hébert, and Don McCaskill, eds. (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1986), 13-14. 
4 John S. Milloy, “A National Crime”: The Canadian Government and the Residential School System, 
1879-1986 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1999), 208-209, 235. 
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 stated assimilative ends.  The allowance of Indians into provincial schools by the late 
1940s thus came to be seen as a necessary step towards the granting of citizenry rights to 
Indians as well as a means for integration.  Neither province nor the federal officials was 
willing
 an 
d not 
 to 
 
 Canadian 
nted 
o 
 
devolution, BC was most amenable when it came to education.  Some of the first and 
ed to be called the 
                                                                                                           
 to resist the push to integrate schools for these reasons. 
An integrationist impulse swept through the Indian Affairs Branch’s (IAB) 
education directorate in post-war decades.  In 1950, both levels of government agreed to 
official terms allowing Indian attendance in public schools via joint agreements and
unprecedented per-capita cost sharing arrangement.  Integration, however, occurre
only with regard to the physical placement of Aboriginal children in public schools, but 
also in operating standards.  Throughout this period, the federal government moved
harmonize its inspection, staffing, and curricula standards with provincial ordinances.  
More generally, in its early stages, the desegregation of Indian education was seen as an
important symbolic means for, and end of, Indian integration.  Only by attending 
provincial schools could Indians gain the required skills to adjust to mainstream
society; the successful placement of Indians into provincial classrooms itself represe
a tangible sign of integration. 
This chapter focuses on developments in British Columbia during the first tw
decades of the school integration process.  Of all policy areas of federal Indian service
most significant steps to desegregate schools took place in BC.  With Indians entering 
BC’s public schools throughout the 1950s and 60s, BC deserv
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 provincial leader in integrated education.  At 1958, more Indian children were attending 
provincial than residential institutions; by the mid-1960s, roughly half of all school-go
Indian pupils in the province were attending provincial institutions.6   
 In addition to tracing policy developments, this chapter explores Aboriginal 
perspectives of integrated schooling.  Virtually excluded from the decision-making 
process, both before and during the process of integration, most Aboriginal people appe
to have taken some, albeit moderate, interest in the prospects of public education.  
Aboriginal people, just as they had around the turn of the century with residential 
schools, looked to provincial schools in accordance with their own interests, the leas
which was desire for complete cultural ass
ing 
ar 
t of 
imilation.7  The actual results of school 
desegregation in BC indicate that federal promises and Indian expectations were rarely 
realized
e not 
lure?  This chapter draws on Foucauldian theories about the playoff of 
           
 during the integrationist period.  The long-term results of integrated schooling 
are difficult to discern but what appears certain is that stated policy “successes” wer
synonymous with actual integration.  Despite their successful “administrative 
integration,” Aboriginal children remained segregated in public schools in terms of 
educational attainment, treatment, and even physical placement. 
Why did integrated schooling in BC prove to be an area of such tremendous 
success and fai
                                      
G 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7983, File 1/19-2-10, Pt. 1, “Observations on th6 LAC, R e Integration 
Program of the Education Division, Indian Affairs Branch, February 1963;” Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 
37 File 13, “Summary of Existing Provincial Services Extended to Indians.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry 
Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Federal Provincial Conference.” 
 
7 See J.R. Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003), 120. 
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 power t ties.  
The history of integrated education policy in BC provides a poignant example of how 
federal and provincial interests, even if dissimilar, were capable of converging in specific 
historical circumstances; they did when it came to integrated education and the results 
were largely negative for Aboriginal people who were relegated to marginal positions of 
power.  In the case of Indian education, the combination of a convergence of intrastate 
interests, specific administrative procedures, and Aboriginal exclusion came to constitute 
efficacious powers at work.  While integrated education undoubtedly marked some 
improvements over the prior Indian school system, actual integration did not occur 
beyond a macro-institutional perspective. 
 
Education had always been a cornerstone of early assimilation policy.  In 1911, 
Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott characterized the 
education of the Indian as, “by far the most important of the many subdivisions of the 
most complicated Indian problem.”   The importance attributed to education in IAB 
programming had changed little by the mid-twentieth century.  In a 1956 report in the 
 the future is 
o show how intrastate relations are capable of producing clear power polari
8
Indian News, J.W. Pickersgill, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, reiterated 
cott’s view:  S
There is no question in my mind that the most important of all the 
activities of the Indian Affairs administration, so far as
                                                 
8 Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, 1911, in Milloy, “A National Crime”, 3.  See also 
Titley, A Narrow Vision, 74.  
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 concerned, is education. … Education appears to be the main key not only
9
 
 
to useful employment but also to the eventual integration of the Indians.  
The primary goal of federal post-war Indian education—educational preparation for 
incorporation of Indians into mainstream Canadian society and economy—only increased 
in the interim period.  A glimpse at the IAB’s budget during the years between Scott and 
Pickersgill’s comments suggest as much.  In 1910-11, the Department spent a total of 
37% of its total budget on schooling.  By the mid-1960s, the IAB was spending 60% of 
its fiscal appropriation on Indian schooling and deeming education the most advanced 
and structurally developed of all its program areas.10 
Although a small number of Indian children were already attending public schools 
by WWII’s conclusion, significant interest in integrating Indians into the provincial 
education system began in the mid-1940s.  In 1946, 201 Indian pupils in BC were already 
enrolled in provincial schools, a trend the Indian Commissioner of the province, D.M. 
McKay, encouraged “at every opportunity.”   Steps towards the integration of Indians 
had been taking place in the United States since the 1930s when passage of the Johnson-
O’Malley Act in 1934 allowed closures of boarding schools in favour of community day 
11
                                                 
9 J.W. Pickersgill, Indian News, May 1956, “Speech by Superintendent-General, ‘The Future of the 
l 
”; 
1. 
).  See also British 
olumbia, Report of the Royal Commission on Education (Victoria: Province of British Columbia, 1960), 
ian 
ool 
Canadian Indian.’”  
 
10 Canada, Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1910-11, xxx, 27-i-19 ½; LAC, RG 10 Centra
Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 3, “Memorandum to the Acting Deputy Minister, 26 April 1963
BCA MS-2848 Box 3 File 5, “Commentary on the Hawthorn Report,” 
 
11 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and 
Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 6 (18 June 1946
C
140.  Most common among Indian communities proximal to white communities, small numbers of Ind
children attended provincial schools under ad hoc agreements struck between the IAB and local sch
boards, with the federal government assuming most tuition costs. 
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 schools.  More notably, post-WWII US termination and relocation policies were 
principled on the transfer of Indian education to state education departments.12  While 
Canadian steps to integrate its schools never matched the pace of US policies, 
devolutionary successes in the US did not go unnoticed by IAB education officials.13  
Neither did comparisons of Canadian Indian education to US segregationist policies
which one 1958 Victoria Daily Colonist article did, describing “Segregation of Indi
parts of interior British Columbia is as bad as segregation of Negroes in the southern 
United States.”
, 
ans in 
 been 
y 
IAB.  
rate schools began gaining significant momentum during the latter years 
of the w t 
me 
14 
Support for integrated Indian education in provincial schools appears to have
widely held, or at least rarely opposed, by most non-Native Canadians.15  By mid-
century, it was becoming apparent that Indian schools were not providing the necessar
tools for the type of social, economic, and cultural adjustment envisioned by the 
The push to integ
ar.  Members of the Special Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishmen
discussed the subject in 1944, agreeing that integrated education could “indicate to so
                                                 
12 LAC RG 10 Vol. 8475, File 651/25-1, MR C-9701, R. Hoey to Bishop W. Bird, 23 January 1939 in 
Milloy, “A National Crime”, 194, f.n. 20.   
 
13 By 1963, several states had accepted full responsibility for Indian education and 72,159, or 52.6% of all 
US Indians were registered in state schools, one third of them at no cost to the federal government.  See 
.G.P. Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” in The Education of Indian 
 Victoria Daily Colonist, 23 January 1958, “Color Bar in Parts of B.C. as Bad as in U.S. South,” 31; 
ited,” 1. 
tinel, 11 April 1945, “For the Indians,” 11 in Scott Sheffield, The Red Man's on the Warpath: 
he Image of the "Indian" and the Second World War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 103. 
L
Children in Canada: A Symposium Written by Members of the Indian Affairs Education Division, with 
Comments by the Indian Peoples (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965), 66. 
 
14
Victoria Daily Colonist, 5 February 1958, “B.C. Segregation of Indians C
 
15 In very few cases were protests raised in regards to the attendance of Indian children in non-Indian 
schools.  See Russell Moses, Indian News, January 1966, “Indian Views”;  See also C.G. Wallace, 
Kamloops Sen
T
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 extent and in a small way the policy that governments may adopt in the future.”16  The
matter of Indian education was canvassed in greater length during the 1946 proceeding
of the Special Joint Committee.  Although the bulk of the committee’s attention focused
on immediate problems in the Indian education system, such as staffing shortages and 
facility improvements, the SJC recommended school integration in its final repo
“[W]herever and whenever possible,” the report states, “Indian children should be 
educated in association with other [non-Native] children.”
 
s 
 
rt.  
ur 
ment of Education stated that he 
sought 
 
is 
17  Even BC appeared to favo
the plan to admit Indian children into the provincial education system around this time.  
In 1950, W.T. Straith, BC’s Minister of the Depart
close cooperation with the Indian Affairs Branch “in an attempt to avoid 
duplication in the building of schools and in looking forward to the time when Indian 
children, wherever their residence, will be admitted to schools under provincial 
jurisdiction.”18   
Concomitant calls for integrated educational programming were also mounting
outside governmental offices.  SJC testimony delivered by anthropologist Diamond 
Jenness further advocated the integration of Indians into provincial schools as part of h
                                                                                                                                                 
 
16 LAC RG 10 Vol. 6205, File 468-1 (1-3) MR C-7937, “R.A. Hoey to the Deputy Minster, 7 June 1944 in 
ools 
eplored,” 3. 
ion of Indian Children in British Columbia, 8 September, 1950.”; 
ictoria Daily Colonist, 16 March 1950, “Prepared to Admit Indian Children into Education System of 
 
Milloy, “A National Crime”, 194, f.n. 20; Vancouver Sun, 7 May 1958, “Segregation of Sch
D
 
17 Special Joint Committee, Fourth Report [final report] (22 June 1948). 
 
18 BCA GR-1071 Box 1 File 6, “Educat
V
Province,” 7. 
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 “Plan for Liquidating Canada’s Indian Problem within 25 Years.”19  Indian advocacy 
groups, such as the BC Indian Arts and Welfare Society, also recommended that yea
“the continuance of the system of sending Indian children to ‘White’ schools whenever 
possible.”
r 
 nineteenth century, Aboriginal people were also 
vocal c
t 
as 
s 
the 
eference 
have required a massive injection of funds, something the IAB could not or would not 
ncial, nor 
h 
 
20  As they had been since the
ritics of the residential education system.  While, as Miller notes, not all 
Aboriginal people in BC and elsewhere believed that education was not important or tha
the churches should not play a role in the education of their children, a consensus w
forming that the Indian Affairs educational system in general, and its residential school
in particular, were failing Native communities.”21 
Despite growing criticisms from politicians, advocacy organizations, and 
Aboriginal people, few signs suggested that the federal government had the interest or 
ability to wrest permanent responsibility for Indian education from the churches in 
late 1940s.22   Although some Branch officials, such as R.A. Hoey, expressed pr
for the creation of new state-run day schools over residential schools, to do so would 
secure from cabinet.  The IAB, quite simply, had neither the structural, fina
political means to assume total control of Indian education from the churches.  Branc
testimony delivered before the SJC exposed the already dire state of federal schools in the
                                                 
19 Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 7 (25 March 1947). 
 
20 BCA GR-1071 Box 1 File 2, “BC Indian Arts and Welfare Society, Report of Conference on Native 
946). 
Indian Affairs at Acadia Camp, UBC, Vancouver BC, April 1-3, 1948.” 
 
21 Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision, 380-81. 
 
22 Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 6 (18 June 1
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 province.  The Indian Commissioner for BC, D.M. McKay, noted that BC needed tw
new day schools and about half of the 55 existing day schools operated in a state of 
disrepair.
enty 
 
 push to end the partnership with the churches coincided with post-war federal 
bureauc  
ed 
26  
         
23  Prospects for a burgeoning Aboriginal population meant that existing federal
facilities would only be further taxed.   
The
ratic and budgetary growth.  In 1947, the Indian Welfare and Training Division
split into separate Welfare and Education Divisions, reflecting and facilitating the 
expanded capacities of each service.24  With growing budgets and responsibilities, the 
IAB began professionalizing by hiring more experienced and professionally-trained 
personnel, such as experienced educator R.F. Davey, appointed Superintendent of 
Education in 1954.25  Between 1921 and 1945, the Indian education budget had remain
low, fluctuating between roughly $1.1 and $2.3 million.  After WWII, however, a 
combination of increasing school enrolment, rising school operating costs, and 
bureaucratic growth placed enormous budgetary pressure on existing branch agencies.
                                                                                                                                        
 
25 Davey began his teaching career as an Indian day school teacher before returning to UBC then becoming 
incipal of Coquitlam Jr.-Sr. High School.  Davey served in the armed forces in WWII, following which 
  
ol. 8567, File 1/1-2, Pt. 1, “Department of Citizenship and 
migration, Indian Affairs Branch, n.d. [circa 1958-59].”  The IAB now funded the schools with a 
 
23 Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 4 (11 June 1946). 
24 Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1947-8, 218. 
 
pr
he worked for the provincial Department of Education.  Davey returned to the IAB in 1947 to fill a vacant 
post of BC Regional Inspector of Schools.  In 1952, he was appointed Assistant Superintendent of 
Education before becoming Superintendent two years later.  R.F. Davey, Indian News, January 1955, 
“Indians Indicate Growing Interest in Opportunities for Education.”  
 
26 In 1957 the IAB ended the per-capita grant system used to fund the church-run school system since 1892. 
LAC, RG 10, Central Registry Series, V
Im
controlled-cost system based on actual expenditures within defined limitations.  Canada, Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1957-58, 63. 
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 In the five years after 1945, the Indian education budget tripled from $2,156,882 to 
$6,221,792.  By 1960, the budget was $25 million and climbing.  In response to this 
growth, further restructuring took place into the 1960s when the Education Division was 
split into three divisions including administration, school supervision, and vocationa
training.
l 
le to 
nto church organizations through its per capita grant 
system
ol 
 
schools. 28  Of course, pressures to close the residential schools existed as long as the 
an most federal officials expected.  A 
27 
Rising costs were a major force informing the federal government’s interest in 
integrated education.  Along with welfare, education accounted for the vast majority of 
the branch budget.  Previously, under the residential system, the government was ab
control costs by offloading them o
.  With the residential system in decline, Branch officials realized that integration 
with provincial schools was a cheaper solution than operating a federal Indian scho
system.  In 1944, Branch Director R.A. Hoey noted that integrated schools would cost 
“substantially less” than an exclusively federally-funded system of residential and day
schools did, which was significantly longer th
significant number of residential facilities continued to operate well into the latter 
twentieth century.29  By 1962, for example, sixty-five residential schools remained in 
                                                 
7 Canada, 2 Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 
 LAC RG 10 Vol. 6205, File 468-1 MR C-7937, “R. Hoey to Dr. G. Dorey, 29 May 1944,” in Milloy, “A 
da, House of 
ay Schools of the 
aritimes (Fredrickton, NB: University of New Brunswick, 1986), 19. 
1965-66, 60; H.B. Rodine, “The Administrative Structure of Indian Education, 1965,” in The Education of 
Indian Children in Canada: A Symposium Written by Members of the Indian Affairs Education Division, 
with Comments by the Indian Peoples (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965), 24. 
 
82
National Crime”, 194, f.n. 23. 
 
29 At 1944, for instance, the branch operated eighty residential schools.  Cana
Commons, Debates, 14 August 1944, 6450; W.D. Hamilton, The Federal Indian D
M
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 operation, of which six were church-run.30  Instead of closing, some residential facili
took on new roles providing social welfare functions as hostels for those children deeme
needing child welfare services as well as those attending day and provincial schools.  Th
IAB’s 1960-61 Annual Report summarized the new primary function of residential
schools at the start of the 1960s: “One of the major tasks of the Indian schools is 
preparation for entrance to a non-Indian school.”
ties 
d 
e 
 
 1965 
the 
t found 
                 
31  R.F. Davey confirmed this in
when he stated: “The developments over the past ten years have tended to incorporate 
residential schools into the total Indian school system whereas previously they had 
operated as independent units.”32 
With school integration accelerating into the 1960s, the federal governmen
new reasons to close its day schools, thereby channeling more students into public 
schools and forcing many communities to relocate for access to education.33  As Milloy 
suggests, once integration had begun, federal budget considerations and cost-cutting 
                                                                                                                                
 
30 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1961-62, 31. 
 
31 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1960-61, 63; SJC, No. 4, June 11, 1946. Harry Hawthorn Fonds, 
Box 33 File 9, “Terms of Reference – Survey to Establish Criteria for Admission of Welfare Cases to 
ur, official eligibility criteria were established to assess 
upil entry for residential schooling.  Eligible candidates had to be 1) orphans, 2) residing in poor home 
By the late-1960s, the IAB began characterizing the Education 
ervices Directorate of the Branch as serving to a greater degree, the role of consultant.  Canada, 
lert Bay, B.C., July 8, 2003; Cliff Emery and Douglas Grainger “You 
oved Us Here: A Narrative Account of the Amalgamation and Relocation of the Gwa’Sala and 
c-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sg37_e.html> (accessed 1 August 2003). 
Residential Schools.”  To help assist this endeavo
p
conditions necessitating removal, 3) without access to day school, and 4) without access to provincial high 
school. 
 
32 Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 33 File 9, “Terms of Reference – Survey to Establish Criteria for Admission 
of Welfare Cases to Residential Schools.”  
S
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Report, 1968-69, 134. 
 
33 See Interview with Stevie Beans, A
M
‘Nakwaxda’xw Peoples," in Report of the Royal Commission of Aboriginal People, 1996. 
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 measur
nly 
 of 
lloy notes how, with the drive to integrate schools, “the Department went 
forward le 
“savage 964, Davey 
went as far as to describe the residential institutionalization of children as akin to parental 
delinquency.  
           
es only served to accelerate the program.34  In 1964, for instance, 25% of the 
branch budget was being spent to maintain residential institutions accommodating o
20% of the Indian school population.35  Branch officials noted that “a disproportionate 
amount of our education budget is spent on the maintenance of these [residential] 
institutions.”36  In 1969, Peter Powell, vice president of the BC School Trustees 
Association, even described religious schools as financially and technologically 
incompetent, and seriously damaging to the prospects of Indian integration.37  A long-
established tenet of the residential school’s civilizing logic—the necessary separation
the child from parents and community—underwent radical change in the integrationist 
era.  Mi
, assigning an active part in education to parents whose supposedly indelib
” character and baleful influence mysteriously disappeared.”38  By 1
39
                                      
, “A National Crime”, 201, 203, 208-9. 
G 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7984, File 1/19-2-10, Pt 1, “R.F. Dav
34 Milloy
 
35 LAC, ey to Dr. H.B. Hawthorn, 
17 June 1964.” 
 
36 Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 33 File 9, “Terms of Reference – Survey to Establish Criteria for Admission 
 Vancouver Sun, 16 May 1969, “Religious Schools Hit—“Harm Indian Integration,” 37. 
, 
R
of Welfare Cases to Residential Schools.” 
 
37
 
38 Milloy, “A National Crime”, 196. 
 
39 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7984, File 1/19-2-10, Pt 1, “R.F. Davey to Dr. H.B. Hawthorn
17 June 1964.” 
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 As both Miller and Milloy note, the secularization of Indian schooling did not 
occur quietly or with the unanimous consent of the churches.  Denominational an
regional differences also shaped attitudes towards integrated education.  Protestants in
northern and more isolated areas favoured Indian attendance at provincial schools with 
children continuing to reside at home or boarding in residential schools.  Catholic orde
on the other hand, often conceived of integrated education in terms of the attendance
Indians in mixed Indian-White Catholic schools, particularly in the west.
d 
 
rs, 
 of 
educati
majority of non-Indians are not educated to understand the Indians, no 
vocational opportunities as if they were non-Indian.  
Other church officials offered an even more sober view.  E.S.W. Cole, principal of the 
United Church Residential School in Port Alberni stated in 1958: 
A lot has been written, and as much said, about “integration for the 
integrating the Indian as, by no stretch of our imagination, can we do this.  
permanently when we have finished our job of education.  
                                                
40  While most 
church representatives approved of the goal of integration, not all viewed integrated 
on as appropriately serving that end.  In 1958, a conference of Catholic teachers 
noted: 
Due to differences in cultural background and in view of the fact that the 
school can prepare Indians for the same kind of life experience and 
41
 
Indian.”  It is, in this writer’s opinion, very stupid of us to talk about 
Integration will come from the Indian himself and will come quietly and 
42
 
 
 Information obtained from Father Berbado, OMI, Sechelt Residential School Principal (July 1958), in 
n Esq., 25 
November 1958,” in Ross, “Wardship to Citizenship,” 62. 
 
40 Lester Ray Peterson, “Indian Education in British Columbia (MA Thesis, University of British 
Columbia, 1959), 114-15; Milloy, “A National Crime”, 220-1. 
 
14
Peterson, “Indian Education in British Columbia,” 130. 
 
42 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7180, File 1-25, Pt.6, “E.S.W. Cole to Erin Nielso
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 By 1958, however, integration was already in full swing and church protests appear to 
have had little to no impact on staying the change.  The Anglican Indian School 
Administration, responsible for oversight of its residential schools, lamented this in a 
1959 b
 
44 
ffairs 
 Since 
fallen 
constitutionally charged with responsibility for education after WWII: the provinces.  In 
 day of academic schooling and in 1950 residential 
rief: “The old spirit of co-operation of Church and Government working together 
for the good of the Indians [sic] children has been lost.”43  Into the 1960s, the Branch 
held conferences with remaining church residential school officials to impress upon
principals the new direction of state education and affirm the primary post-war objective 
of Indian residential education: preparation for integration, citizenship, and leadership.
In addition to phasing out the relationship with the churches, another important 
step towards the desegregation of Indian schooling took place prior to the physical 
placement of Aboriginal bodies in provincial classroom.  After WWII, the Indian A
Department began harmonizing its operating standards with those of the provinces. 
educational programming, such as staffing standards and curricula, had previously 
under church auspices, it seemed only fitting for Indian affairs officials to turn to those 
1949, federal schools adopted the full
schools began using provincial courses of study.  By decade’s end federal schools also 
tarted implementing provincial school calendars and curriculums in respective s
                                                 
43 INAC file 6-21-1, Vol. 2, Brief to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in Reference to a Specia
Deputation of the Anglican Church of Canada, November 20th, 1959, 7 in Milloy, “A National Crime”, 
220. 
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44 LAC RG 10 Vol. 8576 File 1/1-2-2-23 Part 3, “Conference of Residential School Principals, 11-12
March 1964.” RG 10 Vol. 8576 File 1/1-2-2-23 Part 3, “Minutes of Meeting with Church Representatives
on 19 June 1962”; RG 10 Vol. 8576 File 1/1-2-2-23 Part 3, “Minutes of Meeting with Church 
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 provinces.45  Discussed below, the federal government’s wholesale adoption of 
provincial educational standards resulted in severe gaps in Aboriginal pupil educational 
attainment and achievement, effects that only became apparent in the mid 1960s.   
n 
 
 BC 
The harmonization of standards with the provinces appealed to branch educatio
officials for several reasons.  Integrated schools offered a solution to the department’s
lack of operating regulations of its own, and a means for deflecting criticism of its 
education system as segregationist.  The adoption of provincial education standards also 
represented a way to remedy the staffing shortages endemic to the federal day school 
system.  Teacher shortages were noted by one local Branch official in 1944 as “one of the 
big problems facing the Department,” and one exacerbated by growing enrolment.  In
alone, fifteen day schools were closed in 1946 due to teacher shortages and lack of 
enrolment.46  Beginning in 1947, and likely in response to staffing problems made 
apparent from SJC hearings, Indian school teacher classifications, pay scales, and 
benefits began to be brought into line with other federal and provincial standards.47  Into 
                                                                                                                                                 
f 
ordance with 
Representatives on 21 November 1962.” RG 10 Vol. 8576 File 1/1-2-2-23 Part 3, “R.F. Davey to Assistant 
Director of Education, 28 November 1962.” 
 
45 Peterson, “Indian Education in British Columbia,” 117.  By 1959, provincial textbooks began to be used 
in most schools.  Ibid., 111; Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” 63. Canada, 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Report, 1967-68, 81. 
 
46 BCA GR-1222 Box 106 File 10, “Minutes of the Fifteenth Annual Convention, Native Brotherhood o
British Columbia, 12-18 November 1944,” 11. From 1946 to 1956 the provincial pupil enrolment rate 
ncreased by 77.8%.  BCA GR-1113 Box 1 File 2 “Deputy Minister and Superintendent of Education to i
Boards of School Trustees, 12 December 1956”; Special Joint Committee, Minutes and Proceedings, No 4 
(11 June 1946). 
 
47 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1947-8, 217.  Previously, Indian school teachers had been 
exempted from the Civil Service Act passed in 1934 which granted terms and conditions of employment 
such as remuneration and medical insurance on terms comparable to those established by the provinces. A. 
Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 38. Treasury Board approved a new salary schedule and 
teacher classificatory regulations that year.  Teachers began to be classified and paid in acc
112 
 the 1950s, all Indian school teachers became eligible for federal superannuation benefits
and salary scales continued to be updated in accordance with academic qualifications and 
provincial rates.
 
outstrip
 
 
al 
      
48 
Teacher employment increased further by 80.8% during the ten years between 
1946 and 1956 but a general teacher shortage in the province meant that demand still 
ped supply.  By the mid-1950s, for instance, 1750 new teachers were needed 
annually in the province to fill new and evacuated positions.49  In the 1963-64 fiscal year
alone, almost thirty percent of all teachers turned over, including the youngest and most 
qualified teachers, the majority of whom resigned.50  One federal solution to this problem
was to recognize other forms of qualifications based on academic, professional, and 
military experience.51  This, however, did little to raise standards or improve Aborigin
opinions that many Indian school teachers were deficient.  As late as 1968—the same 
year provincial teacher certification standards were finally required for all federal 
schools—Aboriginal people decried some Indian residential teachers as being “as dumb 
                                                                                                                                           
their specific qualifications, experience, and responsibilities.  A. Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian 
Schools,” in The Education of Indian Children in Canada: A Symposium Written by Members of the Indian 
Affairs Education Division, with Comments by the Indian Peoples (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1965), 39-41.   
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956”; Vancouver Sun Magazine, 4 September 1954, “New Era for Our Indians,” 4. 
hing Staff in Indian Schools,” 39-40. 
entages increased dramatically.  For instance, in 1954 86% of 
 
eaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 41-42. 
 
48 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1953-54, 58; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1956-57, 
Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1958-59, 56; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1960-61, 59
ndian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1965-66, 64. I
 
49 BCA GR-1113 Box 1 File 2 “Deputy Minister and Superintendent of Education to Boards of School 
rustees, 12 December 1T
 
50 55.6% of all Indian school teachers were between 21 and 30 years of age, of which only 43% served for 
ne academic year or less.  Moore, “The Teaco
 
 If included, “qualified” teaching staff perc51
teachers in day schools were deemed qualified for the position; by the mid-1960s the figure was in the mid-
90s.  In 1954-55, only 8.3% of Indian school teachers held university degrees; by 1964-65, this percentage
ad only increased to 15.5%. See Moore, “The Th
113 
 as we are,” before urging officials to provide better education services under the Indian 
Act.52  Staffing shortages were also not confined to the teaching profession.  In 1965, the 
IAB no ng 
, 
 
inspection at all.  The inadequacy of school inspections was another source of ongoing 
cquire the power to inspect the residential schools.   Three years later, Thomas Gosnell 
         
ted the loss of experienced federal school superintendents to higher-payi
provincial administrations.53  A paucity of qualified staff plagued federal schools well 
into the 1960s and provided ongoing incentive for integration with provincial schools.54 
In addition to staffing standards, steps towards harmonization with provincial 
inspection standards also took place in the 1940s.  Historically, responsibility for school 
inspections fell to overburdened agency superintendents, a system Miller describes as 
having been “laughable” and incapable of preventing abuses from occurring.55  Indeed
throughout pre- and post-war years few of the province’s Indian schools underwent 
regular inspection; those in more remote regions or with adverse weather, rarely saw
complaint for Aboriginal people.  In 1944, the Native Brotherhood of BC resolved to 
56a
told the SJC that “During the term of position as chief councilor in the village of Pert 
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53 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Report on Indian Affairs for Quart
Ending June 30, 1965.” 
 
54 As late as 1960, 11.7% of day school and residential school teachers were insufficiently qualified.  India
Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1959-60, 56. 
 
55 Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision, 334-37, 422. 
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 [sic] Simpson I have seen an [Branch] inspector arrive there once in the ten year period
what they call a school inspector.  Once is all I saw him.”
, 
ble” well into the 1950s and beyond 58  In BC, one federal 
regiona  
n its 
ral day 
57 
The IAB took steps to improve its inspection capacities after WWII but 
inspections remained “laugha
l school inspector located in Vancouver was responsible for overseeing fifty-five
day schools, thirteen residential schools, and thirteen seasonal schools spanning BC and 
the Yukon.59  Remarkably, for a brief time in the 1940s, the IAB had no positions o
payroll specifically devoted to the inspection of BC’s federal schools.  Inspection 
standards appeared to improve in 1953 when a federal-BC agreement was reached in 
which the province’s Department of Education acquired the ability to inspect fede
schools.60  However, without any power to compel or enforce, provincial inspectors 
                                                 
 SJC, no. 17, May 2, 1947.  An Indian agent from Nova Scotia noted in a
any form of school inspections. See Special Joint Committee, “Appendix AI, H.E. Rice, 
57  letter to the SJC the absence of 
Indian Agent, 
Shubenacadeic, N.S., ‘Re: Indian Band-Millbrook, Colchester County,’” (2 July 1946). 
 
58 While BC’s inspector received the services of an assistant in 1958, the adequacy of school inspections in 
25-6. In 1951, 
, Toronto, and 
Quebec City, coordinated under one federal chief inspector.  As was the case in BC, however, these 
inspectors were charged the double duty of handling inspections in a growing number of classrooms under 
int 
ols.  See Rodine, “The 
he 
 
ne 1947); R.F. 
ducation.” 
ols for Indians to be Viewed,” 15; Victoria Daily Times, 22 July 
19 tion,” 15.  SJC testimony delivered by IAB Director R.A. Hoey 
the province did not improve until the mid-1960s when the regional inspectors were replaced by thirty two 
school superintendents and supervisors, and sixty four guidance personnel.  Peterson, “Indian Education in 
British Columbia,” 111; Rodine, “The Administrative Structure of Indian Education, 1965,” 
the Branch appointed five additional regional school inspectors in Calgary, Regina, Winnipeg
department control as well as working with local school boards and officials towards the creation of a jo
educational program. As in BC, each inspector was situated in an urban-located office, hopelessly 
ncapable of effectively overseeing massive regions and multitudes of schoi
Administrative Structure of Indian Education, 1965,” 24; LAC, RG 10 Vol. 8596, File 1/1-13, MR C-
14226, B. Neary to Director, 28 September 1950, in Milloy, “A National Crime”, 200, f.n. 56. 
 
59 The Indian Commissioner for BC, McKay acknowledged before the SJC that the duties charged to t
inspector were unrealistic.  Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 4 (11 June
1946).  The position was eventually filled by R.F. Davey who later went on to direct the Branch Education 
ivision.  Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 38 (24 JuD
Davey, Indian News, January 1955, “Indians Indicate Growing Interest in Opportunities for E
 
60 Victoria Daily, 23 July 1953, “Day Scho
53, “BC Granted Indian School Jurisdic
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 merely to branch 
headqu  to 
provinc ds met 
the needs of their children.  
Lastly, the adoption of the provincial school curriculum was another important 
step for IAB officials seeking to harmonize federal with provincial education operating 
standards.  At no prior time, as Milloy notes, did the Indian Department draw up a 
comprehensive curriculum for the instruction of Indian children or answer calls from 
regional school inspectors for curricular reform.   The IAB lacked the required capacity, 
expertise, or political will required for curricula development, having previously 
preferred to delegate such matters to the churches.  With its educational responsibilities 
growing into the latter 1940s, however, the branch Education Service decided to 
officially adopt provincial programs of study in its schools.   
In addition to having practical impetus, the adoption of provincial curricula had 
assimilationist underpinnings.  The 1959 branch Annual Report summarized this driving 
rationale of federal Indian education moving into the later twentieth century: 
                                                                                                                                                
 compared IAB-run to provincial schools and reported findings back 
arters.61  By the 1960s, Aboriginal people increasingly turned their attention
ial inspectors in their ongoing lobby to ensure that school facility standar
62
63
 
ggested that informal arrangements may have existed prior to the 1953 agreement.  See Special Joint 
. 1 (30 May 1946). 
-classroom rate.  Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 
vey of Contemporary 
 Affairs Branch, 1967), 78; 
Proceedings and Evidence, No. 38 (24 June 1947). 
e Milloy, “A National Crime”, 198. 
su
Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No
 
61 In 1959-60 the BC provincial school system was divided into five school districts under the supervision 
of District and Regional School Superintendents.  Provincial school inspectors were paid by the federal 
government according to a per
Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1956-57, 61; H.B. Hawthorn, ed. A Sur
ndians: Economic, Political, Educational Needs, Volume Two (Ottawa: IndianI
Special Joint Committee, Minutes of 
 
62 Vancouver Sun, 17 October 1968, “Indians Vote for Ottawa to pay Education Costs,” 16. 
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 Indian education is largely concerned with the social and economic 
differ from those of the non-Indian majority grou
adjustment of a minority group whose culture and standards of living 
p which surrounds them.  
The task of education is to assist acculturation, to promote intercultural 
Indian youth for economic competence and social stability.   
While couched in more fashionable terms, the goals of post-war curricula remained 
fixated on assimilationist ends.  References to Aboriginal people and culture were often 
portrayed stereotypically and unrealistically, when noted at all, in provincial classes and 
textbooks.   Inversely, no forms of training were provided to non-Indians to become 
“more educated to the Indian way of life.”   Under the façade of integration, as Milloy 
notes, “Education remained assimilation.”    
Any accommodation to specific Aboriginal needs or languages was structurally 
absent in provincial schools.  With the province controlling all curricula joint agreement 
terms, the IAB remained reluctant or unwilling to recommend the adoption of any special 
curricula.   In 1959, while appearing before the Joint Committee of the Senate and 
House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Davey responded to a committee member’s 
suggestion that a more culturally-relevant curriculum be adopted by flatly stating: “We 
                          
respect and understanding, to provide vocational training and to prepare 
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 have m
ow 
d 
ity for 
 of 
ts 
at all levels the opportunity to study the legal and administrative implications of a 
73
ade no representations to any provincial department of education that they 
exchange their curriculum to meet our requirements.”69 
School desegregation began in earnest while the federal government looked to 
“integrate” its school operating standards with those of the provinces.  As early as 1948, 
the IAB started approaching provincial school boards and departments of education 
requesting the inclusion of Indian children in public schools.70  In BC, R.F. Davey, then 
inspector of Indian schools, specifically urged BC’s school boards to accept Indian 
enrolment.71  Most initial federal attempts to devolve Indian education, however, met 
with modest success.  L.G.P. Waller, Chief Superintendent of Indian Schools, noted h
selling the idea of integrated schooling to local school boards, Indian band councils an
parents, and church officials, was a “time-consuming task” and one of “slow progress at 
the outset” due to common Indian and non-Indian opposition.72  It appears likely that 
many provinces looked warily upon desegregated schooling as carrying the possibil
federal intrusion into a provincial preserve.  Accordingly, Waller termed the duration
the latter 1940s and early 1950s as an “experimental period,” which “gave governmen
planned transfer of Indian children from Federal to provincial schools.”  
                                                 
69 Joint Committee, Minutes and Proceedings, No. 3 (June 17, 1959), 57. 
nts appointed after 1951.  Indian 
ffairs Branch, Annual Report, 1948-9, 199. 
 
70 This task later was delegated to the six regional school superintende
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71 Vancouver Sun, 9 March 1950, “Indians' Right to Attend School Urged,” 27. 
 
72 Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” 64. 
 
73 Ibid. 
 
118 
 Of all the provinces, BC and Manitoba appeared most amenable to the idea of 
integration at mid-century.  In 1949, Byron Johnson’s Coalition government passed a 
new Public Schools Act, granting the Minister or school boards the ability to negotiate 
and rat t 
ong-
 
 
school attendance guidelines.78  With Indian children now compelled to attend either 
                                                
ify educational agreements with the federal government allowing Indian enrolmen
in BC’s schools.74  The federal government followed statutory suit in 1951 with its l
awaited amendment to the Indian Act.  The new act embodied the federal government’s 
new interest in integrated schooling.  Previously, Indian Act components regarding 
Indian education comprised no more than three sections.75  This changed in 1951 when 
nine new sections pertaining to the administration of Indian education and education 
standards were added.76  Section 87 stipulated that Indians were subject to provincial 
laws of general application; section 113 granted order in council and ministerial power to
enter into agreements with provinces, territories, school boards, or church organizations
“to establish, operate and maintain schools for Indian children.”77  Subsequent Act 
revisions in 1952 and 1956 continued integrationist trends by clarifying compulsory 
 
74 An Act to Amend the “Public Schools Act”, SBC 1949, c. 57, s. 4. 
dance at Indian schools was first enacted in 1920.  Section 115 of the 1951 Act 
ompelled children between over the age of six and sixteen years of age to attend school.  Section 116, 
 was 
ested 
ith cabinet. 
 
75 See An Act Respecting Indians [Indian Act], Revised Statutes of Canada [or RSC] 1906, c. 81. s. 9-11. 
 
76 See Indian Act, Statutes of Canada [or SC] 1951, c. 29. s. 113-122. 
 
77 Ibid.,c. 29 s. 113.  The 1927 Act only contained provisions allowing for the establishment of day, 
industrial, and residential schools.  Indian Act, RSC 1927, c. 98, s. 8. 
 
78 Compulsory atten
c
which allowed children who had passed entrance examinations to be exempt from further attendance,
also repealed.  See An Act to Amend the Indian Act, SC 1920, c. 50, s.10; An Act to Amend the Indian Act, 
SC 1956, c. 40, s.29.  The 1956 Act also clarified application for on- and off-reserve Indians and granted 
the Minister the power to authorize the use of reserve lands for Indian schools, a power previously v
w
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 provincial or federal schools, the IAB noted in its 1956-57 Annual Report that “Indian 
education in general, and more particularly the integrated program of education, has been 
greatly
ing 
ith 
e of 
 
 
croft, Terrace, Telegraph 
Creek,  
                                                                                                                                                
 strengthened by this amendment.”79 
Federal officials such as Brown and McKay invoked statutory law as preclud
federal wresting of control of Indian education from the churches in 1946.80  Legal 
obligations, however, did not inhibit the branch when it came to striking agreements w
the provinces devolving Indian education.  In 1950, one year prior to the passag
enabling federal legislation, BC and Manitoba reached joint agreements with the federal 
government facilitating Indian attendance at provincial schools.  BC alone, however, 
became the first provincial government that year to agree to a blanket province-wide per 
capita rate for Indian attendance in public schools.  The lack of enabling federal statutes
did not impede the first joint agreements from being reached at the local level.  By the
fall, joint agreements were reached in Campbell River, Ash
and Prince Rupert facilitating federal subsidization for 883 of BC’s roughly 5700
 
 
79 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1956-57, 61. The amendments further brought federal standards in 
ional Attainment and 
uture Earnings,” (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Family and Labour Studies Division, 2005), 9, 30.  The 
s 
n the education of the Indian children and until the legislators of 
e dominion in their wisdom decide to make a change in that policy we are obliged to carry out the system 
vidence, No. 5 (13 June 1946). 
line with the provinces, who had compulsory attendance provisions in effect by that time.  Philip 
Oreopoulos, “Canadian Compulsory Schooling Laws and their Impact on Educat
F
federal government could only approximate provincial standards since they varied from province to 
province.  In British Columbia, for instance, the compulsory schooling age was seven, the minimum 
leaving age, fifteen.  Compulsory attendance age limits in the other provinces varied from federal standard
by up to two years. 
 
80 Before the SJC in 1946, McKay stated: “The present policy, as far as I can determine it, is for the 
government to co-operate with the church i
th
that exists.” Special Joint Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and E
 
120 
 Indian pupils.81  Although, some legal uncertainty surrounded those early agreements
preceding statutory sanction, no objections were raised by either BC or federal off
Joint agreements were the main mechanism through which integrated sch
was implemented in BC.  These agreements, negotiated between the IAB and local 
school boards, specified admission quotas for Indian children at the federal per capita 
subsidization rate.
 
icials. 
ooling 
the 
ments.83  
In the s orn 
ar 
ing that 
ments 
82  In addition to setting enrolment rates and the financial terms, the 
agreements also stipulated that the federal government surrender any rights of 
supervision to the province.  BC was to have complete and exclusive jurisdiction over 
administration, control, and operation of all schools identified under joint agree
econd volume of his 1967 national survey of Indians in Canada, H.B. Hawth
summarized the joint agreements as contracts in which “the federal government buys a 
service which is already in existence, and in no way tries to exercise control over the 
current methods of operation in a given school district.”84 
The joint agreements served a multifold purpose.  One, they represented a cle
policy statement for the IAB and a tangible step towards integration.  By stipulat
no racial segregation of Indian children take place in provincial schools, joint agree
                                                 
 BCA GR-1071 Box 1 File 6, “Education of Indian Children in British Columbia, September, 1950”; 
Vancouver Sun, 13 September 1950, “BC Schools Will Open to Indians,” 2. 
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82 Agreements were subject to approval by BC’s Council of Public Instruction.  Created in 1896, the 
Council of Public Instruction was composed of the provincial education minister and members of cabinet 
and responsible for directing provincial education policy under the authority of the legislative assembly.   
See British Columbia, Report of the Royal Commission on Education, 50. 
h and 
 
83 See BCA GR-1071 Box 1 File 1 Box 7, “Agreement between His Majesty King George the Sixt
School District No. 72, August 29 1950.” 
 
84 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume Two, 69. 
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 also provided means for the IAB to allay criticisms of the residential and day school 
system as discriminatory.  Two, by stipulating provincial autonomy over matters 
including curriculum, staffing, and standards, the joint agreements removed the 
possibility for future jurisdictional conflicts.  The province would have accepted no less 
when it
f 
e 
schools, $150 per Indian student per annum was to be paid to school boards by the IAB 
 came to education, an area of decided provincial jurisdiction.  Fortunately for 
BC, the federal government was only too willing to surrender these controls, much as it 
had throughout the process of harmonizing its education standards with those of the 
provinces.  Even the federal right to inspect provincial schools with Indian attendees, 
included in the earliest joint agreements, was removed from later contracts.85   
The joint agreements also provided fiscal incentives, notably in the form o
capital contributions, for both levels of government to participate in the program.86  For 
the federal government, the per capita rate was a cheaper alternative to maintenance of a 
separate federal school system.  Just as it had worked with the churches prior to 1957, 
when the IAB abolished the per capita grants in its residential schools, this funding 
system was a proven means to control expenditures and share its administrativ
responsibilities for Indians.  In exchange for allowing Indians to attend provincial 
under the 1950 agreement.  The federal government pitched these grants as equivalent to 
                                                 
85 See GR-1071 Box 1 File 1 Box 7, “Agreement between His Majesty King George the Sixth and School 
istrict No. 72, August 29 1950.”  This might have occurred in 1953 when the province assumed 
ians, Volume Two, 65. 
D
responsibility for inspection of the federal day schools. 
 
86 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Ind
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 municipal taxes normally paid to the province to fund public schooling.87  While th
federal government long hoped for the eventual incorporation of reserves as 
municipalities, extant provisions in the Indian Act prohibited bands from collecting
contributing taxation monies to the province for provincial schoolin
e 
 or 
g.88 
o 
-
er 
rating 
vincial 
agreements enabled the construction of new integrated high schools.  In 1955, for 
lassroom accommodation for one hundred Indian and eighty non-Indian students; in 
                                              
At least initially, the province found the financial terms of joint agreements als
agreeable.  The federal per capita annual contribution of $150 exceeded the actual non
Indian per capita costs incurred by the province for pupil enrolment.  Provincial p
capita costs for non-Indians were $124.59 per pupil on enrolment and $138.63 per pupil 
on average daily attendance.89  The inclusion of provisional grants for school ope
costs in the joint agreements, including expenses relating to the construction and 
maintenance of facilities, school administration, and instruction, also piqued pro
interest.  These grants offset costs for new school construction and expansion initiatives 
normally shouldered by schools boards.90  Over the next five years, additional 
instance, terms were reached for the construction of an Alert Bay high school and 
c
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 1960 an integrated junior college in Prince George was established.91  By 1965, the 
federal government was allocating close to $5 million nationally to local school boards 
for joint school construction.92  In some areas, federal school facilities were turned over 
to provincial school authorities for operation as provincial schools.93 
With agreements in place, Indian integration climbed steadily throughout the 
1950s, outstripping rival growth in the federal day schools.  At decade’s start, 557, or 
roughly 10% of the province’s school-attending Indian children were enrolled in 
provincial or private institutions.  At decade’s end, this percentage had climbed to almost 
30%.94  In their Annual Report to close the decade, the IAB observed that Indian 
enrollment at BC provincial schools was taking place at a “gratifying level.”95  In 1958 
the number of children in provincial schools finally outstripped those attending 
residential schools.96  Nationally, it was not until the 1966-67 fiscal year that the nationa
percentage of Indians attending provincial schools finally exceeded that of Indian 
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lumbia, Indian Advisory Committee, Annual Report, 1955, 8; Victoria Daily Colonist, 12 June 
1960, “Schoo
 
92 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Record of Achievement in Indian 
93 These arrangements entailed payment of a nominal rental to the federal government with the school 
ard assuming full responsibility for the operation and main ildings.  S.W. Kaiser, 
um Written by 
embers of the Indian by the Indian Peoples (Toronto: 
91 British Co
l Plan Integrates Indians, Whites,” 36. 
Affairs – 1965.” 
 
bo tenance of the school bu
Financing Indian Education,” in The Education of Indian Children in Canada: A Symposi“
M  Affairs Education Division, with Comments 
yerson Press, 1965), 34. R
 
94 See British Columbia, Report of the Royal Commission on Education, 140 [Table 79]. 
 
95 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1959-60, 69. 
 
96 British Columbia, Report of the Royal Commission on Education, 1960, 140. See also Indian Affairs 
Branch, Annual Report, 1960-61, 57. 
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 schools.97  The findings of the 1958 BC Royal Commission on Education also approved 
of the trend taking place.  The commission’s 1960 report noted that while no pressure 
was brought to bear on Indians to leave federally-run for provincial public schools, “The 
Departm vour.”  
The co nd 
should n gained the impression that, on the whole, the 
 
 
incial request 
 
t 
 
desegregation.  Between 1959 and 1961, the number of joint agreements nationally grew 
ent of Education and various school boards have co-operated in this endea
mmission concluded that “the present trend towards integration is desirable a
be encouraged.  The Commissio
programme of integration was progressing in an encouraging manner.”98  This progress
was further evinced in November 1963, when a three year term agreement, retroactive to
January 1 1963 escalated the federal per capita rate to $250 following a prov
for an increase.99  Treasury Board approved the request that February, terming it “most
reasonable” and noting that “failure to meet the request of the provincial governmen
would seriously damage the excellent relationship which has existed in connection with 
the integrated education of pupils in this province.”100  The federal government was
acutely aware of the fiduciary and political costs that might derive from alienating the 
province. 
By the 1960s, Canada’s other provinces began to follow BC’s lead in school 
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 from 72 to 550.101   R.F. Davey, Director of the Branch Education Division, encouraged 
the trend, summing up the federal position before an audience of provincial education 
ministers in 1963: 
What is now required, where it does not exist, is a common understanding 
at all levels of government on attitudes towards the Indian problem and 
a program which will eventually bring Indian education within the 
 
le to 
 was 
tia, 
s 
                                                                                                                                                
areas of responsibility and the necessary legislative machinery to carry out 
jurisdiction of the province.102 
In BC, of course, a “common understanding” already existed.  Later that year, Deputy 
Minister Perry added that “the officials of this Branch have done everything possib
implement and expedite the processing of school board requests to provide 
accommodation for Indian children.”103  The following year, integrated education
further discussed at the 1964 federal-provincial conference on Indian affairs where 
several provinces, including BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba Quebec, Nova Sco
and Prince Edward Island agreed to the principle of integrated schooling.  Minister 
Tremblay was recorded as being “impressed by the response received from the variou
provincial delegates.”104  Integration in BC only accelerated throughout the 1960s.  At 
1965, fifty-three individual joint school agreements existed in the province providing for 
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 the attendance of an estimated 43% of Indian pupils in provincial public schools.105   
That year, BC’s Education Minister Leslie Peterson proudly told the provincial 
legislature that, “BC is leading the rest of Canada in integration of Indian youngsters into 
the public school system.”106  
Joint agreements enjoyed high successes in BC for several reasons.  For one, f
requirements existed for joint agreements to be negotiated.  A provincial school had to be 
considered as good as or better than a federal school and a majority of Indian parents ha
to consent to the plan.  Neither of these conditions appears to have inhibited join
agreements from being
ew 
d 
t 
 finalized.  No extra-governmental standard existed by which to 
assess s
ely 
 whether 
chool resources under the control of both the federal government and the 
provinces.  Even though the federal schools were notoriously underfunded and often 
operated in states of disrepair, it was not unheard of for both levels of government to 
assert the superiority of their schooling institutions over those of the other.107  Precis
what constituted majority Aboriginal consent was also never clearly articulated.  No 
systematic means existed to garner approval since both band resolutions and petitions 
were acknowledged as proof of Indian support.108  Some questions also surround
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Program of the Education Division, Indian Affairs Branch, February 1963;” Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 
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Da , 11 July 1965, “School Board Promotes Integrat
 
10
 
10 orn, A Survey of Conte
 
108 In correspondence to Hawthorn, R.F. Davey, Assistant Director of the Education Division maintained 
that it had Indian support for integrated education, stating that the Branch policy precluded the stri
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 discreditable tactics were employed to acquire consent.  The 1967 Hawthorn report 
documented Indian claims that in certain cases federal officials used “discredit
(intimidation, undue pressure, biased explanations, etc…) to obtain the necessary numb
of signatures for an agreement.”
able means 
er 
 
s or 
 a province-wide per-capita rate.111  That joint agreement negotiations were 
conduc f 
 
          
109  Regardless, it is unlikely that Indian parents would
have had much reason to withhold, or to give informed, consent.  Neither federal nor 
provincial school officials took significant steps to improve Aboriginal understanding
to arrange preliminary visits to provincial schools.110  The existence of a public school 
proximal to an Indian reserve was the most likely actual requirement for school 
integration to occur.   
The specific structure of educational administration in the province also facilitated 
joint agreements.  The organization of school boards into larger administrative units 
under the Council of Public Instruction made easier umbrella agreements such as those 
reached in 1950 and 1963.  It was not until 1965 that a second province, Manitoba, 
agreed to
ted along non-tradition intergovernmental channels also improved their chances o
success.  Localized negotiations for joint agreements involved IAB officials and
individual school boards rather than provincial ministers of education.  In BC in 
                                                                                                                                       
agreements with school boards without the support of the Indian community concerned, either by way of 
band council resolution or by petition from the Indian parents.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 
984, File 1/19-2-10, Pt 1, “R.F. Davey to Dr. H.B. Hawthorn, 17 June 1964.” 
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 particular, rapid growth and staff shortages then endemic to the provincial school syste
had the further effect of impairing communications between field and central 
administration.  The BC Royal Commission on Education noted these gaps in its 1960 
report, adding that “long term planning, with regard to the public school system is not 
being carried out to th
m 
e extent that is required in the light of modern school conditions.112  
Early a cial 
Credit, er 
bureauc  was being 
inal 
particularly in the initial stages.  Integrated education represented a means to acquire 
previously-denied measures of equality and citizenry.  In the mid-1960s Hawthorn 
                                                                                                                                                
greements also took place prior to the 1952 rise to power of Bennett’s So
 a government notorious for exerting high political and ministerial control ov
ratic affairs.113  Through the joint agreements, Milloy notes, “change
instituted in an area of undoubted provincial jurisdiction with little consultation between 
Ottawa and Provincial ministries of education.  Most provinces took greater interest in 
the joint agreements only after their “significance” was discovered, which sometimes 
only occurred once Indians began actually entering provincial schools.114   Those most 
excluded from discussions about integration were those most affected by it: Aborig
people. 
Despite being marginalized from the decision making process, many Aboriginal 
people appear to have taken some interest in the prospects of public schooling, 
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112 British Columbia, Report of the Royal Commission on Education, 5
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 observed that many Indian parents felt that integrated schools helped their children to 
“learn about Whites” and better interact with non-Indians “on an equal basis.”115
saw integration as providing a form of education for non-Indians and a way to eliminate 
racial prejudices.  Elliott Moses of the Six Nations reserve stated this sentiment in a 1958 
Indian News article: 
The policy of having Indian children attend non-Indian schools or vice 
high schools on Indian reservations, it is necessary for them to attend such 
at school age is an effective time for destroying racial prejudices.
  Others 
versa, is I believe, a step in the right direction. … for since there are no 
schools adjacent to their homes in non-Indian communities. … Integration 
 
ing 
long-so  it 
war but for years the best our youngsters could do was grade 8 and then they had 
  
116 
Most commonly, however, Aboriginal people saw public schools as potentially provid
ught skills and knowledge to deal with western modernity.  By the mid-century
was painfully obvious that the labour-intensive “curriculum” of the residential system 
and the elementary grade-limited day schools left much to be desired.  Particularly for 
those Aboriginal people living in BC’s more remote regions, access to secondary 
education under the federal system proved difficult, often requiring relocation.  Speaking 
in 1969, Haida John Williams, noted: “We’ve had a few complete high school since the 
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ets of the Indian problem to a perceptive audience, convincing 
any that the Indian problem is a Canadian problem.”  Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in 
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 nowhere to go for high school.”117  Other period individual and organizational sources 
further suggest that Aboriginal people shared some interest in provincial public 
schooling.  In 1950, a group of Vancouver Island Indians lobbied the federal government 
to fund Indian enrolment at the local public Craigflower school in Esquimalt in response
to lacking residential school facilities.
 
 
 the public school system.120 
ed 
er 
 
118  One of the most outspoken Aboriginal 
proponent of integrated education was Peter Kelly.  As secretary of BC’s Indian Advisory
Committee in 1953, Kelly stated that integrated schooling “was the only answer” to 
Indian woes.119  Later, as chairman of the Native Brotherhood of BC in 1959, Kelly 
continued advocating the full integration of Indians into
Indian opinions of provincial schooling were always shaped by the perceiv
alternatives.  For example, some Aboriginal children preferred residential schools ov
those public schools prone to racial discrimination or when home life was particularly 
unpleasant.121  It is likely that many Aboriginal parents favoured provincial over 
residential schooling simply on the basis that their children would be allowed daily return 
to their homes after school.  It is also for this reason that some favoured expansion of the
                                                 
117
views from other parts of Canada can be found in the Indian News in this period.  See Moses, “Some 
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 day school system over integrated schooling.  In 1944, for instance, Alfred Adams stated 
before the Native Brotherhood of BC annual convention that “There is somethi
in the educational program for Indians … Ideal is a day school where children can live at 
home.”
ng lacking 
ch 
hat went on 
inside p ing 
d 
this as fait accompli, an unfortunate but necessary consequence of the special legal and 
chool committees were essentially ad hoc advisory panels set up at the community level 
122  Regardless, the extent to which Aboriginal people would have known mu
about provincial schooling remains unclear.  Having never before been permitted to 
attend provincial facilities, few Aboriginal people likely knew much about w
ublic schools.  That provincial schools were better equipped to meet the chang
needs of Aboriginal people than residential and day schools appears to have been a 
gamble that many Indian parents were willing to take. 
Aboriginal people remained outside onlookers to integrated school policy 
planning and development throughout the first two decades of integrated schooling 
process.  As noted, early Aboriginal involvement in the decision to integrate was limited 
to the granting of consent.  The lack of any provisions in joint school agreements 
securing ongoing Aboriginal involvement or representation on school boards ensured that 
Indian parents remained marginal to the decision-making process.  IAB officials treate
tax exempt status of Indians.  It was not until 1957 that the IAB implemented a means for 
Aboriginal participation in the process of school integration via school committees.  
S
by branch regional superintendents.  According to the IAB’s Annual Report for that year, 
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 committees were created on a number of reserves “as a means of enabling Indian 
communities to assume more responsibility in the development of educational 
facilities.”123  By 1958, eleven committees operated in BC, Alberta, Ontario, Queb
Nova Scotia.
ec, and 
dly 
 and 
d 
His 1967 survey recommended the inclusion of Aboriginal representation, either formally 
or informally, on school boards where provincial laws applied.126  The BC Indian 
Advisory Committee also found fault with the virtual exclusion of Indian participation in 
124  The IAB hoped that the committees would eventually develop into 
bodies akin to provincial school boards since the provincial property and school tax 
exempt status of Indians prohibited their participation on school boards.125   
It became clear early on that the committees were poor substitutes for Indian 
representation on provincial school boards.  Not only were school committees belate
created long after integrative trends were established, they had few responsibilities
no powers beyond that of recommendation.  Hawthorn, while a proponent of integrate
schooling, criticized the school committees’ poor funding and limited responsibilities.  
integrated school programming, issuing recommendations calling for the inclusion of 
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panded to 
irty-one, a figure that more than doubled within four years.  By 1971, 184 school committees were in 
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 Indian representation on school boards through an exemption to the property tax 
requirement.127  Even though the IAB ostensibly favoured Indian representation on 
provinc
airs 
ial school boards, it lamented that implementing such was beyond federal 
control.128  The provincial education department, in turn, rejected any provisions 
allowing for special Indian representation on school boards.  When Ontario passed 
legislation in 1967 allowing the appointment of Indians on provincial school boards, 
Perry stated: “I am a little disturbed as to either the logic or the ethics of such an 
amendment as the Ontario amendment.”129  While several provinces, including BC, 
eventually passed legislation allowing Indians to serve as school trustees, the electoral 
requirements inhibited most Indians from reaching such status.130  In 1972, Indian Aff
Minister Jean Chrétien admitted to the Council of Ministers of Education that when it 
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proposed to enlarge the role of the committees via regulatory change f
itish 
er 16 and 17, 1965.”  In 1967, the IAB 
ollowing the passage of a new Indian 
Act. 
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 came to the education of their children, Aboriginal parents “remained on the fringe, 
powerless to influence policy.”131   
Aboriginal people remained vocal critics of the integrated school syst
outset although their exclusion from the decision-making process had the effect of 
rendering their criticisms impotent.  The structural exclusion of Aboriginal people, 
combined with the surrendering of all federal powers of jurisdiction and inspection to the 
province, meant that IAB officials knew little about what went on in integrated schools.  
It was not until the mid-1960s, over a decade after school integration started, that officials
began realizing that school de-segregation was not synonymous with integration.  The 
1965 publication of a collection of essays authored by members of the Indian Affa
Education Division disclosed the wide array of challenges facing Indian educators.  Th
proceedings of a one-day workshop sponsored by the Penticton Indian Affai
em from the 
 
irs 
e 
rs Committee 
that sam
e 
second volume of the 1960s Hawthorn survey.  Devoted primarily to the matter of Indian 
ducation, the 1967 report highlighted a range of problems stemming from desegregated 
                                              
e year further highlighted problems in areas of Indian adjustment, attendance, 
educational attainment, and teacher inexperience dealing with Native students.132  That 
fall, the BC Indian Advisory Committee recommended in its annual report that th
province begin to provide special education to Indians. 
The greatest criticisms of the integrated system, however, were saved for the 
e
   
, 
ommittee, One-Day Workshop, ‘What Can be 
repare Teachers for the Task of Working Effectively with Indian Pupils,’ December 6, 1965.” 
131 INAC File 501/25-1, Vol. 9, Minister’s Address to the Council of Ministers of Education, 23 June 1972
9, in Milloy, “A National Crime”, 197 f.n. 42. 
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 education and the failing of provincial schools to effect Indian adjustment.  Hawt
al. described Indian attendance in public schools midway through the 1960s as “spor
and low,” with neither parents, schools, the RCMP, nor IAB officials taking 
responsibility.
horn et 
adic 
 
e 
ildren were, on average, two and a half years behind the non-Indian 
student. ased 
ol 
an 
en Indian 
 of 
provincial schools due to variances in workloads, evaluation, and curriculum between 
137
                      
133  The report noted bleak achievement statistics nationally under the 
integrated system, and “alarming” Indian pupil retention rates during the twelve years
leading up to their study: 94% of Indians dropped out during grades one to twelve; by th
eighth grade Indian ch
134  Analysis of branch statistics reveals that Indian enrolment actually decre
by 50% between 1939 and 1959.  Less than 10% of Indian children attended any scho
beyond grade six; under one percent of Indian children attended grade twelve.135  
Compared to non-Indians, Indian children attended school in higher percentages th
non-Indians in elementary grades, but lower percentages after grade six.136 
Glaring discrepancies in educational attainment became apparent betwe
and non-Indian pupils in integrated schools.  Hawthorn’s report cited Indian children
high academic standing in federal and residential schools encountering failure in 
Indian and public schools.   Hawthorn described Indian students as suffering from a 
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 “cumulative deficit” in provincial schools, one that hampered student successes, 
particularly in the upper grades.  He also noted how high grade repeat rates actually 
worked against the Indian Act provisions setting minimum age requirements for Indian 
school withdrawal.138  For instance, an Indian child who entered school at age seven, 
failed grade one and four, was legally able to leave school at grade six.139  Resultant 
differences in age further alienated Indian from non-Indian classmates and precipitated 
Native drop outs.140   
Racism shaped Aboriginal experiences in public schools and also provided 
incentive for drop outs and low Indian retention well into the 1960s.  As early as the 
1940s, the NBBC noted that racial prejudice was a factor inhibiting Indian school 
attendance.141  Many Aboriginal parents worried that their children would not be 
accepted or received sympathetically by non-Indians, a fear that was often realized once 
in provincial schools.142  Differences between Indian and non-Indian children, 
particularly in the earliest stages of integration, were pronounced in terms of dre
speech, and behaviour.  School yards were commonly socially divided along racial li
ss, 
nes 
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 and fights between Indians and non-Indians were cited as common, notably in lower 
grades.143  Feelings of inferiority and negative self-image among Native pupils w
common response of older students to low academic achievement in public schools, non-
Indian teasing, and singling out by teachers.  As Chief Dan George observed in his 19
short story ““My Very Good Dear Friends,” the metaphorical blacktop was never level i
public schools; Aboriginal children remained segregated, evident in regards to academ
attainment, attendance, and treatment at the hands of non-Native students and teachers. 
Ongoing administrative divisions, the re
as a 
69 
n 
ic 
sult of the assemblage of different federal, 
provinc  the 
nts 
r studies, Indian 
childre es over the 
course incial 
schools ance of Family 
d 
 or 
department, would result in an increase in Branch relief costs; accordingly, not many 
                              
ial, and church schools involved in the Indian education system, proved to be
source of numerous additional problems.  Whereas entire generations of Indian stude
were often accustomed to attending one school for the duration of thei
n in the integrationist period could expect to be transferred several tim
of their education.  Such transfers from church or reserve schools to prov
 provided natural “drop out” points.  Even the discontinu
Allowance payments to families, something the Department of National Health an
Welfare could do to families whose children did not regularly attend schools—Indian
not—had little impact on compelling school attendance.  Milloy notes how field staff 
feared that a reduction in Family Allowance payments, paid out by another line 
                   
enticton Indian Affairs Committee, One-Day Workshop, ‘What Can be 
repare Teachers for the Task of Working Effectively with Indian Pupils,’ 6 December 1965.” 
 
143 BCA GR-0899 Box 5 File 2, “P
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138 
 field staff took steps to enforce the Family Allowance requirement.144  Interdepartm
interests, at least in this case, served to undermine IAB efforts to compel school 
attendance.  Furthermore, Aboriginal attendance at provincial institutions was not alw
guaranteed by joint agreements.  When specified quotas were exceeded, for instance, 
Indian children could be excluded from provincial schools or forced to travel furt
attend institutions based not on convenience but rather quota availability.
ental 
ays 
her to 
 
erate 
learned nothing at all. [in the Skidegate Indian day school] …  We 
along. … When I went away to Coqualeetza at the age of 10 years I still 
 
sure 
he 
                                                
145  Overall,
even under the guise of integration, the Indian education system remained a conglom
effort involving multiple intrastate agencies.   
Integrated schools also exposed major gaps in English and French language 
proficiency among Indian and non-Indian pupils.  Language barriers were endemic 
problems in day and residential schools.  Haida John Williams notes: 
I could understand a word here and there in English but for 2 years I 
couldn’t understand what it was about.  I had to learn English as I went 
didn’t speak English.  I did all my thinking in Haida.146 
In BC, a questionnaire distributed by provincial superintendents in the late 1950s 
revealed that an estimated 75% of Indian children continued to speak their ancestral 
language.147  Yet, with stark evidence like this, IAB officials made no effort to en
that language barriers would be remedied while in provincial schools.  It was not until t
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 1960s that IAB officials even acknowledged the existence of significant language 
problems in public schools.  In 1962, for instance, the IAB’s Supervisor of Language
Instruction, R.C. Colliou, estimated that 25% of Indian school beginners aged five to 
eight were classified as having no knowledge of English or French; 19% were described 
as being able to speak some English or French; 30% and 13% were respectively 
categorized as being fairly fluent and fluent in either language.
 
equippe r federal 
s with 
schools presumably offered reprieve from the physical abuses endemic to many 
148  Colliou remarked 
again in 1965 that language barriers remained an ongoing problem, noting: “Grade 
repetition, loss of interest and age-grade retardation were common characteristics of 
Indian pupils.”149  Provincial school administrators commonly responded to the problem 
by placing large numbers of Indian children in special needs classes separate from the 
main student populace.  Never before was it so apparent the failure of prior church and 
state attempts to supplant the use of traditional languages with English and French. 
As revealed by language issues, public institutions were, in many ways, worse-
d to deal with the educational needs of Aboriginal people than those unde
and church oversight.  Earlier federal attempts to harmonize Indian school standard
provincial standards had little, if any, impact in easing this transition.  While provincial 
residential schools, the Indian education system lost any ability to adapt to local needs 
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 and circumstances once under provincial control.  The provision of basic social w
services, a supplementary feature of the residential system, was absent in provincia
schools.  Children, parents, and school superintendents would cite how Indian pup
lack of adequate clothing, lunches, and books impeded student attainment and attendan
in public schools.
elfare 
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150  Public school teacher shortages and inexperience and lack of
resources or training for working with Indian pupils did little to stay the problems of 
Indian adjustment.  It may be for these reasons, in addition to denominational affiliatio
that some Aboriginal people such as Andrew Paull opposed integrated schooling from 
outset.  Paull, as head of the North American Indian Brotherhood defended the hi
role of the church in 1956, stating that, “if it were not for the churches our position wo
be much worse.”151  Perhaps not surprisingly, IAB officials observed that some Indians 
came to see integrated schooling by the 1960s as a “genocidal and … sinister plot by 
government to shift its responsibilities on to the province or the Indian community.”152 
It remains unclear to what extent school officials were even aware of the 
differences between IAB integrationist rhetoric and the lived reality of integrated 
schooling.  In 1960, for instance, Indian schools superintendent J.C. Lawrence proud
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 announced that “the gap is closing” between Indian and white students in public 
schools.153  Much like those early annual reports that inflated the achievements of 
residential institutions, integrated schools were described as promoting improved 
responsibilities, daily routines, habits, hygiene, health, and social life, benefits that no 
respons
 
dential 
n-wide 
on but 
                   
ible Aboriginal parent could refuse.154  Well into the 1960s, Indian affairs 
officials reported that most Indian children and parents propounded and benefited from 
attendance at non-Indian schools.  In 1965 Waller claimed that “The reaction of the 
majority [of Indians to public schooling] has been one of satisfaction. … All this is in 
strong contrast to the silence and seeming mass indifference of the past,” before 
admitting that “no objective analysis of pupil opinion has been made.155  Hawthorn’s 
survey rendered a more sober view of Aboriginal perspectives of integrated schooling. 
While he found that a majority of Indian parents still preferred provincial over resi
or day schools, Hawthorn described Indian opinions of provincial schooling natio
as neutral at best; the most prevalent attitude noted was verbal support for educati
behaviour that denied it.156   Lester Ray Peterson similarly observed in a 1959 study of 
Indian education in BC undertaken, that “[i]ndividual Indians who speak in favor of 
                                                                                                                              
 
153 Victoria Daily Colonist, 30 April 1960, “The Gap is Closing,” 10. Eight years later, a Williams Lake 
newspaper story citing instances of physical segregation in a local public school were quickly dismissed by 
provincial Department of Education officials as the result of grade differences.  See Williams Lake Tribune, 
11 September 1968, “Thinks Integration is More like Segregation” [n.p.]; BCA GR-0899 Box 5 File 3, 
. Brothers to Dave Powell, 30 September 1968.” 
9-2-10, Pt. 1, “Observations on the Integration 
“D.L
 
154 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7983, File 1/1
Program of the Education Division, Indian Affairs Branch.” 
 
155 Waller, “The Enrolment of Indian Children in Provincial Schools,” 69. 
 
156 Hawthorn, A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada, 137-8. 
142 
 ethnic integration do so because they have hope that their children, or their children’s 
children, may have a chance some day to cross the color line and emerge as Whites.  
Those w
d 
deration 
t 
ing 
lack of consideration for the special needs of Indian children and the assimilationist 
ith no such perceptible hope do not speak of integration.  Many do not want 
it.”157 
Neutral opinions appear to have increasingly turned negative by the late 1960s 
when rounds of federal consultations for proposed revision to the Indian Act uncovere
critical Aboriginal views of integrated schooling.  In the spring of 1969, a Confe
of BC Interior Indians report outlined the failings of integrated schooling, stating that “i
has become apparent that there is a breakdown of integration in the public schools.”158  
That year also saw the North American Indian Brotherhood release a “Brief Regard
Indian Education in British Columbia.”  In addition to noting “a very definite need for 
improvement,” in regards to the provincial takeover of schooling from the federal 
government, the brief stated that “this assembly is in total disagreement with the 
Department of Indian Affairs, especially in the lack of consultation with Indians 
concerning the education of Indian children.”  The brief further criticized government’s 
underpinnings of the provincial curriculum.159  Another brief from the Indian 
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 Homemaker’s Association of BC issued that year drew similar criticisms; both briefs 
described integrated education as the area of “greatest need” for reform.160 
logist 
on 
ling an array of criticisms at federal, provincial, school board, and 
band au
e 
Alongside Aboriginal political organizations, social scientists also escalated 
criticism of integrated education policies around this time.  In 1966, UBC anthropo
Barbara Lane condemned integrated schooling “for trying to turn Indians into middle 
class white children.”161  In a paper written for the Indian Advisory Committee titled 
“Unequal ‘Equality’: Failure in Indian Education,” Wilson Duff, another UBC 
anthropologist, similarly noted that “In Canada we are working on the assumption that 
equal access to education means equality of education, and the error of this view is now 
too obvious to ignore.”162  Two years after the release of the second volume of the 
Hawthorn report on education, Hawthorn authored a full-page article on Indian educati
in the Province leve
thorities.  While continuing to support the principle of integrated education, 
Hawthorn rearticulated criticisms of its implementation articulated in his 1967 report.  
Hawthorn restated his recommendations as, “still generally pertinent,” adding that, “[t]h
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 Indian child needs more than equality or similarity of education.  In some ways he needs 
more and in some ways different schooling.”163 
Calls for reform appear to have had little impact on swaying either provincia
federal officials.  The provinces had no legal obligation or historical precedent for 
providing special services to Indians and under the terms of joint agreements merely 
made this policy official.  The joint agreements, by stipulating that Indians be provided
the same education services as non-Indians, forbade the development 
l or 
 
of any special 
curricu
e 
rate 
 per 
l 
                                                                                                                                                
la or instructional provisions for Indians in public schools.  From the province’s 
perspective, it was merely fulfilling the federal government’s request for equal treatment 
of Indians in provincial institutions as non-Indians.  BC officials remained fixated on th
idea that integrated Indian education be implemented on identical terms as provincial 
public schooling.   
The fiscal terms agreed to in 1950 and 1963 made it even less likely that any 
special educational services might be provided to Indians.  Initially, the per capita 
paid out by the IAB exceeded provincial costs, thus likely spurring provincial interest.  
Into the 1960s, however, provincial costs began to outstrip the per capita payments.  In 
1963, when the contribution rate was increased to $250, provincial per-capita costs
non-Native pupil was already well in excess, averaging $370.164  By 1966-67, the federa
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164 BCA, British Columbia, Sessional Papers, Vol. II 1962, “”Report of Superintendent of Education, 19
0” in Public Schools of the Province of British C5
Printer, 1951), O 12. 
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 contribution covered only 40% to 60% of the total costs in select school districts.165  The 
residential system had been funded via a similar capita grant system for decades, and 
with specific reason.  Miller notes how government was able to effectively control 
schooling costs, particularly during inflationary periods such as WWI, by reducing the 
grants and shifting fiscal burden onto church organizations.166  The per capita system
appears to have worked s
 
imilarly with the province once the trend towards integration 
was fir
el the 
provinc rovince to develop 
 on the report, IAB officials rejected 
Hawthorn’s assertion that integrated education should, as a general principle, take into 
account differences in background, value, and motivation but rather rebutted that 
rimary-school level and even these were always 
 of 
mly established and per capita education costs began to rise.   
The federal government, lacking any power to influence curricula or comp
e to provide special services to Indians, did little to press the p
educational services better tailored to address Aboriginal needs.  Even with mounting 
evidence of the failings of integrated schooling noted in Hawthorn’s report on education, 
the IAB took few remedial steps.  In its commentary
consideration of such “differences be minimized.”   The IAB saw the need for special 
ducation services only at the pre- and pe
contingent on available financial and staffing resources.  Just like their provincial 
counterparts, federal education officials too upheld the joint agreement terms, declaring 
any special and remedial programming as falling within the sole domain and discretion
                                                 
165 The per capita cost to educate non-Indians was $503 in 1966-67.  D.B. Fields and W.T. Stanbury,
Economic Impact of the Public Sector Upon the Indians of British Columbia: An Examination of the 
Incidence of Taxation of Three Levels of Government,” (Ottawa: A Study for the Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, 1968), 412. 
 
 “The 
166 Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision, 384. 
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 provinc t 
th than 
through their many agencies operating in the field. Provincial educational 
course content with a view to ensuring that they adequately reflect Indian 
 
ion process leading up the White 
Paper a nce 
         
ial school authorities.167  Davey confirmed this much in 1968 when he stated tha
“Provincial governments will take over more and more responsibility for education of 
students in Indian residential schools.”168  Even the 1969 White Paper, while affirming 
the principle and expansion of integrated schooling, advocated a more moderate pa
that previously undertaken by prior officials.  In regards to integrated education, the 
White Paper proposed:   
The provincial governments will be approached to support this goal 
authorities will be urged to intensify their review of school curriculae and 
culture and Indian contributions to Canadian development.169 
Apparently, at least in regards to education, the consultat
nd earlier provincial demands for full control of Indian affairs had some influe
on those federal policy intents released in 1969.170 
 
                                                                                                                                        
 
168 Vancouver Sun, 13 March 1968, “Indian Schools Role Under Review,” 7.  It should be noted that some 
or 
 
169 Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the Government Of 
Canada On
 February 1966, “MLA Suggests Indian Takeover,” 13; Vancouver Sun, 6; 
cember, 1968, “NDP Urges BC Bid to Change Laws,” 22; Vancouver Sun, 15 March 1969, “Full 
167 See Hawthorn A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada, 12; BCA MS-2848 Box 3 File 5, 
“Commentary on the Hawthorn Report,” 10; BCA MS-2848 Box 3 File 5, “Survey of the Contemporary 
Indians of Canada [IAB Commentary],” 3, 21. 
 
within the IAB, such as Chief of Welfare Division Walter Rudnicki, identified the elimination of the 
federal-Indian trust relationship as leaving open the possibility for provincial discrimination against 
Indians.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Rudnicki to Acting Seni
Administrative Officer,” 3. 
 Indian Policy, 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), n.p.   
 
170 See Vancouver Sun, 4
De
Integration of Indians into School System Urged,” 13.  Sally Weaver contends that the consultation process 
leading up to the White Paper’s release bore little semblance to the demands raised by Aboriginal people, 
particularly via the regional and national advisory council structure established in 1965.  See Sally M. 
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 For Michel Foucault, what was most significant about power lay in its exercise
not its ontological or institutional origins.  He notes, “power means relations, a more
less organized, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations.”  Indeed, if we view po
as sets of re
, 
 or 
wer 
lations having the generative capacity to “serve” in differing historical 
context  
of education, 
he 
 
 regard to those late-1960s 
conflic  
s and periods, we can undertake what Foucault referred to as an analytic of power
and study power relations through interpretive grids of analysis.171  Foucault’s theories 
provide a way to make sense of the convoluted history of early integrated schooling in 
BC.  Power relations “served” federal departments, provincial departments 
school boards, and Aboriginal people in myriad and often divergent ways throughout t
first two decades of integrated schooling process in BC. 
While the interplay of intrastate power relations in other policy areas, such as 
health, involved significant clashes within intra- and intergovernmental agencies, a
discernible convergence occurred in the area of integrated education.  The general 
deterioration of federal-provincial relations, evident with
ts over Indian health, appears to have not significantly impeded the formulation of
intergovernmental consensus when it came to Indian school desegregation.  A 
convergence of intrastate interests, motivated by a combination of political, economic, 
ideological, and moralistic impetuses, took place beginning in the late-1940s.  Federal 
                                                                                                                                                 
nto 
 
171 Michel Foucault, “Power and Strategies,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-70 (Toronto: University of Toro
Press, 1981), 190-191.  
1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 142.  See also Michel Foucault, 
“Confessions of the Flesh,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, 
Colin Gordon, ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 198-99. 
 
148 
 and provincial interests in integrated education were hardly synonymous, but enough 
common ground and understanding existed—made official by the terms of the joint 
agreements—for “administrative integration” to proceed uninterrupted through two 
decades.   
In the initial stages at least, this process had clear policy and power implications 
which proved largely detrimental for Aboriginal people.  Integrated schools inherited old
problems from the residential and day school system while introducing new ones.  Th
results could hardly be deemed v
 
e 
ery successful.  While Indian pupils were 
“admin .  It 
appears ious 
express
 
integrate schools, BC’s public schools served as spaces for the formulation of both old 
n 
ontinued to support integration long after the shortcomings of public schools became 
                                              
istratively integrated” they remained separate in almost every other regard
 obvious today that Indian children bore the brunt of one of the most efficac
ions of integration policy.  Officials at both levels of government capitalized on 
Aboriginal demands for new education, using the mantra of integration to answer 
growing public demands for equal rights while balancing its own agenda for fiscal 
prudence and the termination of special Indian status.172 
While Indian assimilation was an important motivating force behind the drive to
and new power relations.  Just as most Aboriginal people had long approached Canadia
education according to perceived material gains and available alternatives, many Indians 
c
painstakingly obvious.  Prior to the post-1969 growth of Aboriginal self-control of 
   
ls: 
172 Andrew P. Ross, “Wardship to Citizenship: Integrated Education and Canadian Indian Policy Change—
1945-1969,” (MA Thesis, Carlton University, 2001), 1, 2; Verna J. Kirkness, First Nations and Schoo
Triumphs and Struggles (Toronto: Canadian Education Association, 1992), 12-14. 
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 education, many Aboriginal people saw provincial schools as offering vast improvemen
over prior residential and day schools.  Entire communities continued to relocate for 
access to provincial schools well into the 1960s and beyond.
ts 
, Dan George saw western education as a basic necessity, noting that, 
“In unprecedented numbers our young men and women are entering fields of education.  
There is a longing in the heart of my people to reach out and grasp that which is needed 
for our survival.”174  Others, such as John Williams shared such a pragmatic view of 
integrated schooling.  He notes: 
it’s only in the last 5-8 years that our people have begun to be integrated 
into the provincial school system in BC and the results will not be visible 
for another 15-20 years because it takes times for education to take effect.  
…  The time is coming when it will be necessary for our people to have 
real education in order to take part in the life of the country.175 
 
Williams, speaking in 1969, showed great foresight.  Into the late-1960s and beyond, 
Aboriginal attendance rates in secondary schools began to increase and a new political 
leadership began to emerge, one with greater experience navigating BC’s high schools, 
cities, and other “non-Indian” spaces.176  While, as Paul Tennant notes, public schools 
                                                
173  Although critical of 
integrated schooling
 
173 In 1966, for example, the Brotherhood further demanded the end of segregated schooling at Alert Bay 
and called for closure of the day school which kept Indian children “deprived of the same standards of 
education as those enjoyed by children attending the integrated public school.” Native Voice, December 
1966, “End Segregation at Alert Bay, Says Brotherhood.”  See also Vancouver Sun, 31 January 1969, 
“Indians Quit Isolated Reserve to Avoid Boat Trip to School,” 6; Plant, “Hank Snow and Movin’ On,” 120-
 Chief Dan George, Indian News, October 1968, “The Voice of a Strong Man.” 
Scholars Told,” 55.  Still, very few Aboriginal people reached university 
vels in this period.  The BC Indian Advisory Committee’s 1966 annual report noted that only one in 
123. 
 
417
 
175 Interview with John Williams.  See also Lisa Jane Peltier, Indian News, July 1964, “No Excuse for 
Ignorance”; Elliot Russell, Indian News, October 1965, “An Indian Speaks.” 
 
176 Moore, “The Teaching Staff in Indian Schools,” 58.  Aboriginal post-secondary university attendance 
remained virtually non-existent in the 1960s. Ibid., 59; Vancouver Sun, 31 January 1969, “Education 
Creating Leaders for Indians, 
le
150 
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were not the same source for skilled pan ders as were the residential schools, 
either were they cauldrons of assimilation and cultural genocide.  Over the coming 
years, integrat lly skilled 
dian graduates.177
   
-Indian lea
n
ed schools produced a new generation of bicultural and politica
In
                                                                                                                                              
Annual 
 
177 Both Tennant and Miller note how prominent Aboriginal leaders such as Peter Kelly, Andy Paull, and 
s 
n Land 
5), 140, 
o. 
1,600 Indians, attended university compared to a 1 in 60 non-Indians.  Indian Advisory Committee, 
Report, 1966, 16. 
Frank Calder were brought together and educated in the residential system.  Tennant notes, “The school 
ystem ceased to be a factor in pan-Indianism, since children from distant points and different tribal groups
were no longer collected together.”  See Paul Tennant, Aboriginal People and Politics: The India
uestion in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 199Q
150; J.R. Miller, “The Irony of Residential Schooling,” Canadian Journal of Native Education Vol. 14 N
2 (1987), 3-14.  
 
 Chapter 4 
 
“Education and Training Work Magic for Young People Coming to City” 
1
 
“‘Work Magic’: Indian Affairs and Economic Development Programming.” 
—The Indian News (1965).  
Henri L
tion to 
eth century; Indian reserves were recast 
as perip ls, 
 
 
ge 
efebvre theorizes that the social production of space has both mental and physical 
dimensions.  He notes, “space serves as a tool of thought and action; that in addi
being a means of production it also is a means of control, and hence of domination, of 
power.”2  Historically, Canadian Indian Affairs officials approached the geo-political 
construct of the Indian reserve from such a perspective.  Reserves were seen as spatial 
tools capable of transforming both thought and action, a way of simultaneously 
displacing, protecting, and civilizing Indians.3  Once viewed by government 
administrators as training grounds for assimilation, however, reserves underwent a 
discursive transformation around the mid-twenti
heral spaces of economic and social underdevelopment.  Like segregated schoo
reserve geographies came to typify racial segregation, economic underdevelopment, and
perhaps most importantly, a material challenge to effective administration.  With the
post-war “Indian problem” becoming increasingly defined in secular and administrative 
terms, federal economic development programming came to be seen as a way to brid
ongoing socio-economic inequities between Natives and non-Natives.  Economic 
                                                 
1 “Education and Training Work Magic for Young People Coming to City,” The Indian News, July 1965. 
 
nri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 3-4, 26. 2 He
 
3 See Daniel Francis, The Imaginary Indian: The Image of the Indian in Canadian Culture (Vancouver: 
rsenal Pulp Press, 1992), 203. A
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 development schemes were also seen as facilitating new forms of Indian administra
and cost sharing with the provinces.  In short, economic development was pitched as a 
panacea.  It was forecast that economic assimilation would “work magic” an
lead to and the administrative integration of Indians. 
The advent of federal economic development programming in the late-1950s 
reflected what historian John Leslie refers to as the emergence of new forms of 
bureaucratic intervention in Indian affairs.  T
tive 
d implicitly 
he solution to the economic marginalization 
of India ernment 
 even 
m Canadian 
a 
         
ns, Leslie notes, “was framed in administrative activism: increase the gov
supervision of Indian people, devise community development projects to enhance the 
delivery of social services, and provide economic development opportunities.”4  By the 
late 1950s, many Indian advocates, Aboriginal organizations, social scientists, and
Native people came to see the successful integration of Indians into mainstrea
life as having a requisite economic component. 
Inherently integrationist, devolutionary, and intergovernmental, the economic 
development designs of the late-1950s and 1960s were also tools of social and physical 
production.  Indian affairs officials hoped to see Indians leave their reserves, adopt 
Canadian work habits and values, and cease to be federal cost-burdens.  Under the mantr
of economic development, IAB plans entailed Aboriginal people falling under other 
federal line agencies and provincial governments, and becoming subject to non-Indian 
statutory and taxation requirements.  While Indian affairs administrators always hoped to 
                                                                                                                                        
 
 
4 John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?: The Development of Canadian Indian 
Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD Dissertation, Carlton University, 1999), 244. 
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 see reserves become municipalities, mid-twentieth century economic development 
schemes proposed a more incremental path towards this end that did not require statutory
revision or even Indian cultural assimilation.  Under
 
 extant federal law and 
intergovernmental agreements, the mere relocation of Indians off-reserve entailed an 
increas ials 
era: 
rest 
deral 
attempt ose 
to 
 
view of reserves as undesirable spaces of underdevelopment.  This chapter illustrates how 
trastate power was not an implicit consequence of all integrationist policies.  The 
ion of both 
e in provincial Indian administrative responsibility.  Into the 1960s, IAB offic
increasingly came to recognize that a structural mechanism for “administrative 
integration” already existed to be exploited. 
This chapter examines the three main economic development initiatives 
undertaken by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in the integrationist 
the Employment Placement Program (EPP), Community Employment Program (CEP), 
and the Community Development Program (CDP).  While each varied in specific 
purpose, structure, and implementation, these programs all shared one basic 
characteristic: none was effective in achieving its intended goal.  Political-executive 
disagreements, provincial intransigence, budgetary restraints, limited Aboriginal inte
and involvement, and the IAB’s desire for immediate program successes inhibited fe
s to implement effective long-term economic development programs for th
Aboriginal communities in most need.  Undoubtedly, the EPP, CEP, and CDP failed 
grant economic parity to Aboriginal people.  Few Aboriginal people were affected by 
economic development programs; even fewer appear to have shared the government’s
in
discursive construction of space, while providing potential ways for the extens
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 physical and cognitive domination also, as Lefebvre notes, “escapes in part from thos
who would make use of it.  The social and political (state) forces which engendered
space now seek, but fail, to master it completely.”
e 
 this 
interest in reserves as cognitive spaces of social and 
econom  
omain.  
it 
r 
bout 
During the latter half of the 1950s, federal interest in Aboriginal people’s 
essful 
tatus as Canadian citizens.  In 1956, IAB Director H.M. Jones stated 
5 
 
Growing governmental 
ic underdevelopment originated out of the IAB’s long-standing lack of any
programmatic means to provide adult Indian education or vocational training.  Prior to 
the late-1950s, the IAB viewed economic development as an area of provincial d
The only federal policy at that time was to encourage Indians to access provincial 
institutions for adult and vocational educational services.  At least under the Social Cred
rule of W.A.C. Bennett, the province of BC appears to have accepted Indians in its extant 
vocational training programs.6  However, while some provincial officials, such as Labou
Minister and BC Social Credit League founder Lyle Wicks, might have talked a
creating a “New Deal” and bettering the living conditions for Indians, little specific 
provincial action towards this end was undertaken in the two decades after WWII.7 
economic status increased.  Along with segregated schooling, Indians’ marginalized 
socio-economic status came to be seen as major determinants precluding their succ
integration and s
                                                 
5 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 26. 
 
6 See Victoria Daily Colonist, 19 May 1956, “Indians Must Have Job Training,” 2. 
 
7 Victoria Daily Colonist, 29 January 1956, “New Deal Sought for BC Indians,” 17. 
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 before a regional inspector’s conference that “integration and community economic 
development would enable ‘the Indian … to take his place as an Indian with other 
citizens of the country.’”8  At a 1959 meeting of superintendents, branch officials not
the need for community development and education for employment initiatives as an 
urgent and pressing problem.
ed 
the 
the 
arch 
eputy Minister 
Jean Bo
ons 
                                                
9 
Structural changes within the federal government further underscored 
changing nature of the so-called “Indian problem” after WWII.  In 1950, oversight of 
IAB shifted from the Department of Mines and Resources to the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration.  Leslie notes how the new department had greater rese
and liaison capability than Mines and Resources and was interested, more generally, in 
issues of citizenship and training.  It also was home to more progressively-minded senior 
civil service “mandarins” and “movers and shakers” such as Assistant D
ucher and Citizenship Branch Director Eugene Bussières.10  The 1954 
commissioning of a comprehensive survey of BC Indian social and economic conditi
under the directorship of UBC anthropologist H.B. Hawthorn, was one of the early 
 
8 LAC RG 10 Vol. 8576, File 1/1-2-2-21, MR C-14215, Regional School Inspectors’ Conference, 21-23 
November 1956, in Milloy, “A National Crime”, 199 f.n. 42. 
or many of the changes instigated at the assistant deputy 
inister and director level.  See Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?” 274, 276, 282.  See 
 of 
 
9 LAC, RG 10, Central Registry Series, Vol. File 1/1-2-2-5, Pt. 6, “Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, National Superintendents’ Conference, Banff Alberta, 14-18 
September 1959.” 
 
10 The department was, more generally, philosophically oriented towards defining citizenship values, 
devising schemes for social adjustment, and educating the receiving society to accept foreign customs, 
cultures, and values.  Senior officials in the department, including Minister J.W. Pickersgill and Deputy 
Minster Laval Fortier provided political support f
m
also J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: University
Toronto Press, 1998). 
 
156 
 actions of the new IAB masters.  The final report of the survey, completed in 1955 and 
later published in 1958 as The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of Social Adjustme
revealed the dire economic plight of most Aboriginal people in BC.  The report als
advocated a wide array of administrative reforms underscoring the connection between 
Indian economics and socio-cultural adjustment.
nt, 
o 
 
er numbers 
of India
le into the 1950s and 1960s.  Incorporated in 1960 as 
an advo  
           
11  In addition to recruiting social 
scientists for new policy development purposes, the IAB added an economic 
development division and increased funding to its BC Revolving Fund, a small-scale 
credit program for Indians, to $1,000,000.  Headed by Jules D’Astous,12 another ex-
military-type turned bureaucrat, the new division was charged with the objective of
fostering “more efficient operations amongst Indians in the primary fields of production,” 
and providing “assistance, encouragement and essential training to enable larg
ns to enter into other fields of employment off the reserves.”13 
In addition to growing interest from social scientists such as Hawthorn, social 
advocacy groups and the non-Native public also began taking greater interest in the 
economic plight of Aboriginal peop
cacy group for Aboriginal issues, the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada
                                      
11 H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw, and S.M. Jamieson, “The Indians of British Columbia: A Survey of Social 
and Economic Conditions: A Report to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,” (Vancouver: The 
University of British Columbia, 1955); H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw and S.M. Jamieson, The Indians of 
e 
deral Department of Veterans’ Affairs.  See Jules D’Astous, Indian News, April 1955, “Indian Affairs 
British Columbia: A Study of Social Adjustment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958). 
 
12 D’Astous had served previously as an agency supervisor in Quebec and New Brunswick and as head of 
the Branch Superintendent of Agencies.  He also worked in the Quebec Department of Agriculture and th
fe
Superintendents Provide Community Services.” 
 
13 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567, File 1/1-2, Pt. 1, “Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, n.d. [circa 1958-59].” 
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 describ nomic, 
social, and political equality, and as the “most satisfactory method of overcoming the 
severe handicaps under which Indians suffer.”  Other organizations, including the 
Y.M.C g gap 
betwee ic 
development programming to raise Indian living standards.14  Calls for an end to Indian 
segregation on reserves, often compared to “refugee camps” or “concentration camps,” 
also surfaced regularly in published newspaper reports, editorials, letters to the editor, 
and pho
Indians ed hovels 
that the
tiny and criticism raised by three years 
is 
 concerned over the apparent increase in criticism of 
the work of this administration, both in the press and from other sources.  
 I feel that much of the criticism we have been subjected to could have 
                                                
ed community development as a means by which Indians could achieve eco
.A. and Friends of the Indians Society, shared this concern over the widenin
n Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, advocating increased spending on econom
to exposés.  Such reports publicized the impoverished living conditions of 
 and demanded rectification of what one author described as the “wretch
 Department of Indian Affairs thinks good enough for the Indians.”15 
Ever defensive, particularly after the scru
of 1946-48 Special Joint Committee proceedings, the IAB was acutely sensitive to such 
forms of negative publicity.  Branch director H.M. Jones remarked in a 1959 letter to h
future successor, R.F. Battle, that:  
I am more than a little
…
 
14 See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “A Memorandum to 
Provincial Premiers Expressing the Views of the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada”; Indian News, 
ol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Friends of the Indians Society to Lester B. Pearson, May 22, 1965.” 
dmonton Journal, 27 February 1965, “Indians’ Plight Ignored,” n.p.; Edmonton Journal, 23 
ebruary 23 1965, “Northern Indians Relate Stories of Filth, Hunger,” n.p.; D. Monture, Indian News, 
; Victoria Daily Colonist, 19 February 1943, “Indian Schools,” 4. 
September 1957 “New National Commission Reports on Indian Canadian,”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry 
Series, V
 
15 See E
F
October 1969, “Profile of a Friendship Center”; Native Voice, September 1956, “Reserves Described as 
‘Concentration Camps’,” 3
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 been avoided by intelligent and timely action on the part of our officials in 
16
 
me to double our efforts to give it a new luster and regain the recognition 
best possible administration to the Government and we must never forget 
17
 
criticism, both constructive and otherwise, goes on apace. … This 
and should.  It inevitably produces critical discussion of Indian Affairs 
look at what 
the areas where it originated.  
Jones went on to add that: 
The reputation of this Branch is very much at stake and it is up to you and 
of our sincere, honest and dedicated contributions to the task.  We owe our 
our responsibility to the Minister.  
W.S. Arneil, BC’s Indian Commissioner, voiced the same concern in a 1959 circular to 
all superintendents and staff:  
[Indians] are more before the public eye than ever before.  Discussion and 
awakening of the public interest is a good thing.  It was bound to happen 
Branch policy and functions, and it is here that we must take a searching 
we are doing to see that causes of unjust and unnecessary 
areas in which the problems originate.
criticism are avoided by intelligent and timely action on our part, in the 
 
of 
18 
In this atmosphere of growing public scrutiny, criticisms of IAB economic development 
policies, and shifting discursive ideas about “Native space” and the so-called “Indian 
problem,” federal officials began implementing new programs targeting promotion 
Indian economic well-being. 
 
                                                 
16 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.. 8567, File 1/1-2, Pt. 1, “H.M. Jones to R.F. Battle, 17 Marc
1959.” 
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17 Ibid. 
le 1/1-2, Pt. 1, “W.S. Arneil to all Superintendents 
nd Staff, 14 April 1959.” 
 
18 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.. 8567, Fi
a
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 Agency and regional office staff began placing individual Indians in urban 
employment positions as early as the 1940s.  The Employment Placement Program 
created in 1957, however, marked the Indian Affairs Branch’s first programmatic attemp
to facilitate off-reserve movement for work purposes.  Jointly operated by the IAB and
the Special Services staff of the National Employment Service the program, the EPP was 
designed to assist in the employment of selected individual Indians in urban and r
settings and to support the movement of Indians off-reserve.  The stated long-range 
objectives of the program were: (1) the exploitation of existing employment opportun
for qualified Indians; (2) the development of new opportunities in a wider
t 
 
ural 
ities 
 range of 
employ
s are 
no longer adequate.”19  Rural employment targeted by the Program included work in 
ntrast to federal discourse 
ment; (3) in co-operation with the Education Division, the training of Indians for 
employment; and (4) Indian social orientation and integration into the non-Indian 
community.  The IAB hoped that the program would help “to meet the needs of an 
increasing Indian population for whom the job resources and potential of the reserve
agriculture, road construction, woods’ operations, mining, and similar positions in 
frontier areas.  Urban employment consisted of skilled and semi-skilled work in small 
businesses and the government civil service.20 
At the time of its inception, the EPP stood in stark co
born in the nineteenth century: that Indians belonged on reserves and employed in 
agrarian-based occupations.  For example, the Indian Affairs Department’s short-lived 
                                                 
19 Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1957-58, 49; 
Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1956-57, 50. 
 
20 Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1958-59, 46. 
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 prairie farm education program of the late-nineteenth-century, as shown by Sarah Car
and Helen Buckley, stressed manual labour and small scale peasant farming techniques as
the keys to Indian self-sufficiency.
ter 
 
l ways 
s in 
 
 
 
, 
o the 
                                                                                                                                                
21  The EPP broke with prior policies in severa
and more closely paralleled relocation initiatives then being undertaken by the United 
States’ Bureau of Indian Affairs.  To the south, large scale attempts to relocate Indian
cities and employment positions began after WWII under a relocation and urban
education program, and through the extension of state agency services to reservation
Indians.22  While Canadian policies never matched the intensity or scale of US ones, 
evidence suggest that Canadian officials were aware of US precedents.23 
The EPP was small in scale in its early years of operation.  Initially, the IAB had
only three Indian Placement Officers appointed in regional offices in Toronto, Edmonton
and Vancouver under the coordination of a Chief Placement Officer.24  According t
IAB, Placement Officers were “given an intensive training course at Indian Affairs 
 
 
21 Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 209-10; Helen Buckey, From Wooden Ploughs to 
elfare: Why Indian Policy Failed in the Prairie Provinces (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
 
es, 
ly Vol. 16 No. 2 (1985), 175-190. 
oted in 
ter was later created in Winnipeg.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567, File 1/1-
 Pt. 1, “Department of C ion, The Indian Affairs Branch, n.d. [circa 1958-59]”; 
W
University Press, 1992), 51-58. 
 
22 Over the two decades after 1940, 31,000 Indian relocatees received assistance under the US Voluntary
Relocation Program.  See Kenneth R. Philp, “Stride Toward Freedom: The Relocation of Indians to Citi
1952-1960,” Western History Quarter
 
23 See Victoria Daily Colonist, 7 September 1958, “‘Equal Rights’ Fight Talk,” 1-2; Victoria Daily 
Colonist, 1 October 1959, “Indians Pushed out of Logging,” 2; Carl R. Latham, “Indian Placement Program 
Administered by the Indian Affairs Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration” (MA 
Thesis: University of Toronto, 1958), 63-65.  Community Development Officer Jerry Gambill n
1967 that the IAB’s emphasis on economic development, “follows Washington’s lead.”  Jerry Gambill, 
“Indians, White Men, and I,” The Humanist Vol. 27 No. 5/6 (1967), 180. 
 
24 A fourth cen
2, itizenship and Immigrat
Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1956-57, 50. 
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 headquarters in Ottawa to familiarize them with the special aspects of work with the 
Indian population and of the services of other government departments upon which they 
can dra
 
 
l 
      
w.”25  The number of candidates eligible for participation in the EPP also 
remained low during its early years.  The program was initially focused on integrating 
individual young adults in the 16-25 year age range in the labour force.  The highest
preference was given to single Indians with a minimum standard of grade eight 
education, good health, preexisting employment experience, favourable personality 
factors, and the deemed support of family and the band.  Only those carefully screened
applicants with “better than average qualifications” seen as showing the most potentia
for success were chosen. 26  Regional criteria also appear to have exerted importance in 
the selection process.  The IAB admitted giving particular attention to centrally-located 
reserves proximal to regional offices.27  In its first two years of operation, the EPP 
handled 261 cases, less than 1.7% of the Indian population aged 16-21.  Over the next 
                                                                                                                                           
 
25 Indian News, September 1957, “Employment Horizon Broadens for Indians.”  By 1962, the IAB added 
n branch payroll. Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual 
fairs and National Resources, Indian Affairs 
ranch, Annual Report, 1965-66, 52. 
Report, 1958-59, 47;  The relocation of families was not stressed in the early going 
lthough it did occur in later years.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 3, 
7-68, 
regional offices in other major Canadian cities; by 1967, thirty-seven Branch employment specialists were 
o
Report, 1961-62, 35.; Canada, Department of Northern Af
B
 
26 Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 56-57; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1957-58, 4; Indian 
Affairs Branch, Annual 
a
“Memorandum to the Acting Deputy Minister, 26 April 1963.”  In 1964-65, the Branch began 
experimenting with the relocation of families into frontier industrial communities in Manitoba.  In 196
248 Indian families were assisted to relocate to training or employment.  Indian Affairs Branch, Annual 
Report, 1964-65, 28; Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Report, 
1967-68, 88. 
 
27 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1959-60, 45. 
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 few years, figures gradually increased and by 1963-64 the number of relocatees grew 
511 candidates.
to 
 for 
s.  
esses.  In 1960-61, 
Placem
y 
 
ving 
28   
Shortly after its creation a secondary goal was added to the EPP: placements
short-term seasonal work via the coordination of federal, provincial, and private interest
Placements for casual wages enjoyed the highest statistical succ
ent Officers oversaw the filling of over 4,000 short-term jobs for Indians in 
agriculture, logging, pulp cutting, prospecting, and other general labour, more than 
thirteen positions for every permanent one filled; by mid-decade, the IAB claimed to 
have filled more than twice this number.29  It seems most likely that the EPP merel
served to expand, rather than invent, casual Indian work.  Significant Indian employment
in provincial industries had been taking place well prior to the late 1950s, particularly in 
BC, where Indians had seasonally migrated as far south as Washington State for hops 
picking work and other wage work since the mid-nineteenth century.30  Similarly, most 
positions created by the EPP were in sugar beet farming and fruit picking work invol
Alberta and Saskatchewan Aboriginal groups.31  This, however, did not stop the IAB 
                                                 
28
 
29, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1963-64, 33. 
 
30 See Paige Raibmon, “The Practice of Everyday Colonialism: Indigenous Women and Work in t
 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1957-58, 85; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1963-64, 31. 
he Hops 
Fields and Tourist Industry of Puget Sound,” Labor: Studies in Working Class History of the Americas Vol. 
3 No. 3 (2006), 23-56. 
Jobs – 
July 1965, “Indians Come South to Save Fruit Crop”; Indian 
ews, March 1959, “Estimate 1,200 Jobs in Sugar Beet Fields,”. See Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 
6, 52. 
 
 
31 See Ronald Laliberte, “Why Move Aboriginal Labour in and then Out?: The Transition of Migrant 
Labour from Aboriginal to Mexican Workers in Southern Alberta's Sugar Beet Industry,” (PhD 
Dissertation, University of Calgary, 2007).  See also Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1960-61, 47; 
Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1961-62, 36; Indian News, February 1963, “Some 1,500 Find 
Placement Program Successful”; Indian News, 
N
1958-59, 47; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1965-6
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 from, as it had with residential schooling, equating statistical evidence with program 
successes in its publications; nor did it prevent IAB officials from depicting regional 
successes in casual work placement as enjoying widespread national success.  The 
following analysis is largely based on the EPP’s primary objective of permanent u
employmen
rban 
t placement during the early years of the program. 
d 
s 
ment 
 
 
m 
ent were 
                                                
Actual policy successes under the EPP were impeded by a number of factors an
were unlikely ever as high as estimated in IAB publications.32  For one, very few Indian
appear to have been aware of the program’s existence.  In an MA thesis examining the 
early experiences of eleven EPP participants, Carl Latham found that in all cases, 
candidates became involved in the program via personal overtures from branch officials 
rather than from voluntary initiative.  Latham also noted how some Indians in place
positions did not even know the name or purpose of the program while others had entered
the program unknowingly via extant educational and training institutions in the city.33  It 
was no coincidence that few Aboriginal people knew about the EPP.  Fearful of bad 
publicity and program failure, the IAB limited enrolment in the program and maintained
stringent qualification standards precluding most Indians from partaking.  The minimu
education standard alone, would have excluded most Indians from EPP consideration.  
Ironically, those Aboriginal groups with the greatest need for employm
 
32 The branch reported in the October 1958 Indian News that 85% of Indians cases handled by the 
acement officer in Vancouver made a successful adjustment in their new jobs.  Five years later officials 
at 80% of candidates remained successfully placed in the non-Indian community.  See 
dian News, October 1958, “Placement Officers Help Indians Move into New Jobs”; LAC, RG 10 Central 
 Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 75, 132-3, 133-4. 
pl
briefed Hawthorn th
In
Registry Series, Vol. 7983, File 1/19-2-10, Pt. 1, “Background Information for Integration Research 
project, Indian Affairs Branch, March, 1963.” 
 
33
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 conside ible 
fficers 
ates 
llow-up work with placed 
cases.35
s 
relocatees once in the city would exploit, if needed, non-IAB provincial and community 
, and Friendship Centres.36   
                                                                                                                                              
red the most unlikely to succeed in the program, hence deemed the least elig
for participation.  Even if the EPP had been widely publicized, it is unclear how extensive 
Indian interest in it would have been.  Latham noted how, in most cases, the only reason 
cited by Indians interested in entering the program was a lack of employment on 
reserves.34 
Even though the IAB maintained in its public relations high rates of placement 
success, it appears that problems associated with adjustment to skilled and semi-skilled 
employment and urban life inhibited EPP successes from the outset.  Placement O
were not specially obligated, trained, or equipped to adequately meet the special needs of 
young Indian adults undergoing placement.  Placement Officers treated Native candid
on the same terms as non-Natives and conducted little fo
  As it did in most other integrationist policy areas, such as education and health, 
the federal government maintained that it had no legal or direct administrative obligation
to Indians permanently residing off-reserve; the treatment given to placement candidates 
appears to have diverted little from this policy.  Few support services were delivered to 
Indians during their initial placement under the program.  IAB officials assumed that 
services, such as YMCAs, church groups
   
 Indian News, December 1963, “Friendship and Center and Clubs Make Indians Feel at Home.” 
 
34 Ibid., 88, 91-92. 
 
35 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7983, File 1/19-2-10, Pt. 1, “Background Information for 
Integration Research project, Indian Affairs Branch, March, 1963”; Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 
59, 61. 
 
36
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 Complaints about the inadequacy of vocational training for placement were 
common among early participants in the EPP.37  Many Aboriginal participants in the 
experienced difficulty identifying available services, navigating government offices, and 
contending with racism in predominantly non-Native workplaces.
EPP 
n 
, 
n 
d picked by 
the IAB
rve 
                                                                      
38  The IAB, however, 
apparently never considered providing counseling or education assistance for those 
making the transition from reserve to urban life as part of the EPP.  Moreover, eve
though permanently placed Indians would have been, for most administrative purposes
considered provincial citizens, at no point does it appear that the provinces were 
consulted or involved in the program.  It was not until 1963, when BC’s first urban India
Friendship Center was created in Vancouver, that the province began independently 
funding specific services for urban Aboriginal people.39 
High incidences of return migration to reserves were common to most Aboriginal 
urban relocatees in this period.  With few supports off-reserve, EPP candidates were no 
different in this regard.40  For instance, of Latham’s eleven interviewees han
 as being the “best qualified” to represent the EPP, three expressed plans to return 
to their reserves within three months and six manifested the desire to return to the rese
                                                                           
5-16. 
ill, “The Urbanization of Canadian Indians in Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, 
t, 
 
 
37 Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 141-2. 
 
38 Ibid., 94-95, 96, 11
 
39 See BCA GR-1319 Box 1 File 3, “Leslie Peterson to A.J. Scow, 26 August, 1963.” 
 
40 See Donald Neil McCask
and Vancouver: A Comparative Analysis,” (PhD Dissertation, York University, 1979); Byron King Plan
“Hank Snow and Moving On: Tradition and Modernity in Kwakwaka'wakw 20th Century Migration,” (MA
Thesis, University of Victoria, 2003); James. S. Frideres, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: Contemporary 
Conflicts (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001), 143. 
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 sometime in the future.41  The IAB unlikely achieved anywhere near the rates of succes
reported in its publications, especially since annual reports noting up to 80% rates o
permanent placement only referred to cases immediate to the previous year and not rate
of actual permanent employment and placement.  Some doubt also surrounds the extent
to which the IAB was even aware of the meager program successes initially, even though,
as early as the fall of 1960, H.M. Jones voiced concern to the Deputy Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration about the slow pace of placements.
s 
f 
s 
 
 
tion of how many 
lacement candidates made use of provincial and municipal welfare agencies.  The IAB 
also pre
  Just as 
with integrated schooling, it was not until the mid-1960s that the IAB even acknowledged 
 other branch 
42  As noted, the IAB 
made no effort to study the actual extent of integration and had no no
p
served no record of candidates having undergone multiple placements.  At least 
one branch school superintendent recognized in 1965 that “many Indian students will be 
unable to adjust to the working world in their first, or even second placement.”43
how little it knew about those Aboriginal people who left their reserves.44   
Once IAB officials began to realize the EPP’s meager successes and
and departmental programs began to offer placement services, the EPP diminished in 
                                                 
41 Latham, “Indian Placement Program,” 85, 111, 129. 
 
42 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “H.M. Jones to the Deputy Minister, 3 
November 1960.” 
 
43 G.K. Gooderham, “Prospect,” in The Education of Indian Children in Canada: A Symposium Written by 
Members of the Indian Affairs Education Division, with Comments by the Indian Peoples (Toronto: 
Ryerson Press, 1965), 99. 
 
44 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7983, File 1/19-2-10, Pt. 1, “Background Information for 
Integration Research project, Indian Affairs Branch, March 1963.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, 
Vol. 7983, File 1/19-2-10, Pt. 1, “National Indian Research Project Conference Notes, Ottawa, 30-31 
ecember.” D
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 importance.  In 1964, branch interest shifted to the Community Development P
and in 1965, Indians became eligible for assistance under the Manpower Mobility 
Program administered by the Department of Labour.
rogram 
 
fore being scuttled in 1975, when most of its budget was incorporated into 
general ion, which 
replace
 
wo years on the heels of the EPP’s creation, the IAB initiated another economic 
development project targeting a transformation of “underdeveloped” reserve spaces: the 
Community Employment Program.   Similar to the EPP, the CEP was an inter-
               
45  By 1966-67, responsibility for 
Indian education and placement was transferred from the Resources and Development 
Division to the Education Directorate.46  The EPP, however, languished on for close to a
decade be
 programs developed by the Department of Manpower and Immigrat
d the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1965.47 
T
48
                                                                                                                                  
 
ment in Indian 
46 De ent, Annual Report, 1966-67, 51. 
 Ev s’: Negotiating the Meaning of First Nations Urbanization in Canada, 
1945-19 storical Geography Vol. 30 (2002), 83 f.n. 40. 
the Winter Works Incentive Program (WWIP), a Department of Labou ponsored subsidization program 
Employment Project was often called the Winter Works Program in its early years and should not be 
confused with the WWIP.  Although the WWIP primarily targeted municipalities, bands were allowed to 
o the 
e 1/21-7-2, 
2.”  Since most Indian bands 
45 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Record of Achieve
Affairs – 1965.” 
 
partment of Indian Affairs and Northern Developm
 
47 elyn Peters, “‘Our City Indian
 Journal of Hi75,”
 
48 The CEP was one of several federal employment creation initiatives undertaken in the 1960s, including 
r s
also designed to create public works employment opportunities during winter months.  The Community 
participate in the program under the same terms.  Eligible bands had to initiate, plan, develop, operate, and 
finance winter employment projects following which the Department of Labour reimbursed 50% of the 
irect payroll costs.  Typical WWIP projects included road construction, sewage works, and construction.  d
LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “H.M. Jones, Memorandum t
Deputy Minister, 22 August 1959.”  See also LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 Fil
t 4, “Dept. of Labour, Municipal Winter Works Incentive Program, 1961-6P
lacked the funds required to foot the entire costs for WWIP projects, the IAB operated the CEP as a 
program alternative to direct relief for bands.  See Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1965-66, 51. 
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 departmental undertaking that grew out of the Department of Industry’s Area 
Development Agency Program, a federal economic initiative of the time.49  Unlike t
EPP, however, which sought the promotion of off-reserve employment placement, the 
CEP was meant to address the creation of work opportunities on reserves.  A
D’Astous, the first attempt to implement a winter works employment program
he 
ccording to 
 began in 
1959 as
projects] where the maximum amount of labour can be used.  Projects in 
new road allowances, etc.  The airing of equipment and procurement of 
payment of wages.  
The stated objectives of the CEP were to provide alternatives to the issuance of direct 
relief to able-bodied Indians and, more specifically: 
• To afford the Indian people added opportunities to acquire experience 
in the duties and responsibilities of self-government by involving them 
in the selection, planning and operation of projects. 
• To promote the harvesting and marketing of local resources. 
• To orient and train Indian workmen in various trades as an 
introduction to wage employment. 
• To develop and improve public assets on reserves not provided for 
                                     
: 
[A]n effort to offset unemployment of various reserves … [through 
this category would include things as clearing and brushing of roadways, 
materials should be avoided so that funds may be devoted fully to the 
50
 
otherwise.51 
 
Despite being an interdepartmental undertaking, the IAB administered and oversaw the 
CEP via its extant Placement Section and branch protocols.52  Agency superintendents, 
            
entral 
3.” 
ol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “Jules D’Astous to Indian 
m, 
49 Local offices of the National Employment Service were also used for the Program.  LAC, RG 10 C
Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 1, “Department of Industry Press Release, 6 September 196
 
50 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, V
Commissioner for BC and all Regional Supervisors, 21 December 1959.” 
 
51 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 2, “Community Employment Progra
965.” 1
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 requested to identify and submit proposals for work projects on reserves, submitted these
to regional superintendents.  Regional superintendents in turn, including the In
 
dian 
Commi
 or 
es 
      
ssioner for BC, then forwarded project applications for approval to headquarters, 
and then finally, Treasury Board.  Once funds were approved, local agency 
superintendents began coordinating proposed CEP work projects.   
Just like the EPP, Aboriginal people were assigned little power to determine
influence the CEP.  The main source of consultation between the branch staff and band 
councils consisted of the selection of CEP workers and supervisory staff.53  Although 
branch correspondence suggests that band councils were increasingly encouraged to get 
involved in CEP administration after 1961,54 no efforts appear to have been made to alter 
the centralized manner in which winter works were administered.  Even in early instanc
                                                                                                                                           
 
52 Under the Department of Industry CEP, designated areas in need of federal assistance (initially limited to 
three tax exemption measures) were identified by Area Development Officers via qualification criteria and 
l Registry 
reasury Board to Deputy Minister of 
itizenship and Immigration, 21 November 1963.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 
y 
s D’Astous to Assistant 
irector, Operations, Report to the Policy Committee on the Winter Works Incentive and Community 
 RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 2, “L. Brown to Indian Commissioner 
f BC, Regional Supervisors, Superintendents of Indian Agencies, Draft – Community Development 
subsequent negotiations with other federal, provincial, municipal, and corporate authorities.  See Montreal 
Gazette, January 29, 1965, “Changes in Designated Areas Not Ready Yet.”; LAC, RG 10 Centra
Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 5, “Assistant Secretary, T
C
1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Jules D’Astous, to Director, ‘Evaluation of the Community Employment Program,’ 1 Ma
1964.” 
 
53 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 4, “Jule
D
Employment Programs, 2 August 1962.” 
 
54 LAC,
o
Employment Projects for Indians, 1961.” 
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 where the IAB used band funds to fund the CEP, little consultation or inquiry was made 
into whether bands would welcome the use of their funds for such projects.55 
The CEP was, for all intents and purposes, a work for welfare payments scheme 
designe
 CEP 
paying 
 1961 
 
g more Indians on social assistance to qualify for 
unemployment benefits.58  Two, CEP funds came from Treasury Board allocations 
separate from the IAB’s normal budget.  The IAB submitted annual applications for 
d to transform reserves into spaces of employment and economic opportunity.  
Pitched by the IAB as providing vocational training and industrious work habits, the
primarily served to reduce escalating on-reserve welfare dependency and costs on 
reserves, which were then climbing at an alarming rate: by 1959, the branch was 
up to thirteen times the non-Indian average of some provinces.56  Jones stated in a
branch memorandum his “concern about the staggering relief costs and what these mean 
in terms of dependency and initiative amongst the Indians.”57  The CEP worked to reduce
branch welfare costs in two ways.  One, it alleviated welfare dependency by providing 
employment credits to Indians, allowin
funding laying out the exact number and cost of CEP initiatives to be undertaken that 
                                                 
55 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 3, “J. O’Neill, Community Employment 
 
 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 3, “H.M. Jones, Department of 
960-61, 72. 
Program, March 2, 1962.”;  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, 
“Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 December 1963.” 
 
56 See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Memorandum to the Deputy 
Minister, 9 December 1963.”  Shewell notes the existence of an IAB temporary work for welfare scheme
during WWII.  Hugh Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 131.  See also Appendix C. 
 
57
Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch [Memorandum], Winter Works Program, 1 December 
1961.” 
 
58 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1
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 year.59 aid 
ural means for the IAB to reduce its 
annual 
ost of 
$96,732.  Seventeen of these took place in BC, mostly road construction and brush 
clearing projects, amounting to $22,675.   BC projects accounted for roughly one third 
of the n P 
expend
increases in its budget and project base.61  1962-1963 appears to have been the peak year 
of the program, when the CEP underwent its greatest growth.  That year, Treasury Board 
approved an increase in the supplementary appropriation to $1 million; the number of 
projects increased to 470 nationally.  
                                                
 By replacing IAB welfare payments with unemployment benefits and wages p
through CEP funds, the program represented a struct
operating costs. 
In the first fiscal year of the CEP, 60 projects were undertaken for a total c
60
umber of all national winter works projects and one quarter of total CE
itures.  Over the next four years, the CEP underwent expansion, thanks to 
62
 
 
 
61 By 1961, some 153 projects covering 137 bands were carried out across Canada.  LAC, RG 10 Central 
Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “J.H. Gordon to Chief, Welfare Division, 7 November 
1960.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 2, “R.D. Ragan to Winter Works 
Sub-Committee, 18 April 1961.”  From 1959-1962, 558 projects were implemented nationally, employing 
5,518 Indians at a total cost of $894,245.  169 BC and Yukon projects were approved employing 1,429 
er for BC, Regional Supervisors, Superintendents of Indian Agencies, 
ummary: Community Development Program’ 3 October 1962.”   
y Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 2, “Pages 81, 82, 99 and 100 extracted 
om ‘The Administration of Indian Affairs,’ prepared for the 1964 Federal-Provincial Conference on 
ber 1962.” 
59 Since winter works projects fell between October 15th and the following April 30th, and were one-time 
ventures, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had to annually submit proposals for new 
initiatives.  See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 2, “Allan J. MacEachern 
to J.R. Nicholson, 7 June 1965.” 
60 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “Winter Works – 1959-60.” 
Indians at a total cost of $261,503.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 4, 
“H.M. Jones to Indian Commission
‘S
 
62 LAC, RG 10 Central Registr
fr
Indian Affairs.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 4, “Record of Cabinet 
Decision, Meeting of 5 Decem
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 As with the EPP, early branch reports lauded the success of the CEP.  Nicola 
Agency Superintendent E.J. Underwood remarked: 
[W]e have been able to reduce, in many cases, the amount of relief issued
also pleased in that a few of the people seemed to have caught the “clean 
63
 
need in our Indian villages.  The councils have been only too ready to 
accomplishing much needed improvements to their villages and keeping 
64
 
65
 
to families on this reserve in view of the extra income received. … We are 
up” spirit that has been needed in this village so badly.    
Skeena River Agency superintendent, R.H.S. Sampson also commented in 1960: 
There is ample evidence that this winter works programme is filling a vital 
accept these projects in lieu of relief from both the point of view of 
families off relief.  
Regional superintendents also shared early excitement over the benefits of the CEP.  R.D. 
Raga, Alberta’s superintendent, noted in 1961 that “Most gratifying reports have been 
received from Indians, from field staff, and from the public in general.”  Like his agency 
counterparts, Raga was sure to note the added welfare savings: “a very important result of 
this employment program was an apparent reduction in the relief costs over what had 
been anticipated, as well as the satisfaction of the Indians in earning their own livelihood 
on worthwhile works on the reserve.”   However, as historian Jarvis Brownlie suggests 
in her study of southern Ontarian Indian agents, field employee reports often distorted 
                                                 
63 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “S.J. Underwood to Regional Of
ancouver, BC, 
fice, 
17 March 1960.” V
 
64 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 1, “R.H.S. Sampson to Regional Office, 
ancouver, 21 March 1960.” V
 
65 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 2, “R.D. Ragan to Winter Works Sub-
Committee, 18 April 1961.” 
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 reality.66  Favourable views of the CEP complemented regional and agency staff jo
performance and helped garner cabinet support for the fledgling program.   
Aboriginal responses to the CEP, on the other hand, were rarely, if ever, 
favourable.  Even though the IAB began separating CEP funds from those expen
Indian relief in 1960, this apparently had little effect on altering Native views of the CEP 
as a “work for welfare” scheme.  Such view
b 
ded for 
s appear justified when considering the 
manner
 
 wages were usually set at 10% above normal relief entitlement.68  The 
existen e of the 
program ds of 
time ea  social 
           
 in which the CEP was funded and administered.  Despite being pitched as an 
employment creation program, the CEP was in every respect tied to Indian welfare policy
and provision.  For instance, CEP projects were specifically targeted for regions with 
high per capita relief costs and unemployment rates.67  In BC, this meant that interior 
agencies, notably those in the Okanagan Valley, received the bulk of CEP funds.  The 
rates of pay given to participants in the program also were determined by relief amounts 
paid; CEP
ce of maximum per capita allotments instituted for CEP work also spok
’s intimate ties to social assistance.69  Men were to be employed for perio
ch month that would enable them to earn amounts akin to that provided by
                                      
 Jarvis Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resi
 1918-1939 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2003), xx.   
66 Robin stance in 
Ontario,
 
67 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 2, “Pages 81, 82, 99 and 100 extracted 
om ‘The Administration of Indian Affairs,’ prepared for the 1964 Federal-Provincial Conference on 
ment Program [1962].” 
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Indian Affairs.” 
 
68 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 4, “Guide for Field Staff – Community 
mployE
 
69 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 5, “Assistant Secretary, Treasury Board
to Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 21 November 1963.”  This amount was again allocated 
or the CEP in 1965-66. f
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 assistan e 
availab ngst the unemployed in accordance with their needs 
nal work patterns. 
eir way 
to Ottaw  1961, 
Indian  program.  
Thoma stating: “You 
will never know how poor the people are on this Reserve.  We can’t see how this project 
could help us.”   One band representative from Saskatchewan described a typical 
situation: 
If you are going to ask people to work you have to pay more than the 
aside money for winter works, also they inquired as to how money could 
then line up all these jobs and how much they would cost.  
There were more jobs than money.  They thought that at Frog Lake they 
could widen the present trails by brushing them out, allowing them to dry 
sooner.  They allowed $1,000 for this work.  Unfortunately, instead of 
coming to the Chief and Council for list of names to do this, the office set 
                                                                                                                                              
ce.  Within internal staff memorandums, headquarters was firm that “[t]h
le jobs must be shared amo
calculated in exactly the same manner as for relief assistance.”70  What IAB staff didn’t 
realize was that as long as CEP programming remained wedded to welfare cost 
considerations, it was unlikely to provide any incentive for Indians to not seek welfare or 
to alter established seaso
Local Aboriginal complaints about the CEP as work for welfare made th
a as early as the second year of the program’s operations.  On January 18
and band representatives met with IAB officials in Ottawa to discuss the
s Moyah [location unknown], questioned the utility of CEP works, 
71
amount received for relief otherwise why work.  The government has set 
be used.  They 
up a list of names to do this work, which did not please the band.  This list 
   
 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 3, “H.M. Jones, Department of 
r 
2 Pt 
 
70
Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch [Memorandum], Winter Works Program, 1 Decembe
1961.” 
 
71 Other band representatives used the meeting to question whether specific CEP projects like brush 
clearing would bring benefit to the band.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-
2, “No title [Minutes from meeting with band members and IAB, 18 January 1961.” 
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 was set up off the biggest recipients of Welfare Assistance.  There is no 
use getting a man who is getting 90.00 ninety [sic] dollars relief to work 
for one hundred dollars.72 
With little incentive to participate in the program, Aboriginal people were more likely to 
see the CEP as a discriminatory way to force menial work for welfare pittance, rath
than as a way of promoting industrious work habits.  In Alert Bay, Pete Cook remembers 
the CEP no differently: 
And when I used to get welfare I had to work for it.  And then the other 
things like that [with] the rain blowing.  Other people, they just go in the 
give out a piece of paper written on there how much you’re gonna get.  
at the wrong end of a stick I guess.  I was too black or something. 
73
 
 
er 
people did.  They used to go digging ditches around houses for drains and 
office and they get their money, whatever they gave out.  They used to just 
How much they’re allowed to get in the store.  They’re better now. I was 
Everybody else didn’t have to work for it.  
Cook’s comments imply that within reserves, some individuals were targeted for CEP 
“eligibility” and had to work for their social assistance cheques while others did not.  
Early 1960s IAB correspondence, superintendent field reports, and evidence presented in 
the following chapter further suggests that Indians saw relief as a right and not requiring 
CEP-related work.    74
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73 UVA, Interview with Pete Cook, Alert Bay, B.C., 8 July 2003, interviewed by Byron Plant. 
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 Faced with Aboriginal opposition to the program, the IAB struggled throughout 
the 1960s to alter views of the CEP as a work for welfare scheme.  A series of early 
1960s directives and a guide sent to field staff repeatedly emphasized that, “These are not 
‘work for relief’ projects.”75  Perceptions of the CEP as a work for relief program, 
however, endured well into the latter 1960s.  In 1966, Cowichan superintendent Sam
told J.V. Boys, the BC Indian Commissioner: “I believe that most participants felt it was 
merely ‘work for relief.’”
son 
s 
and 
  One 
of 
76  That fall, Boys notified headquarters that, in several agencie
throughout the province, “Concepts developed, in some cases, unfortunately give the 
impression that works projects are for the soul [sic] of establishing a ‘Work for Relief 
Programme.’”77  The IAB itself admitted in a brief issued that year titled “Attitude 
Participation of Band Councils and Members,” that “Branch instructors insist that these 
are not ‘work for relief’ projects yet the Indians think differently about this.”78 
Some non-Indians also appear to have shared Indians’ views on the CEP.
MP commented during the estimates debate for the Department in 1963 that, “in lieu 
being paying out welfare, these men should be given some remuneration … In that way 
                                                 
75 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 4, “H.M. Jones to Indian Commissioner 
for BC, Regional Supervisors, Superintendents of Indian Agencies, ‘Report to the Policy Committee of the 
inter Works Incentive Program and Community Employment Programs,’ 29 January 1963.”  See also 
H.M. Jones, Department of 
 Winter Works Program, 1 December 
61.”  See also LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 4, “Guide for Field Staff 
 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 6, “R.H.S. Samson to Indian 
embers, n.d. [1966].” 
W
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Commissioner for B.C., ‘Community Employment Program, 9 August 1966.” 
 
77 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 6, “J.V. Boys to Indian Affairs Branch, 
‘Community Employment Programme,’ 7 September 1966.” 
 
78 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 6, “Attitude and Participation or Band 
Councils and M
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 they could be paid instead of being handed out welfare.”79  Ever sensitive to public and 
political perceptions of the CEP, the IAB felt the need to issue an official correction by 
comme
facing within 
the summer of 1962, when the branch issued a questionnaire to its 
superin aling a 
range o ervision, 
shortag s, and low band initiative hindered CEP 
     
nting: “In general the response of the Indians has been most positive to this 
program and they have shown a sincere appreciation for the opportunity to work towards 
the development of their reserves and natural resources instead of merely receiving 
relief.”80  Negative attitudes towards the CEP, however, had even started sur
government ranks by 
tendents soliciting feedback on the CEP and WWIP.  In addition to reve
f administrative problems, the questionnaire results showed that poor sup
es of equipment, weather challenge
successes in 31% of the agencies participating in the program.  Band involvement in CEP 
administration was shown to be particularly low, non-existent in some cases.  The 
questionnaire results revealed councils as having a combination of enthusiastic, 
indifferent, and poor attitudes in regards to each program.81  Claims that bands were 
indifferent, however, also could work to the IAB’s advantage; in addition to providing a 
convenient means for the IAB to assess blame for the ineffectiveness of the CEP, they 
                                                                                                                                            
 
79 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 14 December 1963, 5897. 
 
80  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8433 File 1/21-7-1 Pt 2, “Branch Comments on Item 
ppearing in the Dec. 14 1963 papers of Hansard.” 
 to the Policy Committee on the Winter Works Incentive and Community 
ust 1962.”  Of the remaining problems noted, four were related to program 
ttee on the Winter Works Incentive and Community Employment Programs, 2 
A
 
81 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 4, “Jules D’Astous to Assistant 
Director, Operations, Report
mployment Programs, 2 AugE
administration and financing, and two attributable to problems coming from the band councils.  LAC, RG 
10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 4, “Jules D’Astous to Assistant Director, Operations, 
Report to the Policy Commi
ugust 1962.” A
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 allowed branch staff to dismiss Aboriginal protests that the CEP was a work for welfar
scheme.   
e 
d 
consulted with respect to [CEP] projects which might be undertaken.  
obtain general information on the projects to be undertaken with an 
 
ent on 
 
 
late nineteenth century which stressed manual labour and small scale peasant farming 
Perhaps partly for these reasons, the IAB took few steps to improve areas pointe
out in the questionnaire.  Dissemination of the questionnaire results to field staff did not 
even occur until January 1963, six months after the results were tallied.  Instead, Jones 
instructed the Indian Commissioner of BC, regional supervisors and agency 
superintendents that: 
Where time and travel limitations will permit, band councils should be 
However, this is not essential at this stage because of the urgent need to 
estimate of the costs involved.82   
Apparently, consultations with Native people were not seen as necessary.  Jones w
to paternalistically add that, “Care should be taken to exclude projects which require
contracts with non-Indians of the use of non-Indian tradesman,” before finally restating 
the criteria to be used in establishing priority of projects: the provision of work to allay 
high unemployment, initiatives that improve reserves, and the promotion of self-help and 
industrious habits.83  Jones could have been describing the farm education program of the
                                                                                                                                                 
 
82 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 4, “H.M. Jones to Indian Commissioner 
for BC, Regional Supervisors, Superintendents of Indian Agencies, ‘Community Employment Program, 
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 techniques as the keys to Indian self-sufficiency.84  Indeed, 1960s IAB perceptions of
reserves as underdeveloped spaces never broke completely with historical anteceden
Since the CEP operated as a branch program, the charge of implementing CEP
projects fell to agency superintendents.  Little consideration appears to have been given 
to whether superintendents, already notoriously overburdened with administrati
 
ce. 
 
ve tasks, 
had the
at the 
mplished 
 
confusing even the basic goals and purposes of the program.  In 1964, IAB Director R.F. 
 time or resources to oversee the new program.  Prior to the creation of the CEP, 
for instance, Hawthorn noted in his 1955 survey how, “One can only stand in awe 
myriad responsibilities of the average superintendent and wonder how he acco
so much.”85  The 1962 questionnaire further revealed how extant staff lacked specialized
knowledge or training on how to effectively design and implement winter work 
programming.86  Apparently, aware of these problems, D’Astous unsuccessfully 
attempted to improve staffing levels in 1962, describing the situation as reaching a 
“critical stage and that a breakdown in administration might occur should assistance from 
other Branch divisions not be lent to the Section.”87  Staffing shortages had the effect of 
Battle admitted that a “[l]ack of information as to philosophy, objectives and criteria for 
                                                 
84 Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests, 209-10. 
 
85 Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson, The Indians of British Columbia, 409. 
 
86 The majority of agency staff spent less that 20 percent of their time on the projects.  LAC, RG 10 Central 
ommunity Development Programs,’ 17 October 1962.” See also LAC, RG 10 
Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 4, “Jules D’Astous to Assistant Director, Operations, Report to 
the Policy Committee on the Winter Works Incentive and Community Employment Programs, 2 August 
1962.” 
 
87 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 4, “Jules D’Astous to Chief, Agencies 
ivision, ‘Organization of CD
Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Jules D’Astous, to Director, ‘Evaluation of the 
Community Employment Program,’ 1 May 1964.” 
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 selection of projects has somewhat hampered the program in the past.”88  That year, 
D’Astous also noted how the division of funds between two bureaucratic structures 
caused, “a great deal of confusion in the field.”89  The branch attempted to secure the 
appoint
 
r 
 
 
eed 
                                                         
ment of ten regionally-assigned staff to help coordinate the CEP in 1965, only to 
have the proposal declined by Treasury Board due to a stated lack of funds.90   
Although insufficient staffing impeded the functioning of the program, the largest 
problem with the CEP stemmed from its funding structure.  Applications for CEP 
projects had to be submitted and approved for funding every year via annual 
supplemental estimates.  Treasury Board approval for winter work funding was given in
October or November, too close to the start date of CEP projects for proper planning o
band consultation to occur.91  A 1963 branch memorandum to deputy minister C.M. 
Isbister noted how fall appropriations “made difficult or impossible advance planning of
projects with Band Councils and the development of administrative processes because of
the uncertainty of funds being provided at all.”92  Since monies could not be guarant
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 until projects were slated to begin, Jones was firm that, “under no circumstances should 
field staff incur expenditures chargeable to a project until they have been notified that 
funds are available.”93 
During instances of budget shortfall before fiscal year end, the IAB would 
pool monies from other Branch divisions to meet basic CEP expenses.
limit or 
f 
 the 
ney this 
actions of their regional and headquarters superiors.   
While Treasury Board appropriations for the CEP increased in subsequent years, 
                                                                                                          
94  In the case o
budget surpluses, monies had to be quickly spent since carry-overs presented rationale for 
Treasury Board to reduce its CEP appropriation for the following year.  Superintendents 
voiced both of these scenarios at a conference in 1964.  Island Lake’s agency 
superintendent noted how “The council set up projects – Region [headquarters] cut
money available.”  The superintendent of Northern Ontario (Chapleau) described the 
CEP as “a glut of money … [spent] whether projects are worthwhile or not.”  With an 
even sharper sense of cynicism, the superintendent for Iford remarked: “No mo
year.  The less we do the less we get criticized!!!”95  Such testimonies demonstrate how 
field staff did not always exaggerate policy successes nor agree with the views and 
problems relating to funding and staffing plagued the program throughout its existence.  
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 In the 1963-64 fiscal year, for example, ninety CEP projects were undertaken in BC’s 
eighteen agencies, costing the Department $139,715 in Indian wages and $72,825 in 
materials.  Only $116,000, slightly more than half of the total cost of $212,540, was 
covered
d 
P 
 by Treasury Board funds earmarked for the CEP.96  The remaining funds 
presumably came out of the IAB’s welfare budget.  Funding and staffing limitations 
hindered the CEP’s ability to foster long-term meaningful employment opportunities an
training.  The IAB was keenly aware of this, having made several attempts to address the 
CEP’s funding woes.  In 1963, for example, the IAB requested to have CEP funds 
authorized in regular spring estimates, only to be denied by Treasury Board.  The 
following year, branch officials unsuccessfully attempted to secure funding for perennial 
rather than annual projects via greater capital allocations and a contingency fund for CE
projects.97  The IAB tried yet again in May 1965 when it requested a five year 
appropriation that would have secured funding and staffing increased for the CEP into the 
1969-70 fiscal year.98  Treasury Board declined the request.99  These repeated refusals to 
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 Subsequently, the IAB attempted to garner funding 
r the CEP as part of the War on Poverty program.  It was forced to reduce their request by 40%, commit 
al Program 
0 June 1965 along with a funding proposal for Indian housing.  
AC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “Community Employment Program, 
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Minister, 9 December 1963.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Jules 
D’Astous, to Director, ‘Evaluation of the Community Employment Program,’ May 1, 1964.”; LAC, RG 10 
Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “H.R. Conn to Director, ‘Community Employment 
Program,’ 7 August 1964.” 
99 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “J.W. Churchman, Director o
Development to Indian Affairs Branch, June 15, 1965.” 
fo
to a reduction of their welfare expenditure by $125,000, and file their application with the Speci
Committee of Cabinet, which it did on 3
L
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 expand the CEP through greater capital allocations demonstrate how Treasury Boar
officials viewed the program as a mechanism to offset and control rising Indian welfare 
costs. 
Did the CEP promote new work experiences and opportunities for Aborig
people?  Most CEP work consisted of labour-intensive manual tasks with little to no 
educational value.  CEP projects such as road maintenance and brush clearing offe
only ephemeral work opportunities since they needed to be undertaken once every several 
years.
d 
inal 
red 
year rather 
than the g 
o 
traditional forms of social welfare systems that persisted on most BC reserves throughout 
g 
ndians to look to the IAB for employment or turn down commercial forms of work in the 
  
100  In this regard, the CEP was no better than the EPP in creating permanent long-
term employment.  Furthermore, by modeling projects on the fiscal calendar 
 cyclical economy of particular regions, CEP work proved incapable of adaptin
to, or making use of, local resources or economies.  Winter work employment paid n
heed to the needs of Aboriginal sustenance economies, seasonal cultural practices, or the 
this time.  Partly for this reason, many Aboriginal people came to view branch economic 
development plans as an assimilationist ploy by the late-1960s.  
Intradepartmental correspondence reveals that the IAB even speculated that CEP 
employment might hinder longer-term economic development opportunities by inducin
I
                                                                                                                                               
25 June 1965.” 
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Employment Program, 2 March 1962.” 
 
184 
 winter months such as trapping.101  While this possibility was downplayed in early 
years,102 it gained sudden importance in 1965 when headquarters discovered that wag
in excess of local municipal rates were being paid to Indians under the CEP.  The IAB 
deemed that since CEP labour rates exceeded those paid by local municipaliti
es 
es, 
“comm nitiative 
the Ind
discove rity to 
set casu bour 
pay sca ents.  
 
à-
unity employment programs sponsored by the Branch are destroying any i
ians may have in seeking outside employment.”103  Within a month of the 
ry, the Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration delegated his autho
al wage rates—provided they match the lower provincial Department of La
le—to the BC Indian Commissioner and regional superintend 104
Although the IAB saw the CEP as being more successful than the WWIP,105 it
was never even clear whether the CEP significantly reduced branch welfare costs.  
D’Astous, for instance, noted how the ongoing lack of funds for CEP programming vis-
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December 1963 acting Branch Director, J.H. Gordon, noted that since the prospects for off-reserve 
unlikely to lead to Indian dependency on CEP work.  LAC, RG 10 Central Regi
 Ibid. 
employment provided greater opportunities for Natives to earn higher returns, part time CEP work was 
stry Series, Vol. 8434 File 
1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “J.H. Gordon, ‘Memorandum to the Deputy Minister,’ 9 December 1963.” 
 
103 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 5, “L.L. Brown to Acting Director, 
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104 Under the 1963 Prevailing Rate Employees General Regulations, authority to set casual employee
rates was vested with deputy heads.  See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1/21-7-2,
5, “Delegation of Authority to the Indian Commissioner of British Columbia and the Regional Supervis
of Indian Agencies, Indian Affairs Branch, Under the Prevailing Rate Employ
963, January 1964.”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 1
Indian Commissioner for BC, Regional Supervisors, Superintendents of Indian Agencies, ‘Wage Rates – 
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105 The CEP was seen as more successful since it created more work hours per dollar spent and w
oriented towards the creation of public assets.  See LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8434 File 
1/21-7-2 Pt 5, “Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 9 December 1963.” 
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 vis the ongoing availability of social assistance created additional conflict and confusion 
in bran ny 
development projects in reducing relief or stimulating reserve 
a position to provide the kind of elaborate information necessary to give a 
in which we are convinced it has had a profound influence.  Obviously, we 
nd 
manage this program most effectively.  Similarly, the Treasury Board 
 
t 
 rates 
e 
ase 
veal that every dollar spent on the CEP 
resulted
                                                                                                                                                
ch policies.106  Just like other areas of IAB programming, the IAB lacked a
objective means to even gauge program successes or failures.  J.H. Gordon, serving as 
interim IAB Director after Jones’ retirement, stated in December 1963 that:  
[T]here was no attempt to establish statistically the effects of community 
development and economic growth.  At this stage we believe we are not in 
clear picture of the impact of this program in all the areas of our activities 
need these kind of statistics and information in order to plan, develop a
needs this information to discharge their responsibilities.107 
Gordon did not need to look beyond the IAB’s own existing statistics to surmise tha
reductions in welfare rates were “not so readily established.”  Welfare dependency
continued to grow throughout the duration of the CEP.  Between 1960-61 and 1961-62 
alone, Indian welfare rates increased by 15.6%.  While rates of growth fell in th
following 1962-63 fiscal year, possibly due to CEP works, they still continued to incre
at a rate of 5.7%.  Branch documents from 1964 re
 in a reduction of welfare cost of only $.46 per dollar.108   
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ated in 1963 that 
lief was reduced by half of every wage dollar of Community Employment program funds expended, or 
Director, Operations, Report to the Policy Committee on the Winter Works Incentive and Community 
Employment Programs, 2 August 1962.”  See also R.W. Dunni
C
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108 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8435 File 1/21-7-2, Pt 6, “H.R. Conn to Director, 
‘Community Employment Program,’ 7 August 1964.”  Welfare Division officials estim
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By the early-1960s, it was becoming increasingly clear that extant branch 
economic development programs were incapable of transforming reserves into s
tools of “thought and action,” let alone conjuring Aboriginal economic parity.  Testim
delivered before the 1959-1961 Joint Committee on Indian Affairs (JC), the second 
Senate-House committee struck to re-examine Indian
pecial 
ony 
 administration after WWII, further 
reveale
63 
Agriculture and Rural Development Act, a larger economic development policy then 
also 
 the early 1960s.  In 1962, the “Program Five” was created in cooperation 
d the ongoing economic marginalization of many Indian reserves.  The committee 
recommended in its summary of findings the development of adult education 
programming to check Indian poverty.  One year later, the IAB announced in its 1962-
Annual Report intent to create a “Tentative Plan for Community Development,” in 
fulfillment of that recommendation.109  Initial post-JC branch attempts to initiate 
community development programming were apparently delayed by failed participation 
from the Department of National Health and Welfare and issues with the 1964 
being undertaken by the federal government.110   
Signs of provincial interest in community development programming were 
emerging in
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Cecile, 30 June 1965.”  In 1964, this replaced the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Development Act of 196
The 1964 Act was aimed at rural regional economic development.  K. H. Norrie and Doug Owram
History of the Canadian Economy (Toronto: Ha
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 with the federal Department of Manpower, the IAB, and provincial governments.111  
Several provinces also raised the matter of Indian community development during 
preliminary talks in August and September leading up to the federal-provincial 
conference on Indian affairs.112  At the 1964 meeting, Department of Citizenship and
Immigration Minister Guy Favreau pushed for the creation of a community development 
program as part of federal welfare devolution plans. 
In their studies of the CDP, Rob Cunningham and Hugh Shewell note how
interest in community development stemmed from a range of developments locally and
abroad.
 
 branch 
 
egan 
are policies.  Pearson’s Liberals, having defeated 
Diefenb l 
113  In 1963, for instance, new governments in both Canada and the US b
experimenting with new social welf
aker’s Progressive Conservatives, began working to implement promised socia
security policies such as national pensions.114  To the south, Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on 
Poverty and Great Society plans also involved community based-economic development 
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 programming.  Canadian interest in US social welfare programming and relocation and
termination policies appear to have helped instigate a special 1963 meeting of officials 
from the Canadian IAB and US Bureau of Indian Affairs.  Officials met in Scottsdale,
Arizona that October to 
 
 
discuss policies and areas of mutual concern, the first cross-
border escribed 
ki, 
meeting of Indian affairs officials of this type.  Canadian administrators d
the meeting as “an interchange of information between the administrators of Indian 
affairs in the two countries on a wide range of problems of mutual concern.”115  
Discussed problems of “mutual concern” included economic development, education, 
Indian local and self government, welfare, resource development, employment 
placement, housing, and health.116 
If political impetuses incited interest in community development, bureaucratic 
change in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration catalyzed it.  The 1963 change 
in government brought sweeping changes to senior departmental personnel.  New “civil 
service mandarins,” such as deputy minister Claude Isbister, took over senior official 
posts.  Within the IAB, long time branch director Colonel Jones retired in 1963, to be 
eventually replaced by another WWII veteran, R.F. Battle.  A younger Walter Rudnic
less familiar with war in both title and service, assumed the head of the welfare division.  
Amidst this time of change, branch excitement for community development 
programming ran high although most branch staff, new or old, had little knowledge or 
                                                 
115 RG 10 Vol. 8576 File 1/1-2-2-24 “Department of Citizenship and Immigration Press Release, 24 
September 1963.” 
 
116 Ibid; RG 10 Vol. 8576 File 1/1-2-2-24 “Agenda: United States-Canadian Conference on Indian Affairs, 
 
7-11 October 1963.” 
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 experience with community development.  Few of the branch “mandarins,” Rudni
recalls, had the faintest idea what community development was all about, but the plan 
was accepted because “somebody there [in the IAB] decided that they should at lea
appear progressive.”
cki 
st 
3.5 million over three 
years.  
 and 
ir 
ight 
gh 
n 
ment Officers (CDOs) specifically selected and trained to carry out the program 
at both 
, as 
                                                
117 
The CDP was announced in July 1964 after Treasury Board approved a 
submission detailing the program and earmarking funding for $
Authored by Rudnicki, the cabinet submission was premised on the idea that 
“Indian communities remained outside the mainstream of Canadian economic, social,
cultural life.”118  According to the document, Indians needed to make better use of the
resources, have more initiative, and be self-sufficient.  If these objectives were, as 
Rudnicki suggests, included to appeal to Treasury Board interests, they worked.  The 
program received guaranteed funding allowing for longer term planning than that carried 
out under either the CEP of the EPP.  The amount of funds received also marked a sl
increase over prior amounts allocated for economic development purposes, althou
Department Minister Rene Tremblay described the sum as “the minimum needed for a
intensive three year programme.”119  The CDP was to be carried out by Community 
Develop
agency and regional levels, reporting directly to headquarters.  As Cunningham 
and Shewell note, the program was novel in terms of both personnel and procedure
 
7 Interview with Walter Rudnicki, Ottawa, 21 February 1994, interviewed by Robert Cunningham. 
elopment,” 59. 
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118 Canada, “Memorandum to Cabinet, Community Development, Indian Affairs Branch in Cunningham, 
“Community Dev
 
119 House of Commons, Debates, July 7, 1964, 5128. 
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 well as in its recognition of reserves as permanent Aboriginal communities.  In a 
December 1964 Indian News article, Tremblay explained: “As a general principle th
community development programme will recognize that it is neither desirable nor 
practical to abolish reserves.”
e 
CDP envisioned the long term presence of reserve 
commu
 the EPP 
and CEP, as an ambitious program capable of simultaneously improving Aboriginal 
economy and reducing branch welfare costs.  Battle described the implementation of 
community development programming as a means to address a prior Treasury Board 
request to reduce Indian dependency on the federal government and to promote Indian 
self-sufficiency.   Ever mindful of fiscal interest and political Cabinet masters, the CDP 
submission specifically noted the potential welfare savings to be had from program 
initiatives: “community development would be inversely proportional to welfare 
payments.”   Similar to the CEP, the allocation of CDP funds via separate Treasury 
Board allocations provided a structural means for the IAB to reduce its annual operating 
budget. 
If both the EPP and CEP indirectly sought to increase provincial involvement in 
the CDP marked a more explicit attempt to devolve administrative 
  
120  Even though it sought the integration of reserves into 
mainstream Canadian economy, the 
nities, a tenet endorsed by both of Hawthorn’s reports. 
The CDP’s goals were less novel.  Branch officials pitched the CDP, like
121
122
Indian affairs, 
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 capacity onto the province.  By 1964, intergovernmental discussions regarding the 
sharing of Indian welfare costs and duties had stalled; senior branch officials began 
discussing the introduction of a stepped-up community development program as helping 
to facilitate subsequent joint welfare agreements.123  As Cunningham notes, the Cab
submission was clear on this point: 
In aiming to improve the status of Indians, a form of social and economic 
establish the necessary basis for negotiating the extension of provincial 
124
 
inet 
gain is held forth to the provinces.  Current indications are that this would 
services to Indians.  
The federal government had some reason to believe that a community development 
program would facilitate subsequent devolution agreements with the provinces.  Several 
provincial governments had, after all, already initiated pilot Indian community 
development programs by the time of the CDP’s announcement.  Manitoba struck a 
province-wide community development agreement with the federal government in 1962 
following a 1959 recommendation made in Jean H. Lagasse’s provincially-commissioned 
study of socio-economic conditions in Manitoba.  IAB staff seemed encouraged by early 
successes on at least one reserve, Fort Alexander, which cited increases in employment in 
logging industries and reducing welfare costs and crime rates.   Other programs were 
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er, 26 
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 initiate
e 
g 
DP, 
assistants, 
the latt rry, 
d in Ontario in 1962, Alberta in 1963, and Saskatchewan in 1964.126  Federal 
officials hoped that stepped up community development programming would provide th
incentive for the provinces to sign welfare agreements.  Once the Treasury Board fundin
for the CDP was guaranteed, a subsequent agreement format was created to recruit 
provincial participation.  Treasury Board approved the allocation of funds to the 
provinces on an interim “project area” basis.127  More than either the EPP or the C
community development programming was conceived of as an administrative means to 
further the goal of provincial integration. 
Like the EPP and CEP, the CDP started out small in scale.  In 1964, nine CDOs—
three each in the Maritimes and Manitoba and one each in Quebec, Ontario, and 
Alberta—were appointed.  The program was expanded in its second year when 
provisions were made for the hiring of thirty five additional CDP officers and 
er of whom were to be Indian.128  In BC and the Yukon, the agencies of Mt. Cu
Lytton, Bella Bella, and Anahim received a total of four CDOs.  Overall, the branch 
planned to appoint a total of sixty two CDOs and fifty assistant Indian community 
development workers as part of the three year funding guarantee.129 
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 CDOs were specifically selected from a national competition and trained for
purposes of CDP work.  Successful applicants tended to be young, well-educated, 
hired from outside the branch.  CDOs received three months of intense training to help 
them acquire “extraordinary sensitivity and skilled powers to diagnose and treat inter
related economic and social problems.”
 the 
and 
-
n 
 the 
bureauc ngham 
notes, w
 as agents, 
DOs “practiced” community development in a number of ways.  Some, such as Jean 
Kitchen, apparently “did nothing” in the Quebec reserve of Mistassini while others such 
as Tony Karch, along with CDA George Manuel, immediately set out to improve housing 
conditions on the Cowichan reserve.  Other CDOs had no direct interaction with reserves 
but rather worked in regional offices, a trend that increased into the twilight years of the 
130  Once assigned on reserves, placed CDOs 
were to establish direct relations and trust with local communities and assist Indians i
exploring and developing new economic opportunities.  To have local and direct access 
to Aboriginal people, CDOs were instructed to report directly to headquarters rather than 
to regional superintendents like other field staff.  This had the effect of not only giving 
CDOs “the freedom to practice community development relatively unfettered by
racy,” but also of alienating the CDOs from agency staff who, as Cunni
ould have seen the CDOs as a threat to their traditional authority.131   
Since they were unencumbered by the same bureaucratic protocols
C
                                                 
130 Canada, “Memorandum to Cabinet, Community Development, Indian Affairs Branch in Cunningham, 
Community Development,” 64.  CDO training took place under the auspices of University of Toronto “
psychiatrist Farrell Toombs. 
 
131 Cunningham, “Community Development,” 87. 
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 program.132  Citing interviews with former CDOs, Cunningham notes how conflict 
between Indian agents and CDOs developed immediately.  This might have been 
predict
and, 
ing 
underpaid old vets that their work has been in vain, especially when the 
tell the underworked and overpaid, pension-calculating civil servant that 
comprehension.  But tell it they [CDOs] did.  
Many CDOs found that their services were not welcomed by field staff who saw the CDP 
as a threat to their position and power.  Although headquarters instructed branch staff to 
assist in their work, CDOs quite often found themselves immediately isolated and lacking 
                                                
ed as pronounced differences in responsibility, attitude, and experience separated 
IAB local field staff and CDOs from the outset.  Unlike Indian agents, for example, 
CDOs were instructed to step outside the role of a typical bureaucrat in carrying out 
community development.  CDOs questioned branch policies and answered to Indian 
people rather than senior officials in headquarters.133  IAB field staff, on the other h
acted as local representatives charged with maintaining bureaucratic protocols, balanc
budgets, and carrying out policy manuals.  One former CDO, Gerry Piper, noted the vast 
attitudinal differences between CDOs and IAB regional and headquarters staff: 
[O]ne doesn’t tell a group of battle-scarred, dedicated, overworked and 
group-doing-the telling is relatively new to the battlefield.  Nor does one 
he’s about to lose his soft touch.  That is political naiveté beyond 
134
 
 
132 The actual work 
f
 Interview with Jean Kitchen, Ottawa, 7 July 1994, interviewed by Robert Cunningham.  
 CDOs is more fully documented in the studies by Shewell and Cunningham.   o
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 supports and resources once placed.  Others discovered that some agents even blocked 
CDOs from taking up placement on reserves to begin work.135 
The CDP was remarkable more for its unorthodox bureaucratic protocols, strange 
self-mo
y as 
he 
f 
 the 58 
.  
r 
terms, n  
programming, as originally conceived, ended.  Under the branch’s new welfare director, 
t 
tivational strategies, and controversial status within the IAB, than its actual 
effectiveness.  Based on its longevity alone, the CDP was an abysmal failure.  As earl
1966, less than two years into the program, a series of events spelled the decline of t
program.  In January of that year, Rudnicki left the IAB for a position in the Privy 
Council Office.  With Rudnicki, a driving force behind the CDP, gone, headquarters 
reassigned as CDOs subordinates to agency superintendents.  This action had the effect o
removing the CDOs from the actual field and stripping them of their ability to operate 
independently of regional supervision.  According to Rudnicki, by 1968 only 15 of
CDOs hired worked on reserves; the rest were transferred to Ottawa or regional offices
Now engrained in the old bureaucratic chain of command, CDOs, ceased to exist as a 
source of change within the bureaucracy.136  Manuel later described the CDP in simila
oting: “Participation began as a way of helping people to take a local initiative
and was redefined to mean gaining the consent of the band council for Ottawa-desired 
projects.”137  In 1968, the IAB’s experiment with Community Development 
Wilf Churchman, CDOs were made answerable to regional superintendents, a change tha
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 further undermined CDOs’ autonomy and innovation.  Traditional lines of authority
the IAB were re-established and the CDP was recast to serve other functions such as 
leadership training and infrastructure development on reserves.
 in 
e 
sors, was a small scale piecemeal program 
designe
ow a 
nt 
ther 
the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada, similarly commented that the CDP was “no 
 
138 
As an economic development initiative, the CDP failed on grounds similar to th
EPP and CEP.  The CDP, like its predeces
d to produce immediate results.  Simply too few dollars and positions were 
allocated for the program to have much significance.  At the peak of the program’s 
operation, CDP work was carried out by sixty-seven Community Development workers 
for Canada’s over 550 bands.139  Nationally, this meant that a maximum of one in eight 
bands could have had a CD worker simultaneously employed.  Manuel later noted h
lack of funding for actual implementation of economic development impaired the 
fundamental functions of the CDP: “What happened to the Community Developme
program at the Cowichan is not really different from what happened at a hundred o
Indian reserves across Canada.  There was no money for economic development.”140  
By most accounts, Cunningham’s characterization of the CDP as, “much ado 
about nothing” is fitting.  In an unpublished paper, E.R. McEwan, Executive Director of 
                                                                                                                                                
 Shewell, “‘Bitterness Behind Every Smiling Face’,” 78, Manual and Posluns, The Fourth World, 155.  
 announced to assist in the provision of 
frastructure on Indian reserves.  Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Indian 
 Community Development workers working under 
ary 
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For instance, in 1966 a Community Improvement Program was
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 panacea to Indian problems.”  McEwen noted how the lack of a clear definition of 
community development created divergent interpretations of the program’s
particularly among Community Development workers.  He also pointed out how 
jurisdictional and eligibility issues created intergovernmental confusion which in turn 
inhibited the effectiveness of the CDP.
 purpose, 
n of 
ost of the 
nce 
ation or endorsement provided an unworkable context for 
the pro
 
of 
 
                                                                                                                                                
141 
As Shewell suggests, the CDP failed to resolve the question of the extensio
provincial services and that of First Nations peoples’ place within Canada.142  M
resources needed to facilitate the policy were controlled by the provinces and the abse
of significant provincial particip
gram to succeed.143  Cost-sharing arrangements were finalized with Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia in the two years following the creation of the
CDP.144  No province-wide cost-sharing agreement, however, was reached in BC.  
According to the branch, BC was too slow to assign responsibility for community 
development to one of its departments and was thus unprepared to discuss the striking 
a comprehensive agreement at the time of the CDP’s introduction.  The province did 
agree in 1965 to share the costs of funding a pilot community development project on the
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 Port Simpson reserve but the final results were unspectacular.  In 1968, the concluding 
year of the project, BC’s Indian Advisory Committee reported that, on the 
recommendation of Boys, “it was felt the project should be discontinued because the 
Indian residents have now progressed to a point at which further assistance by
could defeat the purpose of self-management.”
 the worker 
recommended 
termination of the project, mainly because “B.C. has not indicated any interest 
whatso
t 
 
Lithman refers to in his study of 1960s Manitoban economic development schemes as a 
145  Internal IAB correspondence told a 
different story.  G.A. Whitman, a branch regional training officer, 
ever in either continuing this particular project or embarking upon any further 
project area submissions.”146   
After the pilot’s discontinuance, the CDO formerly responsible for the BC pilot 
project remarked that while improvements had been made, it was difficult to determine 
the exact effects since he was there “as a catalyst rather than as an administrator.”147  Jus
like the CEP and EPP, the branch lacked any method or criteria to assess CDP program 
results.  This ongoing lack of ability to evaluate program successes or failures further 
reflected the self-protectionist and survivalist orientation of the IAB, what Yngve Georg
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 characteristic trait of this instrumentally non-functioning branch of government.148  Ev
in those provinces where provincial-federal agreements in economic developmen
occurred, the results appear to have been less than successful.  The Indian Affairs Branch,
as Lithman explains, “in spite of itself or together with other public agencies 
commanding considerable resources, capital, people, skills, is so ineffectual in actually 
being a conduit for the improvement of the lot of the Indians.”
en 
t 
 
 
ans 
ic 
s 
ese 
 
 
                                                
149 
 
In his study of Canadian Indian administration, Noel Dyck refers to the “awesome
and disturbing” ability of the federal government to turn stereotypical images of Indi
into administrative realities.150  Dyck’s characterization poorly applies to IAB econom
development programming after the late-1950s; the branch failed miserably several time
in attempts to create new “administrative realities” on Canada’s Indian reserves.  While 
some Aboriginal people undoubtedly experienced both hardships and benefits from th
programs, federal economic development initiatives in the integrationist era were simply
too small, short-lived, and poorly implemented to have had any lasting impact on those
 
rtually all 
re, what 
 
s or 
experience to the people in a reserve community.  The IAB must thus be understood in this more complex 
154. 
 
150 Noel Dyck, What is the Indian ‘Problem’: Tutelage and Resistance in Canadian Indian Administration 
 
148 Lithman notes how, “the multi-stranded and often-times vague tasks of the IAB, spanning vi
aspects of the lives of the Indians … contributes to the inability to define what is success or failu
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way, and not as an instrumentally functioning bureaucracy.” Lithman, The Practice of Underdevelopment, 
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 people targeted by them.  All three programs, despite adopting the novel discourse of 
economic development, were essentially pilots affecting only a small minority.  
Accordingly, as late as 1966, BC’s Indian Advisory Committee noted in the aft
Aboriginal community consultations that most Indians tended to be unawar
ermath of 
e of any 
econom .151  
tuated two 
ive funding at levels far below actual need and the exclusion of 
Aborig grams 
underta d political 
expedie eeds of Indian people.  That 
s this 
id 
ignored.  As a result, post-war economic development policies in Canada were 
e 1957-58 fiscal year, the height of the US Urban Relocation Program, 
in 10,000 Indians.  This amount equaled the 
ic development opportunities stemming from government policy or regulation
Late-1950s/1960s economic development programs simply failed to provide a “work 
magic” tonic to end Aboriginal economic marginalization. 
Those economic development programs begun in the late 1950s perpe
familiar patterns endemic to the earliest assimilationist Indian policies: the political 
setting of administrat
inal participation from the planning and executive process.  All of the pro
ken in this period were similar in that the behest of Cabinet interests an
ncy dictated budgetary decisions, not the actual n
requests for more generous funding allocations were repeatedly denied underscore
fact.  Proposals to alter extant funding mechanisms from branch administrators, am
overwhelming evidence that programs such as the CEP were failing, were repeatedly 
pathetically small and ineffectual, particularly when compared to US programs.  For 
example, during th
$3.5 million was spent to relocate and tra
entire three year budget of the CDP and matched the total annual operating budget of the 
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 IAB’s Economic Development Division during the peak year of the EPP.152  George 
Manuel would later lament in The Fourth World: An Indian Reality that “until that 
commitment of capital is made, no government will ever solve the problem of 
communities whose own indigenous resources have been undermined.”153 
ists 
eir 
public expenditures on their behalf in the hundreds of million of dollars 
budget and staff for the Indian Affairs Branch, as well as more assistance 
 
The IA
ments 
The absence of political and financial wills guaranteed that branch economic 
development programs could never deliver on their terms of reference.  Social scient
had known this for some time already.  Hawthorn, Belshaw, and Jamieson noted in th
mid-1950s BC survey that “the total burden of additional cost implied in our 
recommendations is a heavy one.”154  Hawthorn’s national study rearticulated this basic 
tenet a decade later: 
An adequate program for economic development of Indians will require 
per annum over the foreseeable future.  This will entail a much larger 
from other government agencies at all levels.155 
B’s reaction to this specific recommendation suggests that it was not new 
information to officials.  In its commentary on the report, IAB officials stated: “In 
economic development the Branch is ready to advance on major program improve
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 if the government approves the new authorities and finances required.”156  While the
widespread and rapid decline of Aboriginal participation in capitalist economies that 
began in BC into the 1960s had no direct relation to branch economic developmen
policies, the effects were little mitigated by them. 
The EPP, CEP, and CDP were conceived of as unrealistically multifunctional 
policies designed to simultaneously enhance Aboriginal economic well-being while 
reducing welfare costs and offloading IAB administrative responsibilities onto other 
federal line agencies and the provinces.  That these varian
 
t 
t interests might be 
incomp y 
he 
as the 
 
control is only another form of imperial conquest.”157  Long after his stint as a CDP 
atible or serving cross purposes was never fully understood or acknowledged b
those in power.  The secretive and centralized manner in which economic development 
programs were developed and operated additionally hindered their success.  Well into t
1960s, the IAB remained highly centralized, ruled by fiscal parsimony, and overly 
concerned with achieving immediate policy successes. 
Another significant debilitating factor to economic development policy successes 
was the exclusion of Aboriginal people from the decision making process.  As w
case with integrated education and health, economic development programs were
developed and implemented without the meaningful consent or participation of 
Aboriginal people.  Manuel later noted how “economic development without full local 
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157 Manuel and Posluns, The Fourth World, 151. Manuel, however, does maintain that the CDP helped 
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 worker, Manuel continued to critique federal economic development policies while
President of the National Indian Brotherhood.  In 1972, he delivered a paper before the 
newly-formed Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs cond
 
emning prior Indian 
econom
 
ars earlier during the 1967 provincial budget debate, Frank 
Calder sic 
step tow
an 
integrationist policies in health and education.  Sto:lo Henry Pennier lamented this in the 
1960s, noting how, outside of a labour context, Aboriginal people like him “could not 
join the white society, socially.”   No work, quite simply, meant no integration.  In 
addition to failing to provide even an integration of workplace with non-Indians, 
economic development programs were fundamentally misguided by the assumption that 
economic integration was synonymous with, social and/or cultural integration.  
Aboriginal people did not share the government’s view of reserves as marginal, 
undesirable spaces of underdevelopment nor were they swayed by the progressive 
ic development programming as prone to poor planning, implementation, scope, 
and quality of staff.  Manuel described branch economic development as “A Whiteman’s
Whitewash.”158  Several ye
similarly stated, “Community and economic development on reserves is a ba
ard extinguishments of the reserve system.”159   
As attempts at “integration,” the EPP, CEP, and CDP had far less impact th
160
rhetoric of IAB economic development policies.  Even Hawthorn, who highlighted the 
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 connec
ed 
periphery (in the emanating flow of the civilizing mission or the cash flow 
which the periphery determines the metropolis – beginning, perhaps, with 
others continually to itself.  
For many Native people, both prior to and after the growth of urbanization that began in 
the latter twentieth century, Indian reserve spaces did not solely represent spaces of 
“underdevelopment.”  Similar to what Lefebvre refers to as counter-productions of space, 
Indian reserves did not lose their normative functions as anchors of identity, culture, 
family, community, and traditional economy.163  For Aboriginal people, permanent off-
reserve movement for the purposes of socio-economic advancement carried a high cost: 
familial loss, community fragmentation, and cultural disruption.   
                                                                                                                                                
tion between mobility and gainful employment, and advocated off-reserve 
migration to improve economic livelihoods, appears to have significantly underestimat
the power of place for Aboriginal people at mid-century.161 
Although made in reference to imperial processes of prior centuries, Mary Louis 
Pratt’s comments on the relationship between peripheral and metropolitan spaces prove 
relevant here.  She writes: 
While the imperial metropolis tends to understand itself as determining the 
of development, for example), it habitually blinds itself to the ways in 
the latter’s obsessive need to present and re-present its peripheries and its 
162
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Perhaps most importantly to fed s, economic development programs 
failed miserably as attempts t inistrative integration” 
with the provinces.  BC was only legally and ministratively concerned with off-reserve 
non-registered Indians and, as the following chapte
shouldering any cost for Indian welfare benefits.  Ongoing perceptions of the CEP as a 
work for welfare scheme, combined with the inability of federal economic development 
programs to effect permanent off-reserve relocation, ensured that provincial interest in 
Indians remained low.164  Hopes that economic development would provide the catalyst 
for the striking of subsequent joint federal-provincial welfare agreements also were never 
realized.  After 1959, no province agreed to a comprehensive welfare agreement.  
Instead, federal-provincial relations regarding Indian affairs only became more strained 
once IAB officials increased their efforts to devolve Indian welfare onto the province in 
the 1960s.
            
eral official
o foster additional forms of “adm
 ad
r shows, was entirely uninterested in 
                                                                                                                                     
4 horn Fonds, Box 32 File 13, E.R. McEwen, “Community Development Services for 
mmunities,” Unpublished paper, n.d. 
 
16  See Harry Hawt
Indian and Metis Co
 
 Chapter 5 
Conference on Indian Affairs.” 
 
—F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-U
2
“‘A Glacial Process’: Indian Welfare Devolution and the 1964 Federal-Provincial 
 
“No grand idea was ever born in a conference, but a lot of foolish ideas have died there.” 
p (1945).1 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, post-WWII Indian Affairs Branch economic 
development programs policies indirectly sought to devolve responsibility and cost for 
Indian welfare administration onto the provinces.  By the early-1960s, Indian welfare was 
fast becoming the largest area of IAB expenditure and of great concern to federal 
officials.   Although BC was no bystander to integrationist trends in Indian social welfare 
in the years after WWII, accepting greater administrative responsibility for Indians in 
areas such as family allowances and child welfare, the devolution of on-reserve Indian 
welfare services onto BC proved to be an elusive goal.  The 1964 convening of a federal-
provincial conference devoted solely to Indian affairs reflected growing federal concern 
about the uneven progress of administrative integration.  The first national meeting of its 
type, the conference canvassed a range of administrative topics but one clearly motivated 
and dominated the proceedings: Indian welfare.  
In his study of Indian welfare policies in Canada, Hugh Shewell suggests that 
Aboriginal people “could have agitated for direct [provincial] involvement in their 
                                                 
1 F. Scott Fitzgerald The Crack-Up, Edmund Wilson, eds, (1945), “Note-Books E,” in The Oxford 
Dictionary of Quotations, 315. 
 
2 See Appendix C. 
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 affairs, but there was no evidence that very many did.”3  While, as Shewell notes
Aboriginal people remained third party onlookers when it came to welfare policy 
discussions, they were neither silent nor inactive when it came
, 
 to the matter of welfare 
devolut
 
out 
  
 
s.  Attitudes and 
policies  
                                                
ion.  Along with federal officials, many BC Aboriginal people favoured 
provincial control of Indian welfare, and for obvious reason.  Provincial social assistance 
rates were three times higher than branch ones and were not paid in truck.  BC social 
assistance was also not subject to discriminatory work-for-welfare qualifications like the 
Community Employment Program.  For such practical reasons alone, Aboriginal people 
demanded access to provincial welfare as a long-denied right of citizenship and they
lobbied the offices of both federal and provincial welfare officials accordingly.  As this 
chapter later shows, however, Indian perceptions of welfare began to change after the 
mid-1960s, largely in response to declining employment opportunities and growing 
welfare dependency in Aboriginal communities. 
Government perceptions of Indian welfare proved far less dynamic through
this period.  Stereotypical assumptions about Indians ran high when it came to welfare.
Since its earliest provision, governments saw welfare as dulling Indian incentive to work
and hindering the prospects of Indians becoming self-sufficient citizen
 in the 1960s strayed little from earlier historical trends.  When it came to Indian
welfare, fiscal interests and intergovernmental politics trumped those moral, social, and 
humanitarian interests that facilitated administrative devolution in Indian health and 
 
3 Shewell only cites a Saskatchewan Indian Joint Committee brief and Hawthorn’s 1966 recommendation 
r the need to consult with Indians regarding welfare devolution as evidence of Indian disinterest.  Hugh 
1873-1965 (Toronto: University of 
oronto Press, 2004), 320 f.n. 198. 
fo
Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’: Indian Welfare in Canada, 
T
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 education.  By the mid-1960s, Indian welfare was becoming an area of fruitless 
intergovernmental impasse in BC, and despite demands for reform from Aborigina
organizations, Indian advocacy groups, and social scientists.   
The 1964 federal-provincial conference
l 
, in many ways, marked the climax of the 
integrationist era.  During the months leading up to the event, Guy Favreau, the Minister 
of Citiz  
 
gh 
 to 
d 
ncial responsibility. 
That an integration of Indian welfare with provincial services never occurred in 
BC underscored the challenge of trying to renegotiate new administrative relationships 
federalism.  In the end, extant jurisdictional 
enship and Immigration, told the House: “I sincerely believe that through this new
development we are entering a new phase and have reached a turning point in the field of
Canadian Indian affairs in Canada.”4  Favreau’s foresight would prove correct, althou
for reasons unanticipated.  Federal and provincial officials butted heads during the 
conference; following the meeting, welfare devolution talks in BC deteriorated rapidly 
into political squabbles more typical of broader conflictual executive federalist relations.  
By the mid 1960s, BC had no interest in financing what it saw as a growing financial 
liability.  The federal government, in turn, gave few reasons for the provincial officials
change their minds by insisting that any devolutionary measure contain some cost-
sharing provision.  Moreover, by consistently positing a distinction between legal an
administrative jurisdictions, federal proposals affirmed Dominion disallowance powers 
and legal limitations on the scope of provi
for Aboriginal people within Canadian 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 14 December 1963, 5881. 
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 arrange
ar 
 to be 
s a 
 
s of their status.  Prior to the Indian Act 
of 1951 g 
s 
ments and the constitutional relationship established in 1867 to protect and 
assimilate Indians provided mechanisms for the provinces to resist administration 
devolution attempts.  The conflicting interests of both levels of government impeded the 
integration of Indian welfare services in BC.  
 
Federal Indian welfare policies underwent a qualitative transition in the post-w
period.  As Shewell notes, “the emphasis shifted away from harsh admonishments
self-supporting toward a search for ways to make these goals achievable in physical, 
social, and economic terms.”5  In other words, while the discourse surrounding Indian 
welfare had changed, the underlying motivations had not.  Indian welfare was seen a
mechanism to hasten Indian assimilation and to further Indian enfranchisement, the legal
mechanism first introduced in 1869 to strip Indian
, which removed compulsory enfranchisement provisions for men, qualifyin
Indians had to demonstrate self-sufficiency and the capability to hold land in fee simple.6  
After WWII, Indian affairs officials began realizing that ongoing Aboriginal socio-
economic underdevelopment, not some racially- or culturally-inferior predisposition, wa
obstructing successful enfranchisement.   
                                                 
5 Shewell, 'Enough to Keep Them Alive’, 173. 
 
nd to 
xtend the Provisions of the Act 31  Victoria, Chapter 42, Statutes of Canada [or SC] 1869, c.6. s. 16; 
0, compulsory enfranchisement was removed 
om the books in 1921 only to be reintroduced and 1933.  Involuntary aspects of this policy were lifted in 
6 See An Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians, the Better Management of Indian Affairs, a
stE
Indian Act, RSC 1906, c. 81, s. 108.  Entrenched in law in 192
fr
1951, 1960-61, and 1985. 
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 For federal Indian Affairs officials, ubiquitous fiscal concerns about escalating 
costs offset pressures to extend or improve social welfare benefits to Indians after WWI
Indian welfare was an area of rapid expansion and cost growth after WWII; in 1947, 
IAB’s Indian Welfare and Training Division split into separate divisions, reflecting the 
increased activities and capacities of each service.
I.  
the 
ians 
as 
ts 
 
administrative integration did occur in several other social welfare program areas.  For 
7  At least early on, however, Indian 
affairs officials could dismiss political pressures for a desegregation of social welfare 
services as opposition party rhetoric and as topics for the upcoming Special Joint 
Committee to determine.8  During a debate regarding the extension of pensions to Ind
in 1947, one MP scoffed at Department of Mines and Resources Minister J.A. Glen’s 
suggestion that Indians seeking old age pensions could simply gain it via becoming 
enfranchised, pointing out that aged Indians’ ability to demonstrate self-sufficiency w
hindered by their inability to collect pensions!9   
Just as in health and education, a combination of moral and fiscal concerns 
motivated the integration of Indian social welfare services with other federal departmen
and lower government.  Administrative integration provided a convenient mechanism for
IAB officials to skirt public and political pressures to include Indians in Canadian post-
war social welfare programs, as well as reduce its own operating costs.  While most 
branch efforts to offload Indian social assistance failed after WWII, successes in 
                                                 
7 Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1947-8, 218. 
 House of Commons, Debates, June 26, 1947, 4726. 
 
 
8 See House of Commons, Debates, October 24, 1945, 1460. 
 
9
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 example, when responsibility for Indian health was being transferred from the IAB to the 
Department of National Health and Welfare, Indians were granted the ability to collect 
Family Allowances.  In 1945, an agreement between the Departments of Mines a
Resources and newly-formed National Health and Welfare extended eligibility for F
Allowances, which had come into place one year earlier, to Indians.
nd 
amily 
 often 
benefit
 
-48 
 to 
principle of provincial integration of services in its final report.  That BC Indians were 
s in 
10  However, as with 
so many other areas of “administrative integration,” administrative realities did not break 
fully with earlier policy traditions.  Indian Family Allowances, for example, were
still paid in kind—mostly in the form of food and clothing—and overseen by agency 
superintendents.  This was justified, according to Glen, in order to “see that there is no 
abuse of the money,” and that “the Indian is capable of using the allowance for the 
 of his children.”11  At least initially, BC topped the list of provinces with the 
highest number of family allowance recipients.12 
Calls for Indian eligibility in newly-created post-WWII social welfare benefits
continued into the latter 1940s and 1950s.  Church briefs delivered before the 1946
Special Joint Committee hearings encouraged the extension of social welfare services
Indians on the same basis as non-Indians.  The SJC also went on to affirm the general 
granted the provincial franchise in 1949 further fuelled pressures to include Indian
                                                 
10 Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report, 1945-6, 210. 
 
11 House of Commons, Debates, 14 December 1945, 3523; Moore, “Indian Health Services,” 142. 
ented administered by regional 
perintendents.  A registry of Indian recipients was created allowing greater control over the dispensation 
 
12 Families whose children were in residential schools did not qualify for the allowance.  Indian Affairs 
Branch, Annual Report, 1946-7, 224.  In 1954, a new system was implem
su
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 post-war social welfare programs.  In 1952, Indians became eligible for Old Age Securit
Pensions on the same basis as other provincial residents.  Also that year, blind Indians
received Old Age Assistance and Blind Persons’ benefits, both administered by 
provincial governments.
y 
 
rt, for 
h 
ll 
Other intergovernmental agreements struck in the area of child welfare during this 
n 
 Department of Citizenship and Immigration and BC Department of 
 
13  These integrationist firsts, enacted by Byron Johnson’s 
Coalition government, met with the wide approval of non-Indians.  In his 1958 repo
instance, Hawthorn described the conferring of equal eligibility status for Indians in suc
programs as “Probably the most significant development in the history of public 
assistance for Indians.”  In addition to lauding this trend, Hawthorn went on to predict 
that the appearance of good will between the federal and provincial staff “promises we
for a transition from federal to Provincial administration in these [welfare] services.”14 
period fuelled federal hopes that a takeover of Indian social assistance would follow.  I
952, the federal1
Social Welfare informally agreed to extend provincial child welfare services onto 
reserves in matters relative to delinquent children, unmarried mothers, and adoption 
cases.15  After 1960, the granting of control of on-reserve child welfare services to the 
                                                                                                                                                
h and Welfare, Annual Report 1953-54, 101. 
.  
 H.B. Hawthorn, C.S. Belshaw and S.M. Jamieson, The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of Social 
of funds, which the DNHW considered “a considerable improvement over that previously used.”  
Department of National Heat
 
13 Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1951-2, 44.  
By 1954, approximately 176 Indians between the ages of 21 and 64 received Blind Persons Allowances
Roughly 1,261 Indians between the ages of 65 and 69 received Old Age Assistance. Indian News, August 
1954, “Blind Receive Aid.” 
 
14
Adjustment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 393, 409. 
 
15 At least initially, the agreement had minor implication and the province only became involved at the 
request of local Indian agents.  When BC clarified its policy for on-reserve child welfare services in 1955, 
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 province, combined with growing public interest in child protection, resulted in a
increase of Indian child apprehensions,
 rapid 
ther provinces also assumed greater 
control
 
s 
16 a phenomenon described by one former BC 
ministry worker as the “Sixties’ Scoop.”17  Several o
 of Indian child welfare around this time.  In February 1956, the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration reached a formal agreement with Ontario transferring
responsibility for child welfare services to the Children’s Aid Society.18  As in BC, the 
number of Aboriginal people affected by the arrangement was initially small but the 
branch considered the agreement “outstanding” and hoped that other provinces would 
follow the Ontarian precedent.  By 1965, similar agreements were in place in Alberta, 
Manitoba, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Quebec, the Northwest Territories and the Yukon.19  A
                                                                                                                                                 
for instance, only twenty-nine Indian children received provincial foster care. Gene Elmore, Sharon Clark, 
and Sharon Dick, “A Survey of Adoption and Child Welfare Services to Indians of B.C.” [Victoria]: A 
Report Presented to the Union of BC Indian Chiefs by the BC Department of Human Resources, 18 
February 1974, 3-5. 
 
16 Between 1957 and 1969, the number of status Indian children under the care of BC Superintendent of 
Child Welfare ballooned from sixty-nine to 1,289.  W.T. Stanbury, Success and Failure: Indians in Urban 
Society (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1975), 384. 
 First 
, 
 
d., 
, Political, Educational Needs, Volume One (Ottawa: Indian 
ffairs Branch, 1966), 327. 
n 
 
 of Canada 
ch, 
s, Box 37 File 13, “Memorandum of Agreement between 
he Government of Canada and the Province of Manitoba.”  The agreement was further supplemented in 
 
17 Patrick Johnston, Native Children and the Child Welfare System (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 
1983), 23; See also Suzanne Fournier and Ernie Crey, Stolen from Our Embrace: The Abduction of
Nations Children and the Restoration of Aboriginal Communities (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1997)
88; Jessa Chupik-Hall, “‘Good Families do not Just Happen’: Indigenous People and Child Welfare 
Services in Canada, 1950-1965,” (MA Thesis, Trent University, 2001), 71-72.  Hawthorn criticized federal
child welfare service provision in 1966 as varying from “unsatisfactory to appalling.” H.B. Hawthorn, e
A Survey of Contemporary Indians: Economic
A
 
18 The agreement entailed an additional nineteen sub-agreements that extended child welfare and protectio
services onto select reserves.  Ottawa stood to provide full fiscal reimbursement under the agreement.
Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 37 File 13, “Memorandum of Agreement between The Government
and the Province of Ontario”; Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Bran
Annual Report, 1956-57, 54 
 
19, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1961-62, 34.  Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 37 File 13, 
“Memorandum of Agreement between The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Commissioner 
of the Yukon Territory.” Harry Hawthorn Fond
T
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 with those joint arrangements in education and health, child welfare agreements 
stipulated that Indians receive the same provincial statutory services as non-Indians, in 
exchan
d its 
sis.21  
ment 
                                                                                                                               
ge for federal per diem cost reimbursement. 
Ontario set another important precedent in April 1959 when it agreed to exten
welfare services onto reserves following an amendment to the province’s General 
Welfare Assistance Act.20  Under the arrangement, bands were reimbursed 80% of the 
cost of assistance via provincial and federal contributions under the Unemployment 
Assistance Act and the Department of National Health and Welfare on a 30/50 ba
The IAB again lauded it as a progressive measure, a positive step towards the fulfillment 
of desires for greater Indian self-management and the remodeling of Indian reserves as 
municipalities. Although, like the 1956 child welfare agreement, the welfare arrange
                  
Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1964-65, 26. LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 
1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Background Information for Integration Research Project, Indian Affairs Branch, March 
ivil Liberties and Rights of Indians in Ontario, which recommended that 
4-
ffairs Branch, Annual Report, 1960-61, 53; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, 
ty 
1964 with addition of additional Children’s Aid Society oversight of various regions of Manitoba.  LAC, 
RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 3, “Departmental Achievements, Indian Affairs 
Branch, 1 Jan 1965 – 31 March 1966.” Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 37 File 13, “Memorandum of 
Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen and the and the Government of the Province of Nova Scotia;, 
1963,” 4.  For a list of agreements see RG10 Vol. 13867 File 1/42-2 Pt. 2.2, “Chief, Welfare Division, 
Agreements with Provinces, 19 May 1964.”   
 
20 The agreement also invoked section 68 of the Indian Act, which granted cabinet the power to allow 
bands to, “control, manage, and expend” their own funds.  SC (1951), c. 29 s. 68.  Shewell notes how the 
lease of the 1954 report Cre
Ontario extend its welfare programs into reserves, influenced this development.  Hugh Shewell, 
“‘Bitterness Behind Every Smiling Face’: Community Development and Canada's First Nations, 195
968,” The Canadian Historical Review Vol. 83 No. 1 (2002), 65. 1
 
 Indian A21
File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Summary: Federal-Provincial Discussions on Welfare Programs and Communi
Development during August and September.” 
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 initially covered only a minority of bands, the IAB hoped it would facilitate a
sub-agreements and similar umbrella frameworks with the remaining provinces.
dditional 
 
airclough, the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigr
ng 
e 
our 
22 
Encouraged by the Ontarian agreement, the branch submitted a memorandum to 
cabinet that fall titled “Application and Extension of Provincial Welfare Services to 
Indians,” recommending the negotiation of new agreements involving either band or 
provincial administration of on-reserve Indian welfare assistance.23  The IAB went public
with the policy the next spring when Ellen F
ation since 1958, announced that the federal government was prepared to 
negotiate agreements with provincial governments to hand over control of Indian welfare 
services.24  Later that year, the IAB decided “on humanitarian grounds” to start providi
welfare services to some non-Indians residing on-reserve, notably those Aboriginal 
women and children compulsorily enfranchised through non-Indian marriage under th
Indian Act.25 
While Ontario was the clear leader when it came to provincial devolution of 
Indian social welfare services, BC appeared at least willing to discuss welfare reform in 
the 1950s.  In 1956, the BC legislature directed its Select Standing Committee on Lab
                                                 
22 Initially, only seventeen bands, or approximately thirty-five percent of the provincial on-reserve Indian 
population fell under the terms of the agreement.  Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1959-60, 45, 52.  
y 1964, thirty-four bands covering about half of the provincial Indian population, administered assistance 
are, 
, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Draft Report of the sub-
 4. 
B
under provincial regulations; remaining bands, mostly those lacking the funds to pay the municipal sh
did not fall under the Act. 
 
23 LAC
Committee of the Federal-Provincial Conference, Appendix A,”
 
24 Ibid., 2. 
 
25 See SC (1956), c. 40, s. 26.  This affected approximately 7,240 individuals as of 1960.  Indian Affairs 
Branch, Annual Report, 1960-61, 53. 
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 to investigate the “Welfare, Health, and Housing of Native People in British 
Columbia.”26  The final report of the committee tabled in March of that year, ho
made few recommendations.  Affirming the primacy of federal jurisdiction in matte
Indian welfare, health, and housing, the committee concluded that “the Indian Act, which 
in general provide
wever, 
rs of 
s the necessary legislative machinery for administering Indian affairs 
through this 
 BC’s 
e 
of 
s.  According to the IAB’s Annual Report of that 
year, th assistance “on 
substan anch public 
disclos at only 
                         
out Canada, may undergo such changes as to make any recommendations of 
Committee at the present time difficult.”27   
Discussions concerning Indian welfare between authorities in the IAB and
Department of Social Welfare continued in the late-1950s.28  To entice provincial interest 
in devolution, federal officials mimicked a strategy employed earlier in education: th
harmonization of Indian welfare standards with those of the province.  After two years 
experimentation, the IAB boasted in 1959 that the former welfare “payment in kind” 
system was being replaced with a more equitable system of eligibility criteria and relief 
scales modeled on provincial standard
e new system placed greater responsibility on Indians and paid out 
tially the same basis as non-Indians.”29  Once again, however, br
ures and administrative realities varied.  One year later, the IAB admitted th
                                                                                                                        
 
26 See LLBC, Select Standing and Special Committees, Sessional Chronological Listing: 1872-1994 
(Victoria: Clerk of Committees, 1994); Vancouver Sun, 1 February 1956, “House Orders Indians Study,” 
22. 
 
 LLBC, Journals (Victoria: Queen’s Printer, 1956), 147-148. 
 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1957-58, 67; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1959-60, 71. 
ries, Vol. 8567, File 
/1-2, Pt. 1, “Department of Citizenship and Immigration, the Indian Affairs Branch, n.d. [circa 1958-59].” 
27
 
28
 
29 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1958-59, 51; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Se
1
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 20% of lar value 
orders still dominated the Indian relief system.   Furthermore, the same year it 
announced the abolishment of payments in kind, the IAB initiated the Community 
Employment Program, which demanded menial employment service as a qualification for 
relief assistance. 
With Indian relief still being paid out in kind or subject to work-for-welfare 
qualifications, it is not surprising that many Aboriginal people demanded more equitable 
social assistance provision from provincial departments.  BC’s major Aboriginal 
organizations appear to have favoured the principle of provincial welfare administration.  
In 1947, Guy Williams and Peter Kelly presented a brief to the SJC on behalf of the 
Native Brotherhood of British Columbia stating: “If the governments have the right to 
impose taxation on the Indians then such social benefits as are enjoyed by the taxpayers 
of the country should be granted to the Indians.”   Twelve years later, Kelly rearticulated 
this same position at the JC hearings: 
As citizens of British Columbia the native people are aware of the 
the provincial government. … However, the health and welfare 
matters are essentially local problems which should be dealt with by local 
authority, we therefore suggest that the federal government should 
enjoyed by other citizens.  This would help to 
                                                                                                                                 
 welfare payments to bands were made in cash; welfare payments of dol
30
31
advantages of being more closely connected with certain departments of 
recommendation has not been expanded enough.  Since health and welfare 
negotiate with the province in order that British Columbia may enjoy the 
same standard of services 
                
May 1947). 
 
30 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1959-60, 51. 
 
31 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and 
Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 15 (1 
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 eliminate the present double standard of services which have tended to 
32
 
make the Indian feel different and inferior.  
Throughout the 1960s, other Aboriginal organizations similarly declared federal 
oversight of Indian welfare as both impractical as well as a denial of national and 
provincial citizenship rights.  A North American Indian Brotherhood (NAIB) brief 
recommended to the federal government in 1961 “The gradual extension of all existing 
[provincial] programs to Indians.”   One year later, the NAIB sent another brief, this 
time to BC’s government, advocating consideration of “the consolidation of [welfare] 
services under one administration wherever possible.”  The brief also noted how IAB 
Indian welfare payments amounted to $22 per head per month, much less than the 
provincial rate of $67.50, and demanded that “the Provincial Government furnish the 
difference in welfare amounts.”   BC’s Provincial Secretary, W.D. Black, would later 
admit at the 1964 federal-provincial conference that the federal welfare proposals then 
being discussed were “those which the Indians have been asking for in British Columbia 
for years.”   Of course, both federal and provincial politicians were not above using 
“Indian demands” to further their own political agendas and to either defer action or 
compel it on the other.  After the release of the 1969 White Paper, for instance, BC’s 
                      
33
34
35
                           
 Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Minutes and 
 RG 10 Vol. 13867 File 1/42-2 Pt 2.2 “Evidence that Indians Favour Provincial Administration of Welfare 
 
, 5905-5906. 
32
Proceedings, No. 6 (2 July 1959), 142. 
 
33
Services.” 
 
34 BCA GR-0128 Box 5 File 44, “North American Indian Brotherhood Brief to the Provincial Government
of B.C. [1962].”  See also House of Commons, Debates, 14 December 1963
 
35 DIANDL, Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, “Federal-Provincial 
Conference on Indian Affairs, Report of Proceedings (Ottawa, 1964), 18. 
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 Minister of Municipal Affairs, Dan Campbell, vowed to never attend another federal-
provincial conference without Indian participation.36 
The IAB had some reason to be hopeful that a comprehensive welfare agreement 
with BC might follow the 1959 Ontarian precedent.  An earlier arrangement had been 
reached whereby the province began providing welfare assistance, on a refundable basis 
from th
 
 
 
f a 
                                                
e IAB, to Indians off-reserve having not established residency in a municipality.37  
The creation of new liaison bodies designed to further intergovernmental talks raised
integrationist hopes.  In 1959, a standing Federal-Provincial Indian Committee was 
created to “clarify existing policies and procedures … and to make period 
recommendations for improvement and extension of social services to Indians.”38  Within
a year, the committee drafted a statement of policy clarifying health and welfare service
entitlements for off-reserve Indians and on-reserve non-Indians.39  The addition o
Federal-Provincial Relations Division to the IAB and appointment of a Provincial 
Relations Secretariat in the Privy Council Office in 1964 further provided forums for new 
 
arch 1950, “Coalition Praised for Taking Indians from Welfare State to be 
ull Citizens,” 27. 
File 1/19-2-10, Pt. 1, “R.D. Ragan to Acting Chief, 
elfare Division, 19 March 1963.” 
y 
2, 
The Standing Inter-Departmental Coordinating Committee on Indian Welfare Programs.”  The Standing 
eport, 1960-1, 74-5; Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1961-62, 34. 
36 Victoria Daily Colonist, 14 August 1969, “Indian Policy Voice Backed by Campbell,” 54.  See also 
Victoria Daily Colonist, 10 M
F
 
37 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7983, 
W
 
38 BCA GR-0361 Box 12, “Social Welfare Services in British Columbia: An Address Delivered by Wesle
D. Black, 14 February 1961.” LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.
“
Committee was composed of three members of each department involved. 
 
39 Similar agreements were reached the same year in Alberta and Saskatchewan.  Indian Affairs Branch, 
Annual R
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 intergovernmental discussions.40  Such reforms reflected, more generally, the changing
face of federal-provincial relations in the 1960s and the shift from cooperative to 
executive federalism.  Political scientist Garth Stevenson characterizes intergovernmental
relations in the 1960s as becoming more prioritized, formal, and technocratic in response
to changing tax sharing arrangements and provincial concerns over rising expenditures
In the meantime, the push to integrate Indian welfare services in BC received ne
impetus.  In January 1962, federal Treasury Board approved financial arrangements 
transferring welfare services in the northern Babine Agency to the province.
 
 
 
.41 
w 
r, 
ther clarifying jurisdictional welfare guidelines for both off-reserve 
Indians
.  
 
                                                
42  That yea
a statement of policy modeled on the earlier coordinating committee recommendation 
was agreed upon, fur
 and non-Indians living on-reserves, contingent on full reimbursement from the 
respective welfare authorities.43  This meant that Indians with twelve months of 
established welfare-free residence off-reserve would receive services from provincial 
welfare offices; on-reserve non-Indians would be administered by federal Indian offices
The statement enshrined the principle that social assistance “be granted and administrated
 
tariat 
 
41 Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 225-26. 
 
42 UBCA, Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 37 File 13, “Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting of the 
Honourable the Treasury Board”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 2, 
 The agreement became effective 1 April 1963.  Under the agreement, both governments reimbursed the 
961-
40 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 2, “Provincial Relations Secre
Terms of Reference, 1964.” 
“Memorandum from Chief, Welfare Division to Chief, Federal-Provincial Relations, 19 May 1964.” 
 
43
other 100% of the costs associated with providing welfare services for Indians off-reserve and non-Indians 
on-reserve.  The agreement was initially reached in 1961-62.  Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1
62, 34. 
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 to the Indian at the place and point of his application and/or need.”  It also epitomized 
what Shewell terms the liberal-democratic discourse endemic to post-war Indian wel
policies by stipulating that “[a]n Indian applying for, or receiving social welfare serv
is like … any other applicant or recipient.  He is best able to use these services … if the 
administrative machinery and practice allow for consideration of individual need and 
individual treatment.”
fare 
ices 
ain conflicts and confusion” and provided provincial 
welfare w 
s, 
 
e 
co-operation between Dominion and Provincial officials, to bring about the future 
44  Although the statement essentially affirmed what was already 
provincial policy under the terms of the BC Residence and Responsibility Act, it was 
significant in that it clarified “cert
 for urbanized Indians.  Rates of Indian urbanization had begun to rapidly gro
during this time.45   
As previously noted, early post-war integrationist measures in BC were largely 
the product of negotiations carried out by specific federal and provincial executive 
agencies.  The convening of senior-level political discussions to examine Indian affair
however, had been advocated as early as 1948.  The final report of the SJC issued that 
year called for Indian affairs to be discussed at the next Dominion-provincial conference
since “There are certain aspects of Indian Affairs administration which, perforce, requir
                                                 
44 Harry Hawthorn Fonds, Box 37 File 13, “A Statement of Policy on Social Assistance and Health to 
dians in British Columbia [n.d.].”  
ity Act stipulated that anyone residing in the province for one 
ear qualified for local public assistance on a 80-20 provincial-municipal basis.  Hawthorn, Belshaw, 
In
 
45 Ibid.  The BC Residence and Responsibil
y
Jamieson, The Indians of British Columbia, 395. 
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 economic assimilation of Indians into the body politic of Canada.”46  As with most of
SJC’s recommendations, the proposal was never implemented in subsequent years.  
Indian affairs were not discussed at a following January 1950 Dominion-provincial 
conference, likely since a new Indian Act was forthcoming.  Even after the 1951 Indian 
Act’s passage, the IAB attempted to have Indian affairs placed
 the 
 on the agenda of federal-
provinc , the 
0s.  In 
are 
f 
pment 
 
ial discussions only to fail in 1955, 1957, and 1958.47  Like the SJC before it
JC unsuccessfully advocated that intergovernmental discussions take place regarding 
Indian administrative matters.48   
With provincial integration proceeding rapidly in the areas of education and 
health, calls for first ministerial discussions on Indian welfare continued in the 195
March 1954, the BC Indian Arts and Welfare Society advocated an Indian parley between 
Dominion and provincial officials to address the “appalling” present health and welf
condition of Indians.49  By 1963, even BC officials began advocating the initiation o
federal-provincial discussions to improve Indian social and economic underdevelo
on reserves.  That May, provincial Deputy Secretary L.J. Wallace notified Favreau of a
BC Indian Advisory Committee recommendation that Indian affairs be the subject of a 
                                                 
46 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons Appointed to Examine and 
onsider the Indian Act, Fourth Report [final report] (22 June 1948). 
 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “K.W. Taylor to Laval Fortier, 
. 1, “K.D. Fulton to 
onald Fleming, October 8, 1957”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, 
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ctober 5, 1955”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt
“H.M. Jones to Deputy Minister, 22 September 1958.” 
 
48 Canada, Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Indian Affairs, Report to the Senate
and House of Commons, 8 July 1961, 617. 
 
49 Victoria Daily Times, 11 March 1954, “Dominion-Provincial Indian Parley Wanted,” 24. 
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 Dominion-provincial conference.50  In March 1964, the Advisory Committee passed 
another resolution further recommending that “negotiations be continued with the Indian 
Affairs
der 
 
al-
net 
                                                
 Branch with the aim to extending Provincial Government Welfare services to 
Indians living on the Indian reserves at the same levels as those received by non-Indians 
living in British Columbia”51  
  The 1963 change of federal government brought new means to act on such 
demands.52  Noted in Chapter Four, the return to power of the federal Liberals un
Pearson instigated sweeping personnel and policy changes, and the formulation of more
systematic approaches to dealings with the provinces.  In 1964, for example, Pearson 
restructured and empowered the cabinet committee system in hopes of improving 
administrative efficiency and government coordination.  He also established a Feder
Provincial Affairs Division within the cabinet secretariat charged with formalizing 
contacts with lower government.53  Changes taking place within the Department of 
Citizenship and Immigration further reflected the new impetus on administrative 
integration.  1963 saw the Department of Citizenship and Immigration receive cabi
approval to pursue the Community Development Program; one year later Indian Affairs 
Branch commissioned Hawthorn to undertake a second national Indian survey, of which 
 
 BCA GR-1661 Box 36 File 7, “L.J. Wallace to Guy Favreau, 8 May 1963.” 
le 44, “L.J. Wallace to E.R. Rickinson, 24 March, 1964.” 
cle during which the basic tenets of Canadian Indian policy were reviewed, evaluated, and recast 
long historically familiar lines.”  John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?: The 
n 
. 4 (1971), 490, 494, 497. 
50
 
51 BCA GR-0128 Box 5 Fi
 
52 John Leslie suggests that 1963 brought an end to prior policy discussions and “the end of a twenty year 
policy cy
a
Development of Canadian Indian Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD Dissertation, Carlton University, 1999), 406. 
 
53 Gordon Robertson, “The Changing Role of the Privy Council Office,” Canadian Public Administratio
Vol. 14 No
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 three entire chapters considered the matter of federal-provincial relations.  The convenin
of a federal-provincial conference on Indian affairs was rooted in this era of reform. 
Fifteen years after the SJC made its initial recommendation, Indian affairs was 
discussed as part of the proceedings of the federal-provincial conference held Novemb
26-29, 1963.
g 
er 
er the 
uced 
 of 
ces on reserves.  Under the framework, provinces were expected 
to make
 
“in 
the long run, the formula enables the Federal Government to extricate itself from rapidly 
                                                                                                                                                
54  Guy Favreau, appointed Minister of Citizenship and Immigration aft
April 1963 election,55 spoke about the need for “economic emancipation” of the Indian 
and lower governments’ constitutional responsibility for services such as health, 
education, welfare, and roads.  Favreau added that “it has become clear that significant 
progress in the future depends upon extension of provincial services to Indians and to 
Indian communities in the provinces.”  At the event, the federal government introd
what would be the first of several cost-sharing formulas to finance the extension
provincial welfare servi
 welfare cost contributions to Indians modeled on non-Indian rates.  Differences 
between Native and non-Native per capita relief rates were to be paid out by the federal
government.56  While this meant that federal contributions to the provinces would 
constitute the majority of Indian welfare costs, delegates immediately observed that 
 
f 
nterim period starting August 
eral Provincial Conference, 
1-2;  BCA GR-0135 Box 7 
lfare, 18 September 
 
54 Sally M. Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-70 (Toronto: University o
Toronto Press, 1981), 27. 
 
5 Richard A. Bell replaced Ellen Fairclough as Minister in the eight month i5
1962. 
 
56 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Fed
ppendix B, Formula for Extension of Provincial Welfare Services to Indians,” A
File 97, “Application of the Federal Formula for Cost-Sharing of Indian Social We
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 increasing welfare costs.”  This federal extrication was to occur once differences in the 
per capita relief rates diminished over time, as a result of Indian community developm
and economic improvement schemes.
ent 
 to 
n 
l 
 
 
arch 1964, L.L. Brown, appointed from the Agencies Division to 
      
57  The supposed inducement for the provinces
partake was the promise that their per diem welfare expenditures would never exceed 
those paid to non-Indians.  With the exception of Ontario, this proposal, along with 
several subsequent ones modeled on similar terms, met with provincial rejection during 
and after the 1964 conference.  At 1963, however, IAB officials were hopeful and 
Favreau concluded his remarks by professing a desire for provincial cooperation, India
consultation, and the signing of immediate agreements between the federal and provincia
authorities on general principles and objectives.58  It was agreed that a subsequent 
conference, this time specifically devoted to Indian affairs, would take place in 
forthcoming months.   
The promised conference, however, faced months of delays and challenges.  An
initially-planned May meeting date was pushed back for several months as scheduling 
and the setting of the agenda proved more difficult for federal officials than initially
estimated.59  In M
                                                                                                                                           
ry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 1, “Federal Provincial Conference, 
ppendix B, Formula for Extension of Provincial Welfare Services to Indians,” 3; LAC, RG 10 Central 
 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 2, “Remarks to Federal-Provincial 
ndian Affairs Item,” 3-5; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 
, “Federal-Provincial Conference Re Indian Affairs: A Working Paper,” 1. 
0 May 1964.” 
 
57 LAC, RG 10 Central Regist
A
Registry Series, Vol.13867, File 1/42-2, Pt. 2.2, “Indian Welfare Services.” 
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59 BCA GR-0128 Box 5 File 43, “Rene Tremblay to W.D. Black, 2
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 tempor to 
 
sent 
tation 
 
, 
t that they were farther ahead of the “more backward” provinces 
when it
                                                
ary Chief of the Federal-Provincial Relations Division,60 visited various capitals 
meet with provincial officers and to discuss agenda details.  Brown’s notes for these 
meetings provide interesting insights into provincial perspectives leading up to the
conference.  In Manitoba, Brown met with provincial officials and noted their dis
over the Community Development Program and, more generally, the lack of consul
with the province regarding the creation of new program areas.61  Unlike the “somewhat 
frosty” reception in Manitoba, Brown described meetings with Saskatchewan and Alberta 
representatives as “friendly” and “most pleasant.”62  Although Alberta, like Manitoba 
offered little comment on the agenda, Saskatchewan did suggest it would make specific
proposals at the conference and entertain bilateral agreements.  Lastly, in Victoria Brown 
met with BC Indian Commissioner J.V. Boys, Deputy Attorney General G.D. Kennedy
and Deputy Minister of Social Welfare E.R. Rickinson.  Brown described officials as 
holding the viewpoin
 came to Indian integration.  Provincial officials described time being best spent 
“getting down to brass tacks” and working towards more collaboration in specific 
program fields.63 
 
All 
s of Indian 
ffairs Branch, 24 March 1964,” 2-3. 
, 5. 
ctor, Indian Affairs Branch, 24 March 1964,” 7. 
60 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13866, File 1/42-1, Part 1.1, “R.F. Battle, Director to 
Officials, Headquarters, Indian Commissioner of BC, Regional Superintendents, Superintendent
Agencies, 24 January 1964.” 
 
61 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13866, File 1/42-1, Part 1.1, “Chief, Federal-Provincial 
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62 Ibid., 2
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 As Brown’s correspondence notes leading up to the October conference reveal, 
provincial attitudes varied widely regarding what needed to be discussed and how.  With
regard to the cost-sharing proposal, the IAB’s summary of discussions classified 
Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island as having a 
favourable attitude; Alberta and BC, however, rejected in principle any provincial 
expense for Indian welfare.
 
s 
le to solicit provincial feedback on the proposed agenda.66  
Even th ncial 
if to negotiate at all. 
Aboriginal people had been increasingly involved in policy discussions since the 
 
64  Subsequent federal and provincial meetings leading up to 
the conference further revealed differences among lower governments regarding interest
and even desires to participate.65  As late as October, two weeks prior to the actual event, 
the IAB continued to strugg
ough T.L Bonnah described relations at that time between the Federal-Provi
Relations Division and various provincial Departments as “most cordial,”67 it became 
apparent early on that most provinces preferred to negotiate on their own specific terms, 
1940s, partaking, albeit on a limited scale, in the proceedings of the two prior joint 
committees.  No provision, however, was made to solicit Indian sanction, participation,
                                                 
64 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Summary: Federal-
Provincial Discussions on Welfare Programs and Community Development during August and 
September.”  The positions of the remaining provinces, with the exception of Ontario, were not stated. 
-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Memorandum to the Deputy 
inister, 21 October 1964.” 
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66 Ibid. 
 
67 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8572, File 1/1-2-2-8, Pt. 2, “T.L. Bonnah to Branch Directo
28 April 1964.” 
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 or opinion surrounding the 1964 conference.68  At the event, several provinces criticize
the exclusion of Aboriginal people, including Ontario, who unsuccessfully attempted to 
include Elliot Moses, a member of the Six Nations band, in their delegation.
d 
blay 
d the 
 federal-provincial conference on Indian Affairs took place in 
Ottawa tary, 
“both a nistration in 
69  Trem
explained the absence of Indian participation as a result of time restrictions, a lack of 
adequate machinery, the high number of bands, inter-tribal jealousies, and language and 
cultural barriers.70  Those Aboriginal people even aware of the conference taking place 
condemned their exclusion.  Kahnawake Kahn-Tineta Horn, for example, criticize
government for conducting the proceedings “without the presence and observations of the 
human beings involved.”71 
The first ever
 on October 29-30, 1964.  It was, as Tremblay stated in his opening commen
n historic and auspicious occasion in the annals of Indian affairs admi
                                                 
68 Tremblay did circulate two letters to bands immediately prior to the conference notifying them of 
ongoing intergovernmental discussions.  Given so little notice, bands were unable to respond or take action 
in time for the event.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “R.F. 
Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Open Letter to Chiefs and Councilors of Indian Bands, 19 October 
 
69 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.3, Memorandum to the Deputy
Battle, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, October 16, 1964”; LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, 
1964.” 
 
Minister, 27 October 1964.”; DIANDL, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs 
Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs, Report of Proceedings  (Ottawa: Indian Affairs 
ards people such as 
e Iroquois.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “Kahn-Tineta 
ear Transfer 
 Old Enemy.”  Globe and Mail, 31 October 1964, “Quebec Iroquois Fear Transfer to Old Enemy,” in 
, 'Enough to Keep Them Alive’, 320 f.n. 199. 
Branch, 1964), 17-18. 
 
70 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 16. 
 
71 Horn added that the Province of Quebec had no historical obligations or affinities tow
th
Horn to Rene Tremblay, October 3, 1964.”  The Globe and Mail reported, “Quebec Iroquois F
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 Canada.”72  Tremblay’s opening speech affirmed the federal view of the conference’s 
core purpose: to probe the possibilities for provincial cooperation in Indian administrativ
devolution.
e 
s 
 
the Federal Government is seeking to transfer to the provinces the 
British North America Act.  It is simply a proposal that envisages local 
d 
provincial policies.  
Brief statements from the provinces followed, and it became immediately apparent that 
significance differences in opinion among the provinces had not dissipated in the lead up 
to the event.  Quebec and Saskatchewan, for instance, noted their readiness to extend a 
range of specific services to Indians on the same basis as non-Natives; New Brunswick 
73  He told the provinces that although Indians had a legal-constitutional 
relationship with the federal government, this did not mitigate the fact that the provinces 
owed administrative obligations to both on- and off-reserve Indians.  “Indians are citizen
of the Provinces,” Tremblay insisted, “not legal wards of the Federal Government as it is 
popularly believed.”  He further reminded provincial delegates that Indians were 
important contributors to the general tax revenue of the provinces and that administrative 
devolution was not akin to a federal shirking of its legal and constitutional obligations to
Indians.  He noted:  
This proposal should not, and must not, be interpreted as an indication that 
jurisdiction over Indians and the lands of Indians, vested in it by the 
services as the best instrument for implementing correlation of federal an
74
 
                                                 
72 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, “Appendix D: Opening Remarks and Speech
made by Hon. R. Tremblay, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, at the Federal-Provincial Conference
on Indian Affairs Ottawa, October 29 and 30, 1964,” (Ottawa: Indian Aff
 
 
airs Branch, 1964).  The Report of 
following analysis is based on the Report and 
ing up to the conference. 
Proceedings is an incomplete record of the proceedings.  The 
draft remarks circulated within the IAB in the two weeks lead
 
73 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, “Appendix D: Opening Remarks.” 
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 and British Columbia provided no formal submission but orally agreed in principle with 
the idea of integrated administration.  The remaining provinces ranged in their response 
to the federal proposal.  Manitoba’s Minister of Welfare, J.B. Carroll, bluntly stated “we 
see no value in merely substituting provincial services for federal service. … Our e
should be more constructively directed towards broad social, economic and education
programs designed to solve the basic and fundamental problems of these people.”
fforts 
al 
nister 
t 
ns different from those of the Indian.”77 
rlier 
                                                
75  
Nova Scotia and Alberta refused to accept Tremblay’s drawing of a distinction between 
constitutional, legal, and administrative rights.  Jems W. Harding, Nova Scotia’s Mi
of Public Works, reminded Tremblay that under the B.N.A. Act the federal governmen
“was in a position whereby it must sell the idea of extension of services to the 
Provinces.”76  Alberta was another hard sell.  While Alberta’s delegates apparently 
endorsed the idea of Indian provincial citizenry, their brief stated that “Our position is 
based on the further belief that so long as the Indian occupies a special position 
constitutionally and legally he cannot at the same time occupy the position of the 
ordinary citizen who has obligatio
The designation of an appropriate strategy to devolve administrative services was 
one, if not the most, important goal of the conference.  Initially, the report of the ea
 
 DIANDL, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, “Appendix G: Statement 
ffairs, Report of Proceedings  (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1964).  
 DIANDL, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, “Appendix I: A Brief to 
fairs, Report of Proceedings  (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 
75
of Manitoba’s Viewpoint Regarding Proposals of the Federal Government to the Federal Provincial 
Conference on Indian Affairs, October 29 and 30, 1964,” in Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian 
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 1963 sub-committee recommended a comprehensive approach to devolution as the
expedient means by which to satisfy the administrative, financial, and tax requirem
provincial devolution.
 most 
ents of 
n 
vealed that a piecemeal approach offered higher 
possibi son 
et al. no
pproach for Indians fearing major changes.   Not all provinces, however, shared the 
department’s decided preference for a function-by-function protocol.  Most provinces 
agreed on the need for federal-provincial coordinating committees and the negotiation of 
province-specific agreements; Alberta, Quebec, and Saskatchewan delegates favoured 
more a comprehensive strategy.  During preliminary talks it became starkly evident that 
federal officials were unprepared to moderate debate, let alone offer single solutions 
satisfactory to every province.  
Deliberations on the subjects of welfare and community development received the 
lengthiest attention at the conference.  These discussions revealed that again, few 
                                                                                                                                                
78  Sometime between 1963 and October 1964, however, the 
federal government reverted to its long-established preference for a function-by-functio
approach.  This was most likely a decision of necessity rather than choice.  Brown’s 
earlier discussions with the provinces re
lity for success than an overall, or lump sum transfer.  Furthermore, as Ander
te, many believed that a function-by-function model was a less threatening 
79a
80
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 provinc
nity to assert the inadequacy of 
ms 
fac
nature.  
ne kind or another, 
dult education, good health services and so on.  
BC’s Black declared the federal proposals indicative of a federal intention to divest itself 
of responsibility for Indian affairs.  The Provincial Secretary stated that the single most 
imp nce was in “the area of financial 
resp  Indian 
affai BC were already quarreling about the 
increasing costs of welfare and the possibility that Indian welfare would be added to the 
pro rovince’s 
ian 
affai
                                                
ial delegates shared synonymous views.  Brief introductory comments by 
Tremblay and Dr. J. Willard, the federal Deputy Minister of Welfare, gave way to 
contrasting views, numerous digressions, and disjointed declarations by participating 
provinces.  Alberta and Manitoba took the first opportu
the federal government’s welfare proposals to resolve the more fundamental proble
ing Indian people.81  Carroll noted: 
[C]ommunity development is not the only answer of a constructive 
Planning must go much further and include a wide range of promotional 
activities including economic development projects of o
82a
 
ortant point that must be decided at the confere
onsibility between the federal and provincial governments in connection with
rs.”83  According to Black, people in 
vincial tax burden.84  These concerns epitomized the main source of the p
obstinacy in the latter-1960s: fear of provincial assumption of any expense for Ind
rs. 
 
81 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 28. 
 
 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 32. 
82 Ibid., 28-29.  Ironically, the CDP implemented that same year, along with earlier economic development 
programming, would fail in part for precisely this reason. 
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 With negotiations already at a seeming impasse, the conference resumed the 
following day when provincial responsibilities for Indians were discussed.  In a brief 
outlining its position and provincial responsibilities, the federal government reiterated 
greater detail the main objectives stated the day prior: 
(1) To have the Provinces recognize that Federal jurisdiction over Indians 
the concept of an Indian as a citizen of the Province, to whom the 
(2) To have the Provinces agree that as a
in 
as effected by the British North America Act, is not inconsistent with 
Province has the same basic obligations as to its other citizens. 
pplied to the extension of 
provincial services to Indians, this concept implies that the Provinces 
 
Government as is popularly believed. 
exclusive legislative jurisdictional, rather than all-embracive, and is 
Province. 
inciple in other 
fields and extend services to Indians and Indian communities on the 
(f) That to deny any Provincial responsibility is to hold that the Indian is 
 
shall share in the cost of extending such services.85 
The brief went on to argue that the provinces held responsibility for Indians based on the 
following reasons: 
(a) Indians are citizens of the Provinces, not legal wards of the Federal 
(b) The jurisdiction over Indians vested in the Federal Government is an 
not inconsistent with the concept of the Indian as a citizen of the 
(c) Indians … contribute to the general revenue of the Provinces on the 
same basis as other citizens. 
(d) That through their sharing of costs with the Federal Government in 
the categorical pensions field, Provinces have recognized some 
responsibility for Indians. 
(e) That some Provinces have given recognition to the pr
same basis as to non-Indians and non-Indian communities. 
not a citizen of the province.86 
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 Never before had the federal government so frankly laid out its position regarding the 
desirability of provincial assumption of Indian administration.  Indians were not feder
wards, but rather, provincial citizens with all the sam
al 
e rights to provincial services as 
non-Ind l law 
 
 
brief 
by Federal legislation pertaining specifically to Indians. 
to Indians who have established residence off reserves, and (B) 
within the jurisdiction and capability of a Province.  
Absent from the federal brief was any confirmation of federal fiscal, legal, or historical 
obligation to Indians beyond that owed to ordinary citizens.  It is interesting to note that 
despite the federal government’s apparent desire to offload and share administrative 
responsibility for Indians, the Dominion seemed more intent than ever to limit the scope 
                                              
ians.  The federal position was shockingly disjointed vis-à-vis constitutiona
and the long history of federal wardship policies.  The accusatory tone of the brief was 
also undeniable.  It was provincial governments, not the Dominion, who were culpable
for denying Indians their rights of citizenship.   
If any of the provinces harboured doubt that the federal government was looking
to shirk its legal, historical, and jurisdictional responsibilities to Indians, the federal 
was proof confirmed.  Here was the federal government privileging an arbitrary 
interpretation of the B.N.A. Act and instructing the provinces to implement it.  The 
federal government, however, was not done.  The final part of the brief laid out Ottawa’s 
position on the desired scope and extent of provincial responsibility.  This included:  
(a) The only limitation to the scope should be those that may be imposed 
(b) Provincial responsibility should extend to (A) providing full services 
providing to Indians on reserves those services which normally fall 
87
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 of provincial responsibility.  Earlier joint education and health agreements struck in BC, 
for instance, required provincial statutory change and entailed the entire surrender of 
deral powers of oversight to the province. 
ly 
ssue 
 
es should be required to provide services to Indians on the 
same b
ials 
 
ces, 
barrage of negative provincial reactions, Tremblay retreated by asserting that “it was not 
reach complete and final agreement on any of 
fe
The federal proposals were noteworthy for their brazenness and provincial 
reactions could have been predicted based on the prior day’s discussions.  One can hard
imagine a more confrontational approach having been taken.  Divided during the first 
day’s proceedings, the provinces now had common ground to unite on: opposition to the 
federal brief.  Even those provinces previously amenable to devolution now took i
with the federal position.  Saskatchewan’s delegates, once prepared to discuss cost 
sharing specifics, now sided with Nova Scotia’s stance that Indians were legal and 
administrative wards of the federal government.  Saskatchewan’s Minister of Natural 
Resources, John Cuelenaere, stated that due to the B.N.A. Act, his government “could not
fully agree that the Provinc
asis as to other citizens.”88  Alberta’s Minister of Public Works, F.C. Colborne, 
previously interested in discussing comprehensive devolution, reminded federal offic
that Alberta was already assuming the costs of off-reserve Indians; the additional burden
of administering services to on-reserve residents was too much to ask.89  Other provin
including BC, apparently did not even respond to the federal brief.  Following this 
the intention of the Federal Government to 
                                                 
88 Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial Conference, 39-40. 
 
89 Ibid., 39. 
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 the topics, specifically on the matter of finance.”90  The conference concluded soon
following brief discussions of general and other miscellaneous matters.
 after 
ce 
s and to 
eral 
discuss  of 
 
was satisfied with what had been accomplished and that “the real beneficiaries would be 
the Indians themselves.”92 
For federal officials like Tremblay, however, the actual results of the conference 
could hardly be termed propitious.  The IAB’s representatives, after forestalling the 
ly 
91 
 
In many ways, the 1964 Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs was a 
remarkable event, undoubtedly both “historic and auspicious.”  For the first time sin
1867, the Dominion and the provinces met to specifically examine Indian affair
discuss alteration of the systemic relationship between Aboriginal people and the fed
government created by the B.N.A. Act.  Considering the lengthy history of failed 
attempts at such a conference, the assembling of most of the provinces at a table to 
 Indians was a significant accomplishment in itself.  In the IAB’s Report
Proceedings, Tremblay, with characteristic overstatement and boldness, stated that he
conference by several months, seemed unprepared entering the event.  They apparent
lacked any negotiation strategy beyond the uniform approval of their policies by the 
provinces.  Discussions remained general, unfocused, and divisive.  While the provinces 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 41-42. 
 
91 These included the subject of future federal-provincial conferences on Indian Affairs and new research 
projects.  Brief discussions on legislation, namely the Indian Claims Commission Bill and the Indian
also took place. 
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 agreed in principle on proposals for integrated education, cost-sharing community 
development programming, and on “the fundamental need to consult Indians and to 
involve ments 
were st orks, cost-
sharing ven 
disagre
confere dian welfare subsequently were 
 Consultations with Indians 
also be isory councils.94 
confere  that 
 them at the planning stage in matters of interest to them,” no formal agree
ruck.93  The most important areas of discussion—negotiating framew
, and Indian welfare—produced no overall consensus.  The provinces e
ed on whether future conferences were needed or desirable.  No further 
nce was planned and matters pertaining to In
delegated to specific coordinating committees on welfare. 
gan shortly after via the 1965 establishment of regional Indian adv
BC officials in particular were less than impressed by the results of the 
nce.  One month after the event, Black told the BC Advisory Committee
                                                 
 Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1964-65, 25.  See also Indian Affairs Branch, Federal-Provincial 
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94 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.13867, File 1/42-2, Pt. 3.1, “Agreement Format – Welfare 
Programs.”; LAC
Committee, 
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Request to the Honourable the Treasury Board, 9 August 1965.” 
, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.13867, File 1/42-2, Pt. 3.1, “Co-ordinating 
9 August, 1964.”  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 2, “Record of 
Achievement in Indian Affairs – 1965.”  In 1965 eight regional committees were established in the 
following areas: the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and 
the Yukon and Mackenzie District.  The committees were composed of eight to twelve members elected by 
al Indian 
re to 
rve a three year term.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, 
 
roposed Regional Indian Advisory Committee,” in Federal-Provincial Conference on Indian Affairs, 
the bands of various regions.  Matters raised by these councils were to be forwarded onto a Nation
Advisory Board, composed of eighteen Indians elected by regional members.  This national board 
coordinated recommendations to be sent to the appropriate political offices.  All council members we
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DIANDL, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, “Appendix K: Details of
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Report of Proceedings (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1964). 
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 “close   A 
the good he [Tremblay] and the conference did.   Large amounts of 
approval on the last day of the conference had already been released to the 
little of the implications of handing the responsibilities for Indian affairs 
And despite all the suggestions from the provinces, it was clear that 
 
Provincial conference come with different points of view and with 
Wesley Black expected would be achieved at our recent conference.  … In 
nference would reach firm 
decisions on most matters.  … and we saw it as basically providing an 
faced in extending provincial services to Indian reserves.  From our point 
 
nge of 
to nothing” came of it and “there was nothing too constructive discussed.”95
Province reporter also quoted Black as stating that, upon his return to BC: 
[I] might have well have … stayed at home and cut out paper dolls for all 
Federal arrogance were on display.  The press release brought in for 
press the night before.  The federal Government seemed to know very 
over the provinces, and hadn’t taken the trouble to make much of a study.  
Ottawa wasn’t changing its thinking a bit.96 
Tremblay responded to Black’s comments by explaining: 
It is, of course, to be expected that delegates attending a Federal-
different hopes and expectations.  … I am not at all sure what the Hon. 
fact, it was not anticipated by us that the Co
opportunity for frank discussion of the problems that would have to be 
of view, useful discussions took place on both aspects.97 
Federal and BC officials could not even agree over their interpretation of the results of 
the conference, let alone specifics regarding cost and jurisdictional sharing of 
responsibility for Indian affairs.  If anything, the conference underscored the challe
restructuring Indian affairs administration amid deteriorating 1960s executive federalist 
relations. 
                                                 
95 BCA GR-0285 Box 8 File 6, “Meeting of BC Advisory Committee, New Westminster, BC, 16 
November 1964.”  Some provinces called for future ministerial discussions including officials while others 
preferred greater attention towards the striking of specific agreements in areas of service delivery.   
 
96 LAC RG10 Vol. 1350 File 901/1-2-2-4 Vol 1, “R. J Perrault to Rene Tremblay, 9 November 1964.” 
2-4 Vol 1, “Rene Tremblay to R. J Perrault, 17 November 1964.” 
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 Tremblay might have been correct in suggesting that conference clarified 
provincial stances and key areas of concern.  However, one can only wonder why this 
was done through such confrontational means and at the cost of creating considerable 
provincial alienation and distrust of the federal government.  Realizing that the possib
for a nation-wide welfare agreement was nil, the IAB reverted back to more province- 
and policy-specific negotiating strategies after 1964, holding out that “more purposeful 
discussions” might still take place.  Federal responsibility for continuing negotiations 
gradually shifted from senior departmental ranks to branch regional level and regiona
superintendents who were instructed to assume more provincial liaison responsibilities.
ility 
l 
  
e 
premiers encouraging the principle of provincial Indian welfare administration.  The 
brief, like Tremblay’s opening comments, affirmed the overall goal of equality of 
opportunity for Indians and reminded first ministers that Indians, as voting and taxpaying 
t the Indian reserve as an integral part of the provincial 
                                              
98
Federal devolutionist strategy, in many ways, had come full circle to resemble the 
negotiating protocols of the late-1940s and 1950s. 
In the meantime, pressures for greater provincial involvement in Indian welfar
from social advocacy organizations, Aboriginal groups, and social scientists continued.  
Just before the conference, the Indian-Eskimo Association submitted a brief to provincial 
citizens of the provinces, deserved those services and treatments afforded to non-Indians: 
“The Province should accep
   
f 
ent, 23 December 1965.” 
98 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol.13867, File 1/42-2, Pt. 3.2, “J.W. Churchman to Director o
Developm
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 community for services.”99  BC Aboriginal people also continued to press for a 
provincial takeover of Indian welfare.  In December 1967, the Southern Vancouver Island 
Tribal F
ial 
sion 
Like 
 
 that 
 
ederation delivered a brief to the federal minister of Indian Affairs and the 
provincial minister of Social Welfare criticizing the effectiveness of government soc
welfare measures to alleviate BC Indian poverty.  The brief stated that “Where provi
is made for extending such services, they are too often poorly planned, implemented with 
widely varying competence and effectiveness, and usually highly paternalistic.”100  
the IEA report, it described the splitting of welfare jurisdiction between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal people as “grossly discriminating toward a group of people, all of whom
pay provincial taxes and are residents of the province.”101  The federation also noted that 
the federal/provincial division of responsibility for Indian welfare was not clear and
“much ‘buck-passing’ and confusion inevitably results.”102  The most public call for 
expedition of the slow progress of devolutionist discussions in welfare, however, came in
Hawthorn’s 1966 report.  Hawthorn noted how “Indians have consistently received 
                                                 
 LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.2, “A Memorandum to 
Provincial Premiers Expressing the Views of the Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada, 14 October 1964.
99
” 
See also LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 13831, File 1/1-2-2-8-1, Pt. 3.3, “Rene Tremblay to 
W.H. Clark, 3 November 1964.” 
 
 Tribal Federation to the 
onourable Arthur Laing Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Government of Canada 
67.” 
” 
100 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “Presentation by the Southern Vancouver Island
H
and to the Honourable Dan Campbell Minister of Social Welfare, Government of British Columbia, 
December 19
 
101 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 95, “Presentation by the Southern Vancouver Island Tribal Federation.
102 Ibid. 
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 different and in most cases inferior welfare services to those provided to non-Indians,” 
and recommended that provincial welfare services be extended to all Indians.103 
Bilateral discussions between the federal government and the provinces continued 
in the two years following the 1964 conference.  In line with the main thrust of the 
conference, the federal government drafted another comprehensive welfare-sharing 
agreement.  Ontario, however, was the only province to sign any further contract with t
federal government pertaining to Indian welfare; all other provinces raised various 
objections.
he 
pears to have been in regards 
to cost.
or 
 far 
ajority 
104  The main source of provincial reluctance ap
  The financial formula proposed at the time, according to Anderson et al., was 
modeled on the idea that the Indians were a “high cost” group and that these exceptional 
costs should be covered by federal contributions.  Under the proposal the costs f
Indians would again be shared, with the federal government picking up all costs above 
the average non-Indian per capita amount.  Since Indian rates of welfare dependency
exceeded those of non-Indians, the federal government still stood to pay the vast m
of the actual costs.105   
 As noted by officials at the earlier 1963 meeting, two principles underpinned the 
cost-sharing proposal.  First was the assumption that as the socio-economic status of 
Indians improved via economic development initiatives, Indian welfare per capita costs 
                                                 
103 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 315, 338. 
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104 See Anderson et al, “Recent Evolution of Canada's Indian Policy,” 527; Shewell, 'Enough to Keep Them 
Alive’, 319. 
 
10  Anderson et. al. estimates that the federal government would have paid 97% of the costs in most 
program sectors.  Anderson et al, “Recent Evolution of Canada's Indian Policy,” 525. 
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 would eventually go down in relation to non-Indian rates.  Second, it was predicted t
as this occurred the provincial cost share would increase.  As subsequent events 
demonstrated, later renditions of the 1963 cost-sharing proposal were no less abhorren
officials who never wavered in their demands that the federal government assume 100% 
of the costs associated with Indian welfare.  At the 1964 conference, BC’s delegates ha
hat 
in BC 
t to 
d 
already
ve 
 
titled to all of the national building programs that are involved and it is 
only a q
.  
One month on the heels of Pearson’s letter, Victoria Daily Colonist and Vancouver Sun 
 rejected the federal suggestion that the provinces should, regarding on-reserve 
Indians receiving provincial services, “contribute at least that share of cost that it would 
incur if the recipients of the service were non-Indian.”106 
Intergovernmental discussions continued to take place and, for a brief period at 
least, it appeared as though the federal and provincial delegates might indeed finally ha
been “getting down to brass tacks.”  A federal progress report from 1965 noted 
favourable ongoing discussions with several provinces, and less than one year after the
conference, Dan Campbell, the BC minister for both Social Welfare and Municipal 
Affairs, announced that provincial jurisdiction would benefit Indians, noting that 
“[Indians are] en
uestion of federal-provincial co-operation in transferring jurisdiction.”107  Later 
that year, Prime Minister Pearson sent a personal letter to Premier Bennett encouraging 
continued cooperation in the areas of integrated welfare and community development
                                                 
106 DIANDL, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, “Appendix M: Financing, 
ncluding Consideration of the Scope ai nd Extent of Provincial Responsibilities,” in Federal-Provincial 
nch, 1964). 
7 Victoria Daily Colonist, 6 November 1965, “Provincial Jurisdiction ‘Would Benefit Indians’,” 12; 
Vancouver Sun, 8 November 1965, “BC Jurisdiction Needed for Indians, Says Campbell,” 13. 
Conference on Indian Affairs, Report of Proceedings (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Bra
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 articles reported Black and Attorney General Robert Bonner as announcing that the 
province was negotiating a welfare pact with the federal government to provide 
integrated community and welfare services to Indians.108  Frank Calder, the Nishga’a 
MLA for Atlin, concurred with the trend and continued his urging of the BC governmen
to wrest control of Indian affairs from Ottawa, starting with welfare and education.
t 
  
Reflecting on the 1965 harmonization, Shewell contends that it marked the climax 
of devolutionary talks, a victory for integrationist and terminationist designs.  He notes 
how the change marked an abdication of federal direct control over social assistance 
                                 
109 
Whether or not the province was actually interested in continuing talks by that 
time is unclear, but federal officials seemed to believe the rhetoric coming from Victoria.
Convinced that a welfare agreement with the province was still obtainable, the IAB took 
perhaps its greatest step yet toward harmonization with provincial welfare services when 
it adopted provincial welfare rates of assistance and eligibility conditions.  Provincial 
Social Welfare Department officials had been calling for such measures since at least 
January 1964 when they began noticing that Indians were moving off-reserve to take 
advantage of the threefold higher welfare rates paid by the province.110  It remains 
unclear if or how enforcement of the twelve-month residency requirement prevented this 
from occurring. 
                                                                                                                
. Pearson to W.A.C. Bennett, 25 November 
”; Victoria Daily Colonist, 16 December 1965, “Welfare Pact Started,” 32; Vancouver Sun, 12 January 
un, 4 February 1966, “MLA Suggests Indian Takeover,” 13. 
 
108 LAC RG10 Vol. 13527 File 901/42-2 Vol. 2, “Lester B
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1966, “Provinces Study Indians,” 16. 
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 policy and procedures, and more generally, introduced a more complex, rationalized 
system for determining eligibility and benefits which was modeled on market-based 
system
t as an 
l 
 
ion of 
ber 
 
  
s of welfare eligibility.111  Closer examination of this development, as well as 
events subsequent to it, however, demands a more nuanced assessment.  First, the 1965 
harmonization was never intended as an end in itself.  Branch officials viewed i
interim measure taken in anticipation of total provincial assumption of Indian welfare.112  
Inter-department circulars and ongoing discussions with the provinces after 1965 revea
that federal officials hoped that lower governments would respond to the federal gesture
by extending their welfare services to on-reserve Indians.  Second, the equalizat
welfare payments with provincial rates entailed increases in federal welfare payments, 
and a step away from more frugal relief administration.  Between January and Octo
1965, BC’s welfare costs increased by 31% and enrolment rates grew by 23%.113  In its 
first year of implementation, the decision to harmonize welfare rates cost the federal 
government an additional $4 million.  While Indians affected by the change were subject 
to new eligibility requirements, the harmonization of welfare rates marked an increase in
                                                                                                                                               
ckinson to C.M. Isbister, 27 January, 1964.”  See also Victoria 
aily Colonist, 17 November 1964, “Increase Coming for Indians on Welfare,” 3. 
cting 
irector, Personnel Division.”; Victoria Daily Times, 14 November 1964, “Indians on Welfare will get 
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 federal-Indian administrative relations and a departure from earlier parsimonious fede
welfare policies.
ral 
been 
t 
sioner requested bands to 
“help c or face 
                                                
114 
Third, it remains unclear how widely the policy was even implemented.  Only 
those provinces with welfare rates above the federal scale, for instance, were affected.  
Quebec and the Maritimes were excluded from the arrangement since the IAB 
determined that provincial rates were lower than federal ones and “it would not have 
to the Indians’ advantage.”115  Even in those provinces affected, the policy appears to 
have been unevenly implemented.  With welfare rates on the rise, by 1967, one federal 
official, D.L. Clarke, was reported as stating that the branch had made a “gross 
underestimation” of the costs of delivering welfare at provincial rates.  Clarke added tha
this “made it very difficult to implement the policies of provincial welfare, as was 
included in the agreement.”116  Around that time, the Vancouver Sun reported a federal 
“Welfare Warning to Chiefs” in which the BC’s Indian Commis
ontrol a steady increase in welfare expenditures among the Indian people” 
resultant cuts in basic reserve infrastructure development.117  One year later, the branch 
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 “Memorandum to all Regional Directors, District Supervisors, and District, Municipal and 
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7 Vancouver Sun, 29 September 1967, “Chiefs Get Welfare Warning,” 33. 
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 did just that when Fraser Valley Indian welfare rates were reportedly slashed by fifty 
percent, provoking negative publicity and criticism.118   
If intended as a way to pique provincial interest in integrating its welfare po
to include Indians, the harmonization gesture failed.  Instead, the skyrocketing wel
costs and growing recipient rolls that resulted from the measure only exacerbated federal 
pressures to reach agreement with the province.  Within the year, IAB officials took 
additional steps to facilitate welfare devolution.  Realizing that Treasury Board approv
alone was legally insufficient for the federal government to enter into agreements with 
the provinces, the government attained Cabinet sanction to negotiate intergovern
agreements that December.
licies 
fare 
al 
mental 
f understanding and the adoption of a “phasing out formula” which would 
see the
                                                                                                                                                
119  A format for new agreements and cost-sharing formula 
was also referred to Treasury Board.120  The proposal consisted of the striking of a 
memorandum o
 province assume greater costs of administering welfare. 
Just as they rejected the principle of any new cost assumption at the 1964 
conference, BC officials found the federal proposal unacceptable.121  The province was 
 
o y, 
“during the peak employment summer.” Vancouver Sun, 2 August 1968, “Cut in Allowances to Indians 
Flayed,” 20.  
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1 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 96, “E.R. Rickinson, [untitled document], 31 August 1967.” 
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 becoming only more wary of federal motives in regards to Indian welfare devolution, and
apparently with valid reason.  Despite behaving to the contrary during and after the 
October conference proceedings, the IAB continued to maintain that its interest in 
welfare devolution was not indicative of a federal wish to abdicate or delegate its 
constitutional responsibilities to Indians.
 
for 
 
the 
 are going to reach an 
accord  
in 
s 
ear 
122  Although federal officials held on to hope 
immediate welfare agreements to be reached, even some within Ottawa were coming to
the realization that longer-term negotiations might be needed.123  In 1966, a statutory 
provision was proposed to incorporate the 1964 cost-sharing formula under Part II of 
Canada Assistance Plan, but never implemented.124  The next year, BC’s Indian 
Commissioner told Rickinson, “it does not appear likely that we
on terms for a Federal-Provincial Welfare Agreement in the Province of British
Columbia.”125 
As noted, the 1964 conference provided grounds for provincial solidarity 
opposition to the federal proposals.  Accordingly, into the latter 1960s, western provincial 
representatives began meeting amongst themselves to discuss matters relating to Indian
and Indian welfare.  In 1966, a Prairie Provinces Ministerial Conference on Government 
Matters Pertaining to the Affairs of Native People took place in Winnipeg.126  One y
                                                 
1965-66, 42. 
122 Canada, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 
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 later, senior officials from the welfare departments of the four western provinces me
discuss Indian matters.
t to 
ss 
nt 
nal interests prevented the reaching of 
consen ced great 
social a ent services 
were in ained that the federal government should bear 
l 
mittee on Indians also continued to meet 
after th
committee became further evident when its BC members drafted and released their own 
                                                                                                         
127  Another meeting, this time between the Deputy Ministers of 
Welfare for the four western provinces, took place in Regina one month later to discu
problems relating to on- and off-reserve Indians.128  Even though the federal governme
was not involved, differing provincial and regio
sus on fundamental issues.  While all provinces agreed that Indians fa
nd economic problems and that extant federal palliative and treatm
adequate, BC stubbornly maint
100% of the costs for palliative services for both on- and off-reserve Indians.  Provincia
attitudes had progressed little from earlier discussions in 1964. 
The Federal-Provincial Welfare Com
e conference, but, by the fall of 1967, it was becoming clear that the 
intergovernmental impasse and internal divisions were inhibiting its work.  At a 
Parksville meeting that October, the committee split over whether the federal government 
should pay the entirety of the costs of administering Indians under provincial offices.  
Even though the committee acknowledged the disruption caused to Indian families by the 
existence of separate policies, priorities, and budget considerations in welfare, most 
members rejected the federal government’s cost-sharing proposal.  Divisions within the 
                                        
eting, 27 October 
967,” 3. 
 GR-0135 Box 7 File 96, “Deputy Ministers’ Meeting, 6 November 1967.”  
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 alternative proposal, one advocating limited provincial involvement within federal 
devolution plans.129  By 1968, internal divisions and ambiguity over the committee’s role 
and function cemented any doubts about the ability of the committee to facilitate an 
agreement.  That year, N.S. Brooke, committee chair and supervisor of the BC
Assistance and Rehabilitation Division, stated: 
There is general frustration in the Committee with its role since it is 
extension of provincial services and in the case of welfare this is 
on a basis for cost-sharing.
 Social 
considered the integration of the Indian as a Canadian must involve 
stalemated by the inability of federal and provincial jurisdictions to agree 
 
ng 
 
edge to take over control of Indian affairs 
might b t’s 
r in 
 
130 
In May 1968, internal committee divisions prompted an unsuccessful motion from the 
Department of Social Welfare to suspend the committee’s activity until the committee’s 
purpose and function could be clarified.131 
Negotiations continued to degenerate into confusing sorties of political posturi
and finger-pointing, with both federal and provincial officials accusing the other of
hindering integration.  Bennett’s 1969 public pl
e best seen as one such example.  Even Campbell, who later defended Bennet
pledge as “a great deal of misunderstanding,” had told a Vancouver Sun reporter earlie
1965 that he supported provincial jurisdiction for Indians.  “Indians,” Campbell noted,
“are entitled to the same welfare conditions as anyone in the country … and it is only a 
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1968.” 
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 question of federal-provincial co-operation in transferring jurisdiction.”132  Politica
wrangling over who was culpable for the impasse appears to have confused even Indians 
and advocacy groups like the Indian-Eskimo Association.  Previously critical of the 
provinces for stalling social welfare reforms in its 1964 brief, the association 
subsequently began criticizing federal officials for the impasse.  In 1968, the association 
delivered a brief to Pearson urging the transfer of welfare, community development, a
educational services from the IAB to provincial and joint governmental organizat
Among those then advocating the brief’s recommendation in principle were Tsartlip 
Chief Philip Paul and East Saanich reserve Chief Edwin Underwood.  Paul sta
l 
nd 
ions.  
ted, “I’m 
very m
 is 
 
province was experiencing a Federal withdrawal from the Indian situation and that the 
uch concerned at the lack of provincial contributions towards services. … We pay 
taxes but get nothing in return from the provincial government towards services.  This
something which has to be settled.”133  Regardless of which level of government was 
ultimately to blame for the stalled negotiations, the bottom line was that a welfare 
agreement was unlikely to be reached in BC.   
The welfare impasse showed further signs of strain when provincial officials 
escalated their criticisms of federal devolution plans.  In 1967, Department of Social 
Welfare representatives commented that federal-provincial relations in Indian Affairs
should be limited to only urgent problems.  J.A. Sadler, the department’s assistant deputy 
minister, told an audience of other western senior provincial bureaucrats that “the 
                                                 
132 “BC Jurisdiction Needed for Indians, Says Campbell,” The Vancouver Sun, 8 November, 1965, 13; 
ancouver Sun, 24 March 1969, “BC InV
13
dian Affairs Branch Pledged by Bennett Denied,” 31. 
 
3 Victoria Daily Times, 1 February 1968, “Transfer of Indian Welfare Urged,” n.p. 
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 Federal Government was thereby silently requesting the province to assume these 
responsibilities.”134  Even those officials within the BC government previously a
at least publicly, to the principle of provincial involvement in Indian welfare, were lo
faith that an a
menable, 
sing 
greement might be forthcoming.  Campbell referred to Indian needs as “one 
of the m ent’s 
” 
solve 
r, 
ister 
respon  
 these 
for BC.  Unresolved, the matter was eventually referred to the then-dysfunctional 
ost serious problems in the province” before criticizing the federal governm
Indian welfare system as reducing the province to a “cheque dispensing apparatus.”  
C.W. Corby, the Social Welfare department’s director for Vancouver Island and 
mainland regions, stated that federal and provincial welfare authorities had a “long pull
ahead of them to integrate the Indian people with the rest of the province.”135 
Provincial suspicions that the federal government was secretly looking to ab
itself from Indian administration gained further substance in 1968 when two disputes 
arose between the province and the Dominion regarding Indian welfare costs.  That yea
the province attempted to recover $600,000 spent in the 1964-65 fiscal year for off-
reserve Indian welfare costs.  In March, Campbell wrote to Arthur Laing, the Min
sible for Indian affairs following the branch’s 1966 transfer to the Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, criticizing the federal refusal to provide
monies as “most unsatisfactory.”136  Laing responded by stating that the issue was a 
matter of misinterpretation and that it would be investigated by the Indian Commissioner 
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135 The Vancouver Sun, 26 January 1968, “Indians’ Problems ‘Unsolved’,” 13.  See also Daily Colon
une 1968, “Land FJ
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 Federal-Provincial Welfare Committee and later to the Federal-Provincial Coordinating 
Committee.137  The episode typified what American bureaucrat James H. Boren 
infamously stated in 1970 as a fundamental rule for bureaucrats: “When in trouble, 
delegate.”138 
Another dispute arose later in 1968 when the Indian Commissioner for BC 
refused to reimburse the province for $27,298 in overdue social allowance accounts
Although the reimbursement appeared owed under the terms of the 1963 federal-
provincial agreement, Boys inv
.139  
oked a six-month time limit for the processing of such 
claims have 
 
t 
agreement authorizing the extension of welfare services remained feasible.  The same 
                                                                        
and refused to provide back dated compensation.  Federal interests might 
prevailed in these disputes—evening the score when considering those provincial 
victories in earlier 1960s cost conflicts involving Indian health—but the victory carried a
political cost.  The conflicts exacerbated the impact of over a decade of failed welfare 
negotiations and served to further alienate provincial officials, who now were certain tha
federal devolutionary motives were primarily, if not entirely, financial in design. 
Remarkably, even with federal-provincial relations at both the department and 
committee level at a standstill by 1968, the IAB stubbornly clung to hopes that an 
year it was alienating the province by refusing to pay welfare back payments, the federal 
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 government drafted another “more generous” cost-sharing proposal for the extension o
provincial welfare for Indians living o
f 
n-reserve, but, with the federal government now 
offering serve, 
then as anada 
Assista of the proposed agreement, “the provincial 
educati d 
elfare agreement by 
the sam ting the 
negotia t pledge by 
Bennet ed 
       
 to pay 90% of the costs associated with extending welfare provision on re
 well as in projected coverage growth.140  N.F. Cragg, Director of the C
nce Plan, noted that under the terms 
contribution bears no relationship to the actual costs of providing assistance to the 
Indians under the agreement.”141  No evidence exists that the province ever seriously 
considered the new proposal. 
In February 1969, Boys reminded Rickinson that successes in integrated 
on in the earlier decade came via lengthy and successful prior negotiations, an
added that “there would be real value in attempting to approach a w
e methods.”142  By then, however, the province had little interest in revisi
tion strategies of the prior decade, and irrespective of any subsequen
t to the contrary.  For provincial officials such as Rickinson, all unresolv
administrative matters relating to Indian welfare were federal domain.143  The release of 
the White Paper that summer only confirmed provincial fears that the federal government 
                                                                                                                                          
osts. All 
expenses in excess of this were to be assumed by the federal government.  BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 94, 
“N.F. Cragg to E.R. Rickinson, 13 November 1968.” 
 
141 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 94, “N.F. Cragg to E.R. Rickinson, 13 November 1968.” 
 
142 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 98, “J.V. Boys to E.R. Rickinson, 21 February 1969.” 
97, “[untitled Department document] 31 August 1967.”; BCA GR-0145 
ox 7 File 97, “Federal-Provincial Indian Committee, Cowichan Project – Terms of Reference, 4 October 
 
140 Again, this agreement involved 50-50 cost sharing up to the amount equivalent to non-Indian c
 
143 See BCA GR-0145 Box 7 File 
B
1967.” 
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 had been plotting all along to offload cost and jurisdiction for Indian welfare onto the 
provinces.  The White Paper stated:  
Propose to the governments of the provinces that they take over the same 
provinces. The take-over would be accompanied by the transfer to the 
augmented as may be necessary.
responsibility for Indians that they have for other citizens in their 
provinces of federal funds normally provided for Indian programs, 
 
 in 
 
believe that they [federal officials] are deliberately working toward the 
situation which will present the Provinces with a fait accompli as to 
methods of organization within the Indian Affairs Branch are implying 
 
ng joint 
144 
For BC officials, the White Paper was not only confirmation of a federal conspiracy
regards to Indian welfare, but also an attempt to abrogate all prior joint agreements.  The
White Paper proposed to entrench the devolutionary principles first articulated at the 
1964 conference, principles then and thereafter unanimously rejected by the province. 
The BC reaction could have been easily anticipated.  A few months after the 
release of the policy statement, Campbell confided to the Premier: 
I 
programs we can share. … I strongly emphasize that the unilateral 
very substantial on-going commitments by Provincial Governments.145 
Campbell also rejected Boys’s earlier suggestion to revive prior methods of reachi
cost-sharing agreements with the federal government, stating: “I consider it extremely 
dangerous … for single Government Departments to unilaterally negotiate particular 
formula-sharing arrangements between the Federal Authority and the Provincial 
                                                 
144 Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the Government Of 
Canada On Indian Policy, 1969. 
 
145 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 98, “Dan Campbell to W.A.C. Bennett, 16 December 1969.” 
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 Authority, e.g., education.”146  Never before had the shift in provincial attitudes 
earlier decades been more apparent. 
The release of the White paper also spelled the ruin of the Federal-Provinci
Welfare Committee. 
from 
al 
 After months of stalemate, committee operations were finally 
suspend
 
ly 
II, 
g federal 
                                                
ed that December.  According to spokesperson A.W. Rippon, the committee’s 
provincial members prompted the suspension since they did “not consider that the 
Committee is the only method of solving these concerns.”  Rippon lamented that while 
the committee provided the ideal means to facilitate intergovernmental discussions, it 
could not function as long as the federal-provincial impasse continued.147  Ironically, the 
federal-provincial coordinating committees, the main mechanisms created to facilitate 
discussions, proved incapable of reconciling intergovernmental differences. 
 
Writing in 1966, Hawthorn described the activity of garnering provincial 
involvement in Indian welfare as a “glacial process.”148  It is a fitting metaphor when
considering intergovernmental relations after the 1964 conference.  Despite ear
successes in the extension of social welfare benefits to Indians in the decade after WW
the trend halted by the mid-1960s.  BC was an early pioneer in not only advancing the 
integration of Indian health and education, but also when it came to rebuffin
 
146 Ibid. 
 
147 BCA GR-0135 Box 7 File 98, “A.W. Rippon to E.R. Rickinson, 18 December 1969.”  Hawthorn 
generally described the operations of the coordinating committees as “fraught with exceptional difficulty.”  
dians, Volume One, 327. 
Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 350. 
 
148 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary In
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 devolution offers regarding Indian welfare.  The history of failed attempts at an 
integration of Indian welfare services underscores how provincial interest in Indians 
varied from policy to policy, period to period.  No singular or steadfast provincial 
perspective existed. 
Why was Indian welfare such a great cause of intergovernmental impasse in BC?  
Several factors and developments unique to the 1960s appear to have had a significan
influence on provincial attitudes and actions.  Liberal-democratic discourse and popular 
desires to grant Indians administrative equality exerted less force in welfare than in other 
areas such as health and education.  Stereotypical ideas about Indians as indolent, welfare
dependent, and lacking work ethics and thrift persevered well into post-war decad
t 
 
es.  As 
John Lu
 
Indian self-sufficiency justified or required minimalist welfare provision.   
IAB officials lacked any long-term plan to remedy ongoing Aboriginal economic 
g prior to the devolutionary 
tz, Hugh Shewell, and Helen Buckley note in their studies of Indian welfare in 
Canada, racist ideas about “Indians” have a long genealogy stretching back to the
nineteenth century.  Many non-Indians sympathized with the plight of Indians and 
detested the IAB’s long-established frugal welfare policies but negative popular and 
political attitudes about Indians and welfare remained resilient amid post-war 
integrationist years, particularly under the Bennett Social Credit government.149  Both 
provincial and federal officials appear to have subscribed to the notion that the goal of 
marginalization, something the province likely realized lon
                                                 
149 See Victoria Daily Colonist, March 1954, ”Officials Can’t Help Widow: Can Eight Survive on $55?
House of Commons, Debates, 14 December 1963, 5905-5906.  See also Hawthorn, A Survey of 
Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 334. 
” 3; 
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 talks of the mid-1960s.  Federal officials consistently viewed Indian welfare on a 
temporary and ad-hoc basis, and, just like those previously examined areas of education, 
health, neglect.  
As She
assimil .   If the 
province ever seriously considered assuming control of welfare as contingent on the 
implementation of effective economic development programming, federal programs did 
little to instill provincial confidence.  Hawthorn explained this in his 1966 report: “In the 
absence of a detailed and comprehensive policy position there was no basis for intensive 
negotiations with the provinces in search of mutually-satisfactory agreements.  
The general deterioration of federal-BC relations that occurred in the 1960s also 
impeded progress in the area of Indian welfare devolution.  Although executive 
federalism is often discussed within the context of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, BC 
experienced its own alienation from Ottawa in the 1960s.  Escalating intergovernmental 
conflict over the Canada-US Columbia River Treaty, the creation of a provincial bank, 
federal transfer payments, and taxation arrangements influenced all BC-federal 
discussions in that decade.   That disputation over the costs of Indian welfare would 
and economic development, such attitudes justified ongoing policies of 
well notes, welfare administration was seen as serving finite objectives: 
ation and the transformation of Indians into independent wage labourers 150
151
152
                                                 
150 Shewell, 'Enough to Keep Them Alive’, 328. 
 
115  Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 334. 
iversity of Toronto Press, 1989), 222-223. 
 
152 See Paddy Sherman, Bennett (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), 297; Philip Resnick, The 
Politics of Resentment: British Columbia Regionalism and Canadian Unity (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2000),, 28-29; Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 
1945: Power Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: Un
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 occur m  
matters other than those of genuine national and international concern be 
strain of recent years on national administration has arisen from a failure 
operations.  
Party animosities and philosophical differences between provincial Social Credit and 
federal Progressive Conservatives and Liberals also did not help smooth discussions.  
Bennett’s cabinet was notoriously opposed to big government and the creation of a social 
welfare state, even though, as former BC social worker Bridget Moran notes, “Socred 
social policies ensured that a welfare state was in the making.”   Communication 
barriers, local agent misinterpretations of policy, and successive 1960s ministerial and 
bureaucratic changes in Ottawa further challenged intergovernmental discussions.   
Between 1962 and 1968 alone, the minister responsible for Indian affairs changed seven 
times.  After being transferred to Department of Northern Affairs and National 
Development in 1966, Indian affairs again moved within a year to the Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development. 
ight have been predicted at the 1963 federal-provincial conference.  At that event,
Bennett stated:  
British Columbia believes is it is time that independent decision on all 
restored to the provincial legislatures. …  We submit that much of the 
on their part to recognize the appropriate boundaries of their sphere of 
153
 
154
155
                                                 
153 Quoted in Sherman, Bennett, 288-289. 
154 Bridget Moran, A Little Rebellion (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1992), 39.  See also David J. 
 
Mitchell, W.A.C. Bennett and the Rise of British Columbia (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1983), 327, 
346, 354, 356. 
 
ell, 8 March 1950.”; BCA GR-
720 Box 3 File 5, “J.A. Sadler, Memorandum to all Regional Administrators, 2 February 1955.”; BCA 
lems 
xisting between the regional headquarters in Vancouver and the provincial capital in Victoria.  Hawthorn, 
, Volume One, 16. 
155 For examples, see BCA GR-2720 Box 3 File 5, “O.H. Wall to M. Ridd
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GR-2720 Box 3 File 5, “J.P. Scott, “Note for File, 16 May 1958.; Hawthorn cited communication prob
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 In many ways, federal-provincial strife over Indian welfare was a product of both 
governments’ desire for cost savings.  Bothwell, Drummond, and English note how the 
Pearson
y 
 
 1952, looked to reduce budget costs and 
control ment projects, the 
nationa ly 
exerted additional pressures on provincial budgets and executive decisions.  
Whether BC officials would have agreed to any welfare plan offering less than 
full federal remuneration can only be speculated.  However, by insisting that any 
devolution plan contain forms of long term cost-sharing, BC officials came to see federal 
interests as driven by financial first principles.  In many ways, the view from the west 
was well-justified.  Parochial federal negotiating strategies did little to allay provincial 
concerns as did federal insistence that fiscal arrangements be reached prior to the 
extension of provincial services to Indians.  In 1966, the IAB rejected a recommendation 
made by both Hawthorn and the IEA that funds facilitating the extension of provincial 
                          
 government of the latter-1960s faced an enourmous budgetary crunch once the 
fiscal effects of the expansion of earlier social welfare programs began to be felt.  
Ushered in without any rational assessment of their costs or controllability, federal 
programs such as universal medicare, pensions, and Canada Assistance were propelled b
“need” or by demography, and were largely run by the provinces.156  Similarly, the
Bennett Social Credit, after coming into office in
 the provincial debt wherever possible.157  Large scale develop
lization of BC electricity and healthcare, and BC’s 1962 financial crisis, on
158
                       
 Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada After 1945, 305. 
7 See Victoria Daily Colonist, 17 February 1956, “Premier ‘Admits’ Debt heavier than Claimed,” 2. 
. 
156
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 service n 
 
constitutionally endowed with an autonomy which by its nature includes 
assume in areas traditionally regarded as outside their orbit of concern.  
In other words, the provinces felt free to pick and choose which areas of responsibility 
they wanted and entertain select federal devolution proposals accordingly.   In the 
absence of sufficient incentives to the provinces for extending their services to Indians, 
Hawthorn concluded, federal-provincial devolution discussions would fail.  While 
incorrect in his earlier 1958 prediction that an integration of welfare services seemed 
likely to occur, Hawthorn was more accurate in his 1966 assessment. 
s be provided via extant federal-provincial fiscal arrangements rather than “by a
infinity of specific agreements dealing with particular functions.”159   
In turn, the extant constitutional status of Indians provided ready means for the
province to reject federal welfare offers.  BC officials might have downplayed legal and 
constitutional factors in areas of Indian education and health but they invoked them 
handily when it came to welfare.  Section 87 of the Indian Act meant little to provinces 
such as BC vis-à-vis the overarching powers of section 91(24) of the B.N.A. Act.  
Hawthorn noted this in his 1966 report, stating: 
[T]here is an elementary consideration that the provinces are 
the right to determine the kind and extent of the responsibilities they will 
160
 
161
                                                 
159 See Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 16; BCA MS-2848 Box 3 File 5, 
“Commentary on the Hawthorn Report,” 5; BCA GR-0128 Box 5 File 43, “B.W. Snider to J.A. Sadler, 7 
October 1966.” 
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 When it came to social assistance, BC thought it was already doing its part b
providing off-reserve Indian welfare under the twelve-month residency rule; its officials 
saw on-reserve welfare administration as bringing only added costs and risks.  Citing 
interviews with former federal officials, Shewell cites this as one of the main rea
provincial reluctance to take on Indian welfare.
y 
sons for 
to 
 cost an 
e as 
s 
 the 
 
 
                                                
162  The provinces realized, according 
senior branch clerk C.N.C. Roberts, “what a can of worms they would be getting into.  
Ottawa was … glossing over so much of it.  They realized … it was going to
awful lot of money.”163  By 1963, the per-capita welfare costs of Indians were twic
high as those for non-Indians in British Columbia; by 1968, they had grown to five times 
the non-Indian average; an estimated one-quarter of both on- and off-reserve BC Indian
depended on welfare to the tune of $6.5 million.164  Oral testimonies corroborate how
flow of Indian welfare increased dramatically in this period.  Squamish elder Louis 
Miranda notes: “And when they started dishing it out, like 80 dollars, 100 dollars a month
for each one, that’s when things went really haywire … after ’67 that’s when they started
 
163 Interview with C.N.C. Roberts in Shewell, 'Enough to Keep Them Alive’, 320. 
 
 
Maritimes.  LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 7983, File 1/19-2-10, 
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hree Levels of Government,” (Ottawa: A Study for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
162 Shewell, “‘Bitterness Behind Every Smiling Face’,” 72. 
 
164 In 1963, per capita Indian welfare costs were twelve times the non-Indian rate in Saskatchewan and
twenty-two times higher in the 
P
7 File 94, “N.F. Cragg to E.R. Rickinson, 13 November 1968.”  Between 1966 and 1967 alone, the total 
provincial welfare case load increased by over 4%, going from 79,563 to 82,880 cases.  The Vancouver 
Sun, 26 January 1968, “Indians’ Problems ‘Unsolved’,” 13.  Fields and Stanbury noted how, from 1967-
1968, welfare costs rose by an astonishing 50%.  D.B. Fields and W.T. Stanbury, “T
the Public Sector Upon the Indians of British Co
T
Development, 1968), 413. 
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 dishing it out.”165  The underlying causes of growing Indian welfare accessi
dependency, of course, also related to the general economic decline of BC’s Aboriginal 
communities that began in this period.  Greater regulations, industry consolidations, and 
unionization practices in BC’s resource industries—the main source for Indian 
employment—squeezed out many Aboriginal workers.
on and 
7  
 took a less public approach by moving off-reserve and 
back to collect provincial welfare cheques.  One MP speaking in 1963 empathized with 
Aboriginal demands and stated the obvious: “it costs a native person just as much to eat 
and fill the bellies of his children as it costs a non-Indian.”168  Furthermore, as John Lutz 
and Liam Haggarty recently suggest, Aboriginal people historically espoused their own 
                                                
166  Neither the provincial nor 
federal government appears to have looked beyond the welfare impasse to devote effort 
towards stemming growing Indian economic marginalization in this period. 
 Undoubtedly, as Shewell noted in 2004, the phrase “Indian welfare” today 
conjures up pejorative opinions, among both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people.16
Period evidence and Aboriginal perspectives from the 1950s and 1960s, however, tell 
another story.  Aboriginal people accepted, even demanded their inclusion in social 
welfare and provincial welfare programs as part of their rights as voting and tax-paying 
citizens.  Many more individuals
 
165 BCA, Reuben Ware Collection, Interview with Louis Miranda, North Vancouver, 1 June 1979, 
Interviewed by Reuben Ware. 
BC Press, 
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168 House of Com
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 264 
cultural views of social assistance, whether as a complement to a syncretic 
sustenance/wage labour “moditional” econom stem, or as a neo-traditional form of 
“sp  
creasingly negative into the 1970s and today, and as a result of growing welfare 
ommissioner Doug Kelly described this shift in 2005: “what was intended as a safety 
net has become a way of life.”   Aboriginal people, in addition to holding their own 
views of welfare, also have not shared the same parochialism as government officials 
when rationalizing the underlying causes of Indian welfare dependency.  Haida John 
Williams similarly stated in 1979: “welfare is not the main problem facing Indian affairs.  
It is just a symptom of your main problem which is a lack of education and the lack of 
orienta n affairs 
policy 
                                                
ic sy
irit money.”169  What appears certain is that Indian attitudes towards welfare became
in
dependency and economic marginalization.  Sto:lo Grand Chief and former BC Treaty 
C
170
tion to city life on the part of Indians.  And this is a direct result of India
for the last 100 years.”171
 
169 Lutz, Makúk, 270-271; Liam James Haggarty “‘I’m Going to Call it Spirit Money’: An Ethnohistory of 
Social Welfare among the Sto:lo,” (MA Major Research Paper, University of Victoria, 2005). 
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 Chapter 6 
“Conclusion: The Politics of Indian Administration” 
 
 
“On
“There should be no special legislation.  There should be no Indian Affairs Branch.” 
 
 
On June 25, 1969, just three months after Bennett’s pledge to take over Indian affairs and 
create a provincial Indian affairs department, the federal government introduced its 
Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, now commonly referred to as 
the White Paper.  Jean Chrétien, the minister reponsible for Indian affairs, delivered a 
brief speech before the House of Commons describing the statement:  
From the early days of this country, a trustee relationship of a highly 
Indian people.  The Indian people should have the right to manage their 
rs. 
… True equality presupposes that the Indian people have the right to full 
of Canada.2   
Chrétien advocated repeal of the Indian Act and the statutory removal of any legal 
distinctions between Indians and non-Indians.  He also outlined what the provincial role 
would be in the new policy.  The White Paper “propose[s] to the governments of the 
ce fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are hardest to destroy.  
Bureaucracy is the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action.” 
—Max Weber, Sociologist (1914). 
 
      —J.V. Boys, Indian Commissioner for B.C. (1964).1
 
paternalistic nature developed between the central government and the 
own affairs to the same extent that their fellow Canadians manage thei
and equal participation in the cultural, social, economic and political life 
 
                                                 
1 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 987; BCA GR-0285 Box 8 File 6, “Meeting 
of BC Advisory Committee, New Westminster, BC, November 16, 1964.” 
 
2 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 25 June 1969, 10581-10582. 
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 provinces that they take over the same responsibilities for Indians that they have for oth
citizens of the provinces.”
er 
on of 
nt, 
les of Bennett’s earlier March pledge. 
d 
provinc y 
stateme rks were worth the 
wait.  By the fall, a chorus of Aboriginal and provincial politicians, Bennett included, 
                                                
3 
The White Paper, as Sally Weaver suggests in Making Canadian Indian Policy: 
The Hidden Agenda 1968-70, was the product of Pierre Trudeau’s iedological visi
an egalitarian and liberal Canada, a “just society.”  In terms of its political developme
she notes, the White Paper signified new and growing powers vested in the Prime 
Minister’s and Privy Council Offices to shape executive policies.  Despite being 
described as an exercise in democratic consultation, she adds, the White Paper ignored 
the recommendations of Indians via the advisory council system created in 1965.4  
Aboriginal people responded with shock to the contents of the federal proposal and in 
anger to this apparent mockery of the consultation process.  BC officials considering the 
fiscal implications of the White Paper were just as aghast, even though the White Paper 
eerily echoed the philosophical princip
The White Paper stimulated a wave of unprecedented pan-Indian activism an
ial opposition.  News and understandings of the implications of the polic
nt took several months to reach BC, but the resultant firewo
 
nadian 
dian Policy,” in Anthropology, Public Policy and Native Peoples in Canada, Noel Dyck and James B. 
M. 
ation: The White Paper on Indian 
olicy,” (Paper delivered at the National Social Science Conference on Social Science and Public Policy in 
3 Ibid., 10582. 
 
4 Sally M. Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-70 (Toronto: University of 
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 chastised Pierre Trudeau’s Liberals for attempting to offload federal responsibility for 
Indian affairs onto the provinces, condemning the White Paper as an arbitrary shirking of 
the federal government’s constitutional obligations to Indians.  The proposal was labeled 
a “misf
on 
tional 
calls fo  movement 
in the U itor Elliott 
Russell
mmon with our 
northern brothers, except that we are Indians—I do not say Mic Mac, 
whether we live north, south, east or west, our basic problems are the same 
 
ire” by October, triggering protests at the BC legislature.5  Guy Williams, 
president of the NBBC, predicted that “The Indian will suffer more under provincial 
jurisdiction than he has in 100 ‘disastrous’ years of federal administration” and that “All 
this will do is unite all the Indians of BC—in opposition.”  Williams was right.  In 
November, a conference of BC Indian chiefs in Kamloops attracted the largest ever group 
of Indian representatives in one place.  Repeated calls for unity were heard and the Uni
of British Columbia Indian Chiefs was formed.6  The White Paper also fuelled na
r pan-Indian activism which, influenced by the growing “Red Power”
S, had been brewing in Canada since the mid-1960s.7  Indian News ed
 issued one such call in 1965: 
Many of us in the southern areas of Canada have little in co
Cree, Chipewyan or Salish, but Indians!  This is what really matters for 
however much of our ways of earning a living may differ.8 
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5 Vancouver Sun, 4 October 1969, “Indians Wait in Vain, Chrétien 'Ambush' Misfires,” 16.  
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 With an unprecedented pan-Indian political movement born and the BC government 
alienated, Bennett’s 1969 pledge was promptly forgotten in the wake of the White Paper 
fiasco. 
The White Paper is often described as Canada’s last-ditch attempt at fina
“termination” of the so-called “Indian problem,” one that instigated a turning point in
Aboriginal-state relations.
l 
 
ubtedly, the White Paper failed in its attempt to end the 
separat  
 
responsibility for Indian land. … 
people to the province without ensuring that the provinces have the 
and services… 
precedents also prompted the 1974 creation of the Office of Native Claims to deal with 
e Court of Canada ruled in R. v. 
9  Undo
e legal status of Indians and expedite the passing of both the “Indians” and the
Indian Affairs department.  The federal government, faced with a barrage of criticism and
opposition, quickly distanced itself from the 1969 statement.  By November, Chrétien 
was exhorting that the policy statement was “NOT a final policy decision,” and: 
does NOT propose that the provincial government should take over 
does NOT propose that the federal government “abandon” the Indian 
resources to maintain and improve upon the existing level of programmes 
does NOT advocate the assimilation of Indian people…10 
By then, however, the damage was done.  With a new pan-Indian political movement 
spawned, the federal government began adopting more conciliatory tactics, initiating a 
core program to fund Indian organizations and announcing the creation of a.  Court 
Aboriginal treaty and land disputes.  In 1965, the Suprem
                                                 
9 See Menno Boldt, Surviving as Indians: The Challenge of Self-Government (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993), 18. 
 
 Indian News, November 1969, “The Policy De10 bate Continues.”  Chrétien reportedly delivered this 
eration.  It is unknown who added the capitalization speech to the Saskatchewan Women’s Liberal Fed
mphasis. e
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 White and Bob that the Douglas agreements signed on Vancouver Island in the 1850s 
were valid Indian treaties under Canadian law.11  The Supreme Court Calder decision of
1973, although technically a ruling against the Nisga’a plaintiffs, affirmed the prior
existence of Aboriginal title in BC.
 
 
n 
 of 
t 
s 
                                                                                                                                                
12  Following the Calder judgment, Trudeau 
purportedly told a delegation of Union of BC Indian Chiefs, “[y]ou have more legal 
rights than I thought you had.”13 
 Although the White Paper marked a turning point, it was less novel in other 
ways.  The statement was, as Weaver notes, “simply an extension of the policy directio
of the Laing era.  The transfer of DIAND programs to the provinces, for instance, had 
begun in the fields of health and education in the 1940s and 1950s.”14  Although it was a 
product of discernible post-1968 political and ideological changes ushered in by the 
Trudeau Liberals, the White Paper was also grounded in a lengthier post-WWII history
integrationist government policies.  Government efforts after 1945 looked to solve at las
the long-standing “Indian problem” via administrative acts and devolution schemes 
involving the provinces.  The White Paper offered a sweeping remedy to a devolution 
process that had slowed to a crawl by the late-1960s.  The policy statement also promised 
fifty million dollars for economic development purposes alone.  However, even this wa
 
 
11 R. v. White and Bob (1965), 52 D.L.R. (2d), 613. 
 
12 See Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy Webber., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder 
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 hardly 
m 
sm, yet 
ive-
oriente
rinciple 
innovative.  The government had already made similar expenditures for Indian 
economic development purposes as incentives for the provinces to extend their welfare 
services onto reserves.  Furthermore, while $50 million was a significantly greater 
amount than anything ever allocated under prior initiatives like the Community 
Development Program, it too fell far short of the “hundreds of million of dollars per 
annum,” called for in the Hawthorn report three years earlier.15 
John Leslie’s aphorizes the history of Indian policy community development fro
1943-1963 as an era of “continuity within change.”16  His description rings true when 
examining the White Paper and political developments to 1969.  Indian affairs took on 
new national relevance and unprecedented public and political scrutiny and critici
racist attitudes, assimilationist agendas, fiscal first principles, and paternalistic faith in 
administrative solutions also remained remarkably durable throughout.  Well into the 
1960s, the Indian Affairs Branch remained overly centralized, underfunded, defens
d, and short-sighted in its policies.  It answered to Treasury Board and Cabinet 
masters instead of Indians; it remained an agency whose ironic main function was to not 
exist.  BC’s Indian Commissioner, J.V. Boys, affirmed this fundamental guiding p
of the Indian affairs bureaucracy when he stated in 1964, “There should be no special 
legislation.  There should be no Indian Affairs Branch.” 
                                                 
 H.B. Hawthorn, ed., A Survey of Contemporary Indians: Economic, Po
Volume One (Ottawa: Indian Affairs Branch, 1966), 14. 
15 litical, Educational Needs, 
 
16 John Franklin Leslie, “Assimilation, Integration or Termination?: The Development of Canadian Indian 
ton University, 1999), 406. 
 
Policy, 1943-1963” (PhD Dissertation, Carl
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 Both change and continuity can also be found when examining administ
ments.  Indeed, one can only be struck by the remarkable shifts that took pl
.  In BC especially, the administrative mechanisms of Indian service 
d profoundly.  Beginning in earnest at mid-century, the province reversed
 towards Indians as anything more than potential sources of land and r
rative 
develop ace in 
this era delivery 
change  its long-
attitude esources to 
exploit.  Urged on by federal officials as well as by a non-Indian provincial public 
 
id-century.  A range 
of othe
 
s, 
 
, bureaucracy, once 
establis  He adds: 
“Such a irely 
new formations of authority, more and more impossible.”   For Walter Rudnicki, his 
demanding desegregation and the granting of basic rights of citizenship to Indians, BC
began allowing Indians into its public hospitals and schools around m
r supplementary agreements in areas such as off-reserve Indian social assistance 
and child welfare furthered devolutionary trends into the 1960s.  Not all areas of 
administrative integration, however, were met with provincial agreement or interest.  BC
actively resisted involvement in the provision of Indian welfare on-reserve; other area
such as Indian economic development piqued little to no provincial interest at all. 
While the post-WWII era witnessed remarkable administrative change as well as 
bureaucratic proliferation and professionalization, the Indian affairs bureaucracy proved
highly immutable and resilient to change.  As Weber suggests
hed, “is among those social structures which are hardest to destroy.” 
n apparatus makes ‘revolution’ in the sense of the forceful creation of ent
17
experiences in the IAB while heading the CDP epitomized such a gloomy view of 
government.  He would state in a later interview that: 
                                                 
17 Weber, Economy and Society, 987, 989. 
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 Changing the bureaucracy is virtually impossible. …  Again, when one 
Department today, you have to talk about, if you like, the whole Mandarin 
civilization....and so the DM [Deputy Minster] of Indian Affairs by 
decide what direction it’s going to go – the policy.  The DM of Finance, 
Council Office] and so on and so on are the people who decide these 
to replace them.  
Vis-à-vis Boys’s 1964 statement about the desired ephemerality of the Indian affairs 
department, the observations of both Rudnicki and Weber seem apt. 
Although a discourse of “integration” replaced “assimilation” after WWII as the 
guiding mantra of Indian Affairs activities, the meaning and implications of this change 
remained unclear.  For some, integration was merely another word for assimilation, one 
carrying the same socially and culturally erosive connotations.  For others, including 
some IAB officials, it meant desegregation, a granting of long-denied rights of citizenship 
and of equal administration to Indians, rights that did not demand or require surrender of 
cultural distinctions.  In 1944, for instance, the Minister responsible for Indian affairs, 
T.A. Crerar, wrote to Peter Kelly and the NBBC stating that: 
it is my own view that the policy of Indian administration should be 
 
the life of the country and to accept the privileges and responsibilities of 
     
talks of bureaucracy, you can't just speak of the IAB, or the Indian Affairs 
system throughout the whole public service, and our objectives of our 
himself, doesn't necessarily, or the Minister of Indian Affairs, doesn't 
the Secretary of the Treasury Board and the Secretary of the PCO [Privy 
things.  And since they renew each other, since they pick people like them 
18
 
directed along the lines of encouraging the Indians to take an active part in
full citizenship but retaining at the same time the traditions of their race.19 
                                                                                                                                            
18
19 “T.A. Crerar to Peter Kelly, 9 November 1944,” in BCA GR-1222 Box 106 File 10, “Minutes of the 
Fifteenth Annual Convention, Native Brotherhood of British Columbia, 12-18 November 1944,” 19.  See 
also LAC, RG 10 Central Registry Series, Vol. 8567 File 1/1-2 Pt. 3, “Jules D’Astous to Ruth Gordon, 
 
 Interview with Walter Rudnicki, Ottawa, 21 February 1994, interviewed by Robert Cunningham. 
 
‘Bridging the Gap,’ 7 July 1966.” 
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20
Others, notably H.B. Hawthorn, went one step further in 1966 when he coined the 
concept of “citizens plus” in his national survey of Indian conditions.  For Hawthorn, 
Indians were charter Canadian citizens with unique cultural traits whose rights, 
particularly administrative, included, but were not limited to, that of non-Indians.   
While the desired ends of integration policy remained marred in interpretive differences 
well in ntested.  
The for nd 
provinc complete 
assimil d 
those of non-Indians.  This partly explains why so many Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people in BC supported those initiatives aimed at administrative integration during the 
two and half decades after 1945. 
If we define bureaucracy like Max Weber as “the means of transforming social 
action into rationally organized action,” the very continued existence of the Indian affairs 
department speaks to the failure of branch attempts to bring about Indian assimilation and 
assert state hegemony in this period.  Indeed, for branch officials during post-WWII 
decades, old habits died hard.  The lack of an effective long-term policy strategy, 
ubiquitous concern with financial first principles, and defensive-minded instincts are 
familiar themes stretching back to the earliest DIA policies of the nineteenth century.  
After WWII, even the most ardent advocates of Indian assimilation had ample grounds to 
to the late-1960s, the means deemed needed for “integration” were less co
ging of new administrative relationships between Indians and federal a
ial governments came to be seen as a requisite step, whether towards the 
ation of Indians or towards the acquisition of Indian rights above and beyon
                                                 
20 Hawthorn, A Survey of Contemporary Indians, Volume One, 6. 
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 criticize Indian Affairs officials for their lackluster track record and apparent inability to 
develop long-term sound planning.  Diamond Jenness, seven years after he delivered his 
“Plan for Liquidating Canada’s Indian Problem within 25 Years” before the Special Joint 
Committee in 1947, continued his diatribe on the IAB in a journal article titled, “Canada's 
Indians Yesterday. What of Today?”: 
What were the obligations of the Canadian Parliament and people?  
Briefly these: to protect the Indians from exploitation, to safeguard their 
ever asked how long the training should endure, how long the Indians 
millenium.  The Indian administration did not ask: its job was simply to 
its administration that it forgot the purpose of its custodianship, especially 
 
 those 
 
s 
o fund 
                                                
health, to educate them, and to train them for eventual citizenship.  No one 
should be kept as wards whether for one century, two centuries, or a 
administer, and, like many a custodian, it was so involved in the routine of 
since the fulfilment of that purpose would sign its own death-warrant.21 
When looking beyond period IAB rhetoric it becomes readily apparent that, even in
devolution areas federal officials described as progressing to “gratifying” and 
“outstanding” levels, actual integration remained elusive.  Administrative realities did not 
entail the types or breadth of desegregation promised by both federal and provincial 
officials.  Particularly when it came to education, institutional assimilation did not mean
that Indians were socially, and sometimes even physically, integrated with non-Indian
even though Indians and non-Indians shared the same public facilities.  Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in those areas deemed of highest devolutionary and integrationist 
“success,” Indians still remained the predominant legal and fiduciary responsibility of the 
federal government.  In both education and heath, for example, Ottawa continued t
 
enness, “Canada's Indians Yesterday. What of Today?” The Canadian Journal of Economics 
l Science Vol. 20 No. 1 (1954), 98. 
 
21 Diamond J
and Politica
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 the bul
low 
on 
 
 for 
fettered 
 
ans 
tion and realized effect.  This, 
howeve
t.  
r 
criticisms that the federal government was failing to meet its constitutional obligations to 
k of the cost of schooling and healing Indians in provincial institutions.  This was 
likely the only way provinces like BC would have ever agreed in the first place to al
desegregation to occur, even under the seemingly more “progressively-minded” coaliti
government of Byron Johnson.  Bennett’s Social Credit regime proved particularly frugal 
when it came to Indians, particularly into the 1960s periods when budget belts were
tightened and more conflictual relations erupted with Ottawa. 
The protectionist impulse also proved difficult to shake, even amid the fervour
desegregation that swept through federal political and bureaucratic offices in WWII’s 
aftermath.  Despite encouraging, often demanding, the provinces to implement un
integration in health and education, federal officials were sometimes surprised to learn
that unfettered integration could produce unintended effects and actually be to the 
detriment of Aboriginal well-being.  Whether in the context of the White Paper proposal 
to adopt a more culturally-relevant school curriculum or in calls for Prince Rupert Indi
to be afforded more equitable treatment under BC health planning, federal bureaucrats 
often struggled to reconcile gaps between policy expecta
r, was nothing new or unique to post-war years.  In the area of Indian health, 
contradictions between the Department of Indian Affairs’ stated lack of legal obligation 
to provide Indian health care, and its actual conduct in this area, existed from the outse
Such contradictions, in turn, created jurisdictional ambiguities and new opportunities fo
officials to adhere to minimalist policies of neglect and frugality while deflecting 
Indians.   
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 The IAB also struggled with gaps between its historical and post-WWII mandate 
and identity.  While it was increasingly self-identifying as an agency facilitative of 
provincial devolution after WWII, Ottawa continued to act as a protectorate of Indian 
wards.  As noted, the IAB maintained its primary legal and fiscal ties to Indians, for thos
ostensibly “administratively integrated,” both on-reserve and off.  Continued IAB 
administration of welfare and the creation of new “integrationist” programs in ec
development only served to further entrench and legitimize the unique Indian-federal 
relationship.  Writing in 1964 i
e 
onomic 
n an Ojibwa community context, anthropologist R.W. 
Dunnin
as the 
deral 
CEP reeked of the century-old patronizing mission, something Noel Dyck terms the 
                                              
g noted how Indians continued to belong to a unique legal, political, and 
administrative system.  “This fundamentally different structure,” he writes, “plays an 
important role in the ‘separateness’ and ‘differentness’ which Indians feel.”22  Yet, 
federal brief delivered before the 1964 federal-provincial conference revealed, the fe
government was not prepared to discuss constitutional reform as a means to facilitate 
provincial devolution.  Prior to 1969, Indian affairs officials proved alternately unwilling 
and incapable of completely severing its ties to Indians. 
Age-old paternalistic views and, what J.R. Miller describes as a “Great white 
father knows best” mentality also never lost their fashion in both federal and provincial 
minds after WWII.  Sufficient evidence of this can be gleaned from both bureaucratic 
words and actions throughout post-war decades.  1960s initiatives such as the EPP and 
   
22 R.W. Dunning, “Some Problems of Reserve Indian Communities: A Case Study,” Anthropologica Vol. 6 
No. 1 (1964), 35. 
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 policy of “coercive tutelage.”23  Colonially-minded governments also ignored the 
primary recommendations of both Hawthorn surveys: that Aboriginal people deserved 
special administrative rights and that changes of a social and cultural nature only occur at 
the beh s by 
assertin ederal 
official  lay a 
fundam ntal challenge to the long-standing paternalistic and protectionist orientation of 
the Indian affairs department. 
Recent Canadian scholarship has affirmed the survival of colonialist mentalities 
around the mid-twentieth century.  Scott Sheffield’s intellectual history, The Red Man’s 
on the Warpath: The Image of the “Indian” and the Second World War, examines 
wartime-era constructions of Indians in the public and administrative imagination.  
Considering events up to the conclusion of the SJC proceedings in 1948, Sheffield argues 
that “There was far too much continuity within both public and administrative images of 
the ‘Indian,’ even after the war, to support any claims of a paradigm shift.”   Mary 
Ellen-Kelm’s study of Indian health and healing in BC ends around the same time and 
similarly finds little evidence of changes in both Canadian attitudes and policies.  While 
these works illustrate how assimilationist ideas endured well into the twentieth century, 
they also exemplify what Foucault warns of a fault prone to works excessively occupied 
                                                
est and discretion of Aboriginal people.  BC eschewed these principle
g that Indians had no special privileges beyond those of other citizens.  F
s found Hawthorn’s recommendations no less objectionable as within them
e
24
 
23 See Noel Dyck, What is the Indian ‘Problem’: Tutelage and Resistance in Canadian Indian 
Administration (St. John’s: NFLD: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1991), 24-25.  
 
24 Scott Sheffield, The Red Man's on the Warpath: The Image of the "Indian" and the Second World War 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 177-179. 
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 with finding singular and static expressions of discourse: “the quest for and repetition o
an origin that eludes all historical determin
f 
ation,” and, “the interpretation of ‘hearing’ of 
an ‘alre
ensure the infinite continuity of discourse and its secret presence to itself 
receive every moment of discourse in its sudden irruption … Discourse 
when it occurs.    
When examining mid-twentieth century Canadian Indian Affairs contexts, Foucault’s 
lesson is an important one.  The war both coincided with, and helped to catalyze, a major 
shift in governmental discourse, albeit one that took both subtle and non-so subtle 
expression over the course of many years.  “Irruptive” events included WWII, but also 
countless, albeit less sensational, integrationist administrative developments thereafter.  
All had important influences on Native-newcomer relations leading into the modern era.  
The broader point to be drawn here is that Aboriginal people gradually became more 
“relevant” throughout this period, and as a result of a combination of discursive change, 
shifting administrative landscapes, political reforms, and Aboriginal agency.  For these 
reasons, the quarter-century between WWII and the 1969 White Paper may very well be 
the most influential time in the history of twentieth-century Native-newcomer relations.  
ady-said’ that is at the same time a ‘not said’.”  To avoid this, Foucault urges: 
We must be ready to renounce all those themes whose function is to 
in the interplay of a constantly recurring absence.  We must be ready to 
must not be referred to in the distant presence of origin, but treated as and 
25
 
In terms of demographics alone, this era saw Indians outlive the notion that they were 
                                                 
25 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 2002), 27-28. 
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 destine
960s 
 of 
 
d to “disappear,” a popular fiction Brian Dippie terms in the US context as the 
“pathology of the vanishing American.”26 
Post-WWII Canadian-Indian relations can be described as “the politics of Indian 
administration.”  Indian administration was negotiated in “six dimensional political 
spaces” involving multiple actors, offices, and interest groups.27  Although intra-
governmental processes had a significant influence on developments in this period, 
federal-provincial politics appear to have exerted the most influence on 1950s and 1
integrationist developments.  IAB personnel admitted this much in internal 
correspondence regarding the 1966 Hawthorn Report: “Political factors exercise most
the restraints in our Federal-Provincial negotiations.”28  Moreover, politics, when defined 
in the specific sense of, “the often internally conflicting interrelationships among people 
in a society,”29 also provides an overarching analytical rubric to encapsulate those 
broader shifting relations between Aboriginal people and governmental agencies that 
took place in the two and a half decades after WWII.  Aboriginal people, along with both
federal and provincial governments, political parties, advocacy agencies, and social 
scientists, engaged in interstitial “political” processes in contexts this study terms 
intrastate spaces.  
                                                 
University of Kansas, 1982), 32-44
26 See Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Lawrence, KA: 
. 
 
27 See J. Rick Ponting and Roger Gibbins, Out of Irrelevance: A Socio-Political Introduction to Indian 
Affairs in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980), 315. 
2848 Box 3 File 5, “Commentary on the Hawthorn Report,” 1. 
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28 BCA MS-
 
29 ITP Nelson Canadian Dictionary of the English Language (Toronto: International Thomson Canada Ltd.
1997). 
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 Closer examination of the gaps between discourse and lived experience sugge
that the administrative landscape of “Indian affairs” has, and likely has always been, 
contested terrain.  This dissertation has gone to considerable lengths to demonstrate how 
government discourse, structural considerations, and “official” policies, while potentia
hegemonic, are not necessarily inherently potent determinants in themselves.  It is from 
this perspective that this study has also striven to incorporate ethnohistorical insights and
render voice to those people targeted by integrationist policies.  Such a task is long 
overdue.  Historians, by privileging structuralist analyses about the monomorphic 
existence and efficacy of colonial “state” power, whether expressed in governmental 
discourse, law, or assimilationist institutions, have implicitly relegated the perceived need 
to give due credence to Aboriginal agency and voice.  Noted in the introduction c
Bourdieu warns of this danger of taking over, or being taken over 
sts 
lly 
 
hapter, 
by a thought of “the 
state,” , “when 
ther 
 
when endeavouring to even think or speak of it.  Indeed, as Bourdieu adds
it comes to the state, one never doubts enough.”30  Historiographer Hans Kellner fur
cautions the tendency of scholars to approach historical sources, and history itself, as 
containing continuous self explanatory “truths.”  Rather than attempting to “get the story
straight,” Kellner notes, historians should strive to “get the story crooked” by 
acknowledging research and evidence as being governed by rhetorical principles of 
selection and patterning.31 
                                                 
30 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
35-36. 
 
 31 Hans Kellner, “Language and Historical Representation,” in The Postmodern History Reader, ed. Keith
Jenkins (New York: Routledge, 2001), 127-129, 137. 
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 Healthy doubt and a rejection of the notion that a singular narrative exists to 
characterize the intended and realized actions of officials are necessary when gaug
import of post-WWII administrative relations.  Not all officials, government departments, 
or intergovernmental parties acted or viewed Indian integration in the same manner.  
Indians, too, varied widely in terms of attitude and opinion.  Some, such as Frank Cald
demanded administrative integration and envisioned a future than involved a provin
takeover of Indian affairs.  Others, particularly after the 1969 White Paper, held the 
federal government solely accountable for improving Indian well-being and livelihood
While, as Terry Wotherspoon and Victor Satchewitz suggest, most Aboriginal peoples’ 
political struggles prior to the 1960s may have been “primarily local in nature,” they w
important struggles nonetheless that directl
ing the 
er, 
cial 
.  
ere 
y and indirectly precipitated broader 
subsequ
associa uced a multiplicity of results.  In health, Aboriginal people 
demanded and took advantage of improvements in health care provision facilitated by the 
involvement of other federal line agencies and provincial departments in Indian health.  
The remarkable reversal of Indian mortality and morbidity rates that occurred around 
WWII owed in no small part to the actions of Aboriginal people seeking out new forms 
of Canadian medicine.  In the area of welfare, Aboriginal people also appear to have 
long-identified the inadequacies of federal policies and sought change.  Whether in 
                                              
ent struggles of a national and international character.32   
Articulations of Aboriginal agency defied any singular form just as their 
ted impacts prod
   
00), 226. 
32 See Terry Wotherspoon and Victor Satchewitz, First Nations: Race, Class, and Gender Relations 
(Regina: Canada Plains Research Center, 20
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 condemning the work-for-welfare Community Employment Program, demanding social
assistance from provincial a
 
uthorities, or moving off-reserve to take advantage of 
loopho
t 
Chilliwack Area Indian Council. That was 1969. That organization was a 
out the welfare checks, basically. And government was happy to do that.  
The council soon began taking on greater capacities in other areas such as education.  Ed 
Kelly also notes how the Chilliwack Area Indian Council, whose constituency was 
modeled on the Indian affairs departments’ district council structure, eventually became a 
vehicle for Sto:lo pursuit of the land and treaty question into the mid 1970’s.   Even in 
the field of integrated education, the harsh effects of desegregation on Indian children, 
                                                
les in federal-provincial residency requirements for welfare assistance, Aboriginal 
agency was clearly manifested.  The latter strategy appears to have, in turn, even helped 
to influence federal policy and the IAB’s decision to harmonize its on-reserve Indian 
welfare rates with those of the provinces.  Furthermore, the ongoing inadequacy of 
federal welfare provision into the 1970s provided reason for Aboriginal people to demand 
greater powers of self-administration.  Sto:lo Grand Chief and current BC Lieutenan
Governor Steven Point describes how the ongoing impoverishment of federal health and 
welfare service administration in the late-1960s motivated local Sto:lo to organize for 
greater self-control.  Point describes how: 
[local Sto:lo] got together with a lawyer … and they formed the 
non-profit society that contracted with Indian Affairs to provide, to give 
33
 
34
 
33 Interview with Steven Point, Sardis, B.C., 3 June 2002, Interviewed by Byron Plant. 
 
34 UVA, Interview with Ed Kelly, Sardis, B.C., 5 June 2002, Interviewed by Byron Plant.  The council 
eventually developed in the Sto:lo Nation. 
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 and resultant inequities in Native/non-Native academic achievement and treatment had 
varying long-term effects. 
Further research on this largely ignored era in Native-newcomer relation remains 
sorely needed.35  This study, too, has necessarily been guided by principles of “selection 
and patterning” and by no means does full justice to the full scope and breath of change 
encapsulated by post-war decades.  Other subjects of provincial significance deserv
further study include Indian housing, child welfare, urbanization, municipal relations
fish and game law.  Thematic attention to other important areas such as Aboriginal 
cultural change, economic relations, and gender and class dynamics also warrant greater
attention than tha
ing 
, and 
 
t given above.  Studies of developments in other provincial contexts will 
allow f
f oral 
s.  By 
 new 
tions 
                                                
or comparative studies of administrative integration.  Although Aboriginal people 
left a discernible imprint on the archival record during this period, the inclusion o
and community-based research will shed important perspectives on all of these area
focusing on gaps as well as consistencies in the extension of state power, both 
continuities and contradictions between discourse and realized action, a more nuanced 
image of Native-newcomer relations can emerge. 
In light of the post-1970s explosion of Aboriginal participation in political 
discussions, rights and title movements, self-government talks, and court litigation,
historical narratives are required that better connect modern Native-newcomer rela
to developments in earlier periods.  Indeed, when considering period Aboriginal 
 
35 Ken Coates and Robin Fisher note how enormous gaps exist in the historiography of twentieth century 
 
win Publishing, 1998), 3. 
Native-newcomer relations.  Ken S. Coates and Robin Fisher, eds. Out of the Background: Readings on
Canadian Native Studies (Scarborough: Ir
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 perspectives and the full range of articulations of Aboriginal agency in this era, Sh
assertion that “the period of citizenship was characterized by the complete hegemony of 
the Canadian liberal state and market society” becomes increasingly difficult to justify.
ewell’s 
  
ena 
s to 
scholar  and 
the 
ps to 
an survival and resurgence, and the modern era of 
Aborig
current whether 
public  action 
to solv ervice 
36
Most Aboriginal people were undoubtedly marginalized from the decision-making ar
in this period, but this did not inhibit them from developing and discovering new way
use, manipulate, and even contravene administrative landscapes to serve their own 
survivalist interests.  Unfortunately, a number of assumptions perpetuated by recent 
ship—namely Aboriginal abstention from the political process prior to 1969
provincial non-involvement in Indian affairs—have been incorrectly projected onto 
post-WWII era. 
The history of Native/non-Native relations in the two decades after WWII hel
explain and contextualize Indi
inal rights, redress movements, and nation-to-nation protocols in which we 
ly live.  Many of those “historic” themes examined in previous pages, 
interest in Indian integration, consistent bureaucratic faith in administrative
e social and economic problems, or attempts to recruit the provinces as s
delivery agents of the federal government, continue today.  The 1990s emergence of the 
BC treaty process, for instance, has simultaneously elevated the importance of the 
province in Indian affairs while circumscribing its role to that of tertiary land and 
resource provision in treaty negotiations.  Contemporary intergovernmental strife is 
                                                 
36 See Hugh Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive’: Indian Welfare in C
University of Toronto Press, 2004), 331. 
anada, 1873-1965 (Toronto: 
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 another
comple e housing 
conditi  public 
disclosure of mould-related prenatal deaths and high rates of child apprehensions.37  
Disputes like this endure even though both BC and the federal government recently 
agreed in principle to put cost and jurisdictional considerations aside, and to provide 
services to children, youth, and their families solely on immediate need-based terms.38 
Recent events in Native-newcomer relations need to be seen from within a 
broadened historical framework, one accounting for provincial roles in post-WWII 
Native-newcomer history and all forms of Aboriginal agency.  Sto:lo Steven Point frames 
the events of the past forty years as part of a longer struggle for basic recognition of 
Aboriginal rights.  He notes: 
[In 1969] all that we were fighting for in those days was the recognition of 
the existence of Aboriginal rights.  We weren’t fighting for a treaty; we 
were saying because we don’t have a treaty, we still have Aboriginal 
rights. They haven’t been extinguished. … Right up until the time that 
B.C. came to the table to negotiate land claims, they said that B.C. didn’t 
have Aboriginal rights, that they were extinguished when they became a 
province. … By 1969 you have the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs being 
                                                
 carry-over from the post-WWII period.  At the time of this dissertation’s 
tion, debate erupted over the issue of responsibility for improving Nativ
ons on the Tsluquate reserve of northern Vancouver Island following the
 
37 See Prince George Citizen, “Who’s to Blame for Shoddy Homes,” 5 December 2008, 4; Times Colonist, 
“It’s Not up to B.C. to Fix Native Housing,” 9 December 2008, A10; Times Colonist, “NDP Weighs in on 
Housing Issue on Reserve,” 9 December 2008, A03. 
 
38 Jordan’s Principle stipulates that the needs of Aboriginal children, youth, and their families be placed 
ahead of jurisdictional disputes.  The principle is named after a northern Manitoba Aboriginal boy who 
spent two unnecessary years in hospital in Winnipeg before dying, while the federal and provincial 
governments argued over who should pay for his at-home care.  The House of Commons passed the 
principle as Private Member’s Motion 296 motion on 12 December 2007.  BC Premier Gordon Campbell 
declared support for the principle on 24 January 2008.  Gordon Campbell, “Jordan’s Principle: Check 
against Delivery,” (Speech by Premier Gordon Campbell delivered 24 January 2008); First Nations Child 
and Family Caring Society of Canada, “Jordan’s Principle Fact Sheet,” 
<http://www.fncfcs.com/docs/JordansPrincipleFactSheet.pdf> (Accessed 10 December 2008). 
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 formed to fight for Aborigin heir primary purpose, just 
the fight for fishing rights, for hunting rights, for land rights. To get our 
rights recognized again. But B.C oing, “we don’t recognize 
your rights.” They wouldn’t even talk to us about it. So these 
’t get anyone to talk to them!  
dging by governments’ growing recognition of Aboriginal rights into the 1970s, the 
actions of Aboriginal people in the post-war period profoundly reshaped Native-
                
al rights. That was t
. was still g
organizations in those days weren’t talking about treaties because they 
couldn 39
Today, the BC and federal governments are talking with First Nations about treaties.  
Ju
newcomer relations moving into the modern era. 
                                 
 Steven Point. 39 Interview with
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 APPENDIX A 
 
Indian Affairs Branch Budget, 1944/5 – 1964/5 (Current Dollars, Millions) 
 
 
Source: Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, ndian Affairs Branch, Annual Reports, 1945-1949; 
Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, dian Affairs Branch, Annual Reports, 1950-1965. 
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APPENDIX B 
BC Indian Population, 1934 – 1969 
 
ource: Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Reports, 1935-1949; 
anada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Reports, 1950-1965; 
anada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Reports,1967-1969. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Indian Affairs Branch Program 
Social Assistance Program 
1962/1963 – 1967/1968 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Canada, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Annual Report, 1967-68, 77. 
